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WHITEHEAD'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

by

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A dissertation presented to the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

June, 1971

Saint Louis, Missouri

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PREFACE

The ultimate value of Whitehead's work, like Plato's, may well rest with its rich suggestiveness rather than with the details of its particular conclusions. Thus while Whitehead's fundamental outlook seems to retain a high degree of consistency throughout his career, there continually emerges a wide range of variation in the conclusions of those who would represent his views.

Part of this is due to poor scholarship, involving the oversimplification of complex thought and the emphasis of the part to the detriment of the whole. However, an equal or greater part is due to Whitehead's conception of speculative philosophy as a "lure" or stimulus for conceptual activity. The result is a mode of expression infused at every point with catholicity of reference yet so concrete that, in his own terms, it constitutes a "real potential" for diverse yet viable understandings.

The attempt to elicit Whitehead's moral philosophy is by no means exempt from the advantages, and disadvantages, of his style. In particular, I offer here a reading of Whitehead which differs considerably from previous efforts to present his ethical insights. Yet with respect to the better of these, no explicit rejection or condemnation is intended. Emergent differences in results perhaps reflect

primarily the authors' differences of emphasis in approach. The scholarly debate then becomes only the question of which rendition may most plausibly be taken as reflecting Whitehead's own sense of importances.

In undertaking this exegesis of Whitehead's ethical views, I had originally thought to concentrate upon their development in detail, employing minimal reference to his metaphysics. It is a tribute to the coherence of his work that I have found myself continually frustrated in this endeavor. The result might best be described as a metaphysical theory of value examined from the perspective of its moral dimension. Although projections are made as to the structure of the "ethical science" envisioned by Whitehead, its detailed development would be a less scholarly and more originative enterprise best left for another occasion.

Here I devote considerable attention to clarifying Whitehead's distinctions between science, art, religion, and morality, taken as four basic categories under which civilized human behavior can be more or less adequately subsumed. Whitehead's distinctions between the last three have been rather hopelessly confused in the various examinations of his value theory. In applying his metaphysical notions to the interpretation of concrete phenomena, Whitehead employs various perspectives of analysis. These perspectives do not have the status of "categories" in his metaphysical system but constitute an independent and somewhat more conventional isolation of phenomena to be illuminated by the system.

XUM

Within it, they take on a subordinate role in terms of its application. It is fully conceivable that other categories than these four might be drawn from Whitehead's works and utilized with equal effectiveness. However, the interpretation which I develop follows a train of thought that is so recurrent throughout Whitehead's later works that one cannot escape the conviction that this particular fourfold analysis of human behavior was a dominant theme in his thought, even if never developed in explicit detail. Thus while I concentrate upon presenting what can definitely be attributed to Whitehead rather than on developing an ethical theory based upon his work, nevertheless there has been some compromise of scholarly rigor insofar as I attempt to bring out what appears to be a consistent line of thought occasionally lost in the wanderings of his fertile imagination.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
PREFACE		ii
ABBREVIATIONS		vii
Chapter		
1.	INTRODUCTION: THE ETHICAL ENTERPRISE	1
	PURPOSE	1
	PROCEDURE AND CONTENT	4
	META-PHILOSOPHY	7
	PROSPECTS	38
2.	MORAL AND AESTHETIC SYSTEMS	51
	ETHICS AND AESTHETICS	51
	POINTS OF CRITICISM	77
	POSITIVE ANTICIPATIONS	81
3.	THE MORAL PROCESS	92
	VALUE	92
	Elements of Morality	92
	Creative Values	97
	Importance	112
	Emotion	120
	Valuation	127
	Evaluation	134
	THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS	138
	Society	138
	Individual Consciousness	143
	Moral Instincts	149
	Practical and Theoretic Reason	157
	Moral Responsibility	165
	Moral Designs	183
	Good and Evil	195
	Religion and Morality	205

Chapter		Page
4.	DERIVATIONS	214
	MORAL INTENTIONS	214
	In Conclusion	214
	Moral Values	215
	Moral Decisions	221
	MORAL SITUATIONS AND MORAL ORDER	238
	MORAL SCIENCE	253
APPENDIX		261
BIBLIOGRAPHY		265

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used to facilitate economy of reference in footnotes; editions are indicated in the bibliography.

AE: The Aims of Education and Other Essays

AI: Adventures of Ideas

FR: The Function of Reason

"I": "Immortality"

"MG": "Mathematics and the Good"

MT: Modes of Thought

PR: Process and Reality

RM: Religion in the Making

SMW: Science and the Modern World

XUM

If Hamlet from himself be ta'en away,
And when he's not himself, does wrong Laertes,
Then Hamlet does it not, Hamlet denies it.
Who does it, then? His madness. If't be so,
Hamlet is of the faction that is wrong'd . . .

(Act V, Scene II)

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: THE ETHICAL ENTERPRISE

> . . . Unfortunately life is an offensive, directed against the repetitious mechanism of the Universe. It is the thesis of this discussion that a policy of sociological defense is doomed to failure.[1]

> . . . In ethical ideals we find the supreme example of consciously formulated ideas acting as a driving force effecting transitions from social state to social state.[2]

PURPOSE

I am here concerned with the extraction and reconstruction of Whitehead's personal contribution to the ethical enterprise. However, no attempt is made to carry articulation of the moral content down to the level of an adequate instrument for concrete moral decisions. There are several reasons for this: initially, it would be folly to hold that Whitehead offers such, and I am here attempting primarily to present Whitehead's own position. Depending upon perspective, Whitehead's moral philosophy may be regarded as an effort either to characterize the essentials of any system of moral behavior or to lay down a foundation for the development of moral theories and their codified

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[1] AI, p. 87. [2] Ibid., p. 25.

applications. At the same time, it cannot simply be regarded as a normatively neutral "meta-ethics" insofar as there are elements in it which operate to determine the substantive content of derivative theory. There is a concrete value in these generic elements, even for immediate moral decision, but their operation at the personal level must be taken as an informally suggestive conceptual apparatus awaiting formal development for effective fulfillment.

One element in Whitehead's moral philosophy is the tenet that the derivation of its particular applications and systems of moral practice may well be an indefinitely extensive task. This follows in part from the claim that the generic moral elements are subject to situational qualification. A basis of decision making is given but it makes no pretense to adequacy in presentation of the subordinate principles requisite to precision of application. Thus the development of Whitehead's view becomes the tendering of a long-range prospect, posing challenges as well as offering solutions. Attention is given to Whitehead's indication of the need for an ethical science, developing moral codes appropriate to limited contexts. These codes are to be special exemplifications of the general theory.

Given Whitehead's identification of ethical ideals as the paradigm of effective conceptual expression,[3] it is

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[3] Ibid.

arresting to note how little has been said of his ethical views in the extensive corpus of commentary on his work. In the major published expositions, there is hardly a single page exclusively devoted to his ethics.[4] Indeed, the most prevalent view is that this lacuna may be explained by the fact that he had none. Yet it hardly seems credible that a thinker of Whitehead's scope could have held ethical ideals to be of such significance while yet regarding them as beyond the range of his own philosophic concern. After all, Whitehead explicitly endorses Sidgwick's claim that:

> '. . . the primary aim of philosophy to unify completely . . . cannot be realised by any philosophy that leaves out of its view the important body of judgments . . . which form the subject matter of ethics.'[5]

In Understanding Whitehead, Victor Lowe charges that Whitehead develops a general theory of value, aesthetic in character, within which he subsumes ethics to aesthetics.[6]

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[4]Here I refer to Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962); William A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959); W. Mays, The Philosophy of Whitehead (N.Y.: Collier Books, 1962); Ivor LeClerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics (N.Y.: The Humanities Press, 1965); A.H. Johnson, Whitehead's Theory of Reality (N.Y.: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962); and A.H. Johnson, Whitehead's Philosophy of Civilization (N.Y.: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962). Among these only Lowe explicitly claims that Whitehead had no distinctive ethics. It is true that Johnson and Christian each devote three pages to the topic of "morality," but this is only incidental to other discussion in both cases and offers but random scraps of thought.

[5]SMW, p. 129, citing Henry Sidgwick, A Memoir, Appendix I.

[6]Infra, first section of Chapter Two.

XUM

P.A. Schilpp makes the same point, in a widely influential exposition of Whitehead's moral thought.[7] However, Schilpp further contends that even were it not for this "subordination," Whitehead's ethical views would be woefully inadequate. The general opinion that Whitehead's theory of value is reductionistic and the criticism presented by Schilpp have been major factors inhibiting students of Whitehead from making a more serious effort to develop his ethics. This fact has been influential in determining the form of the present dissertation. In it, I contend both that there is significant moral thought contained within Whitehead's works and that Schilpp's criticisms arise from a misunderstanding of major points in Whitehead's metaphysics.

The purpose of the dissertation may be summarized as follows: (1) to establish that there is a coherent and systematic moral philosophy contained within Whitehead's later writings; (2) to present an exposition of his views for the sake of clarifying popular misconceptions and answering criticisms leveled against them; (3) to repair the serious omissions of previous expositions; and (4) to establish that Whitehead's views have substantial philosophic value and are worthy of interest by contemporary moral philosophers.

PROCEDURE AND CONTENT

Were Whitehead's ethical views readily accessible,

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[7] Infra, first section of Chapter Two.

their existence would hardly be questioned. The problem of exposition is not simple and is further complicated by the ambiguity of the term 'ethics.' Philosophers variously employ it to refer to such diverse phenomena as formal meta-ethical theories and individual moral attitudes. In the next section of this opening chapter, I propose definitions of several central terms in value theory, including 'value theory' itself. Such a beginning is justifiable insofar as it establishes the nature of that which is sought in exposition while at the same time affording a basis for the critical evaluation of the emergent view. In this instance, the task is particularly relevant insofar as I contend that a contemporary and too-narrow conception of ethics is partially responsible for the charge that Whitehead has none. In the course of developing the definitions presented, I concentrate on re-examining several old issues involved in the question of whether moral discourse is cognitive in nature.

The final section of the first chapter presents a projection of the resultant theory, developed in relation to the distinctions drawn in the preceding section.

The second chapter critically examines previous expositions. Initially I argue, against Lowe and Schilpp, that Whitehead's use of aesthetic terminology neither necessarily precludes the presence of an adequate ethical theory nor commits him to the subordination of morality to aesthetics. Here I point out that Whitehead regards the

XUM

application of aesthetic terminology to moral concerns as metaphoric in the sense developed at the outset of Process and Reality. The demonstration that this usage is not reductionistic can only be fully completed in the exposition carried out in the third chapter. However, in order to establish that Whitehead's approach is not idiosyncratic, I briefly examine historical precedents which exhibit the common feature of closely relating aesthetic and ethical matters for reasons that are neither arbitrary nor obtuse. This section contributes a substantial illumination of dominant notions in Whitehead's position, without entering into detailed development.

The second section of this chapter presents the major criticisms posed by Schilpp, in developing his charges of inadequacy, and indicates what will be required to answer them, thereby projecting the structure of the third chapter. In the concluding section, I indicate areas of agreement and disagreement between my own interpretation of Whitehead and previous sympathetic interpretations.

Chapter Three presents the complete exposition. Aside from its didactic and dialectical functions, it also offers independent supportive argument for several central philosophic claims. For reasons which become obvious, the discussion proceeds through the following three major stages of presentation: development of the general theory of value, examination of the phenomenology of moral consciousness, and demonstration of the dependence of Whitehead's own humanistic

moral views upon his theory of moral value.

Whitehead's failure to address himself explicitly to writing an ethical text has necessitated gathering of materials from widely scattered sources. As a result, I have attempted to preserve accuracy by giving multiple references and avoiding the use of anomalous passages. Although reference is made to all Whitehead's later works, by far the bulk of the textual material is drawn from the first and final parts of Adventures of Ideas, the first half of Modes of Thought, and the lectures, "Immortality" and "Mathematics and the Good."

In the concluding chapter, I evaluate the soundness of Whitehead's position relative to the definitions developed in Chapter One. Further, the foundation which he provides for moral theory and practical morality is critically compared with several classic and contemporary alternatives. Finally, since the dissertation contends that the value of Whitehead's work is foundational, I offer a brief and rather speculative projection of what would be required for the development of ethical science from the basis afforded here.

META-PHILOSOPHY

One criterion which might be employed to distinguish philosophers from scientists is the amount of time which they spend talking about themselves. In particular, the justification of meta-theoretic claims is apt to become bogged down in meta-meta-theoretic issues. Being basically reflective

creatures, we are limited in our ability to depart into meta-irrelevance only by our capacity to sustain tedium. Such a regression arises when meta-theory is regarded as the specialized study of a particular theoretic subject matter, itself appropriate to a more abstract and specialized study. Occasionally, the attempt is made to plug the drain by appealing to the concept of "bare" analysis, as if meta-theory would be thereby freed of its own substantive content. Unfortunately, the concept of "bare" analysis is vacuous insofar as analysis is always "in terms of" some conceptual apparatus which is the result of an activity both temporally and genetically prior to the analytic determinations.

Similarly, the difficulty with a statement such as: "Philosophy makes no theoretic claims of its own" is that it makes both a philosophic and theoretic claim itself. I am aware of the reams which have been written about the escape from this predicament. Here I merely wish to point out that to close off the demand for justification by appealing to the notion that meta-theoretic statements express methodological conventions also settles nothing. If stress is placed upon the "conventional" character of such rules (whether of usage or practice) then the inquiry ends in arbitrariness. On the other hand, if stress is placed upon the well-foundedness of these conventions, then covert appeal is being made to the correctness of such procedures as exemplified in successful practice.

From this covert viewpoint, adopted overtly here, well-warranted statements of methodological rules are accurate characterizations of successful procedures. However, their warranty--qua meta-theory--is in their descriptive and interpretive accuracy relative to the procedures in question and not the practical justification of the described procedure itself. The latter is to be judged in terms of the results achieved relative to the goals of the practice. The pragmatic definition of truth intentionally blurs this distinction. I am here claiming that theoretic activities, relative to a meta-theoretic perspective, themselves comprise a domain of practice.[8] Further, I wish to hold that meta-theoretic claims about theoretic practices are verified by their own success in predicting the success of theoretic programs carried out in accord with themselves. Thus the cognitive success of the theoretic activity, relative to its own interests, has the status of a practical achievement--affording <u>evidence</u> for the cognitive claims of of the meta-theoretic descriptions and providing practical justification for appealing to these descriptions as prescriptive norms for the theoretic activity itself. In other words, meta-theory is the attempt to describe what we do when we do well in a definable area of cognitive actitity.

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[8] In one sense, this is simply an extension of pragmatism--suppressing the emphasis on overt behavior. It should be made clear that "theoretic activities" is intended to include the theoretic content as well.

I shall elaborate a bit further before developing and defending these claims.

There is no disagreement here with those who hold that philosophy is a meta-theoretic activity. However, the development of the concept is in many ways more traditional. Let us consider another approach which regards meta-theoretic claims as cognitive, its representatives attempt to cut off the meta-theoretic regression by the appeal to "logic" as the only conceptual tool of analysis, with all theoretic discourse falling beneath its sway. But the problem always remains of justifying the logical notions themselves. Moreover, such analyses often seem to involve the attribution of an extra-logical semantics to the connectives employed in analysis.[9]

But this appeal to logical analysis may be interpreted as the appeal to a higher level of generality in order to avoid absolute specialization ad infinitum. This solution may also be invoked if meta-theory is conceived as having a substantive content of its own. But given both a substantive and a cognitive conception of meta-theory, the problem of justifying meta-theoretic notions may then be resolved by an appeal to fact. The "facts" involve both the theoretic activity considered--including its conceptual

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[9]Excellent examples are R.M. Hare's practical analogue of affirmation in The Language of Morals and J.L. Austin's concept of "authorization" implicit in claims to certainty in "Other Minds" and elsewhere.

tools--and an independent appeal to that which it purports to interpret. This "independent appeal" must be achieved through the analytic determination of the phenomenon in question by means of conceptual variables more general than those of the object theory. In particular, the meta-theory must have concepts capable of interpreting the investigative methodology and interpretive activity of the object enterprise as well as its data.

Much of this section is comprised by the development of this notion of meta-theory. Although my ultimate purpose is to provide definitions of certain terms relevant to value theory, the justification of these definitions is dependent on the concept of meta-theory itself. Further, I argue that the general theory of value has a meta-theoretic status relative to such areas as aesthetics and ethics. Finally, the most controversial claim to be made is that ethical theory is not only a cognitive activity but also has a descriptive content of its own. I have attempted below to argue this claim by tracing non-cognitivism in both meta-theoretic-methodological considerations and value-theoretic considerations to a common origin in a confused handling of the theory-practice dichotomy. My point with respect to the descriptive content of ethics is made in the course of this discussion. The result is a compromise--the sketch of an argument, since the full presentation would

require a separate dissertation.[10]

* * *

From a doctor's standpoint as a medical scientist, the treatment which he prescribes to his patient has the status of a description of procedures which he predicts will lead to the patient's health. If they do not, then he is only shown to be in error but the patient is dead. The practical and theoretic implications of the procedure differ substantially. One presupposition of the prediction is that the procedures which it describes will in fact be exemplified within the behavior of the patient. From the standpoint of the patient, whose interests are far more practical, the doctor's descriptions function as rules. Their practical authority is derivative from the fact that the patient values his health and has faith in the doctor's knowledge of that which he values together with the means to obtain it. That is to say, the practical authority of the doctor's procedures is derivative in part from the aim of the patient and in part from the doctor's position as medically knowledgeable, an "authority" in the theoretic sense. From the theoretic viewpoint, this aim will have only the

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[10]Moreover, the treatment anticipates the main body of this dissertation in some particulars. Although I believe the views developed here do not significantly differ from Whitehead's, they have been derived from independent considerations and are as much influenced by Marx, Leibnitz, and Butler, as by Whitehead himself.

XUM

status of a consequence which--for cognitive purposes--will be almost as valuable if it fails to result as if it does result. When experimentally oriented physicians attempt to reassure their patients by mentioning this fact, the result is occasionally an ex-patient. The critical difference is one of perspective.

Considerable confusion may result from the fact that doctors are also practitioners of medicine. It is in this role that they are more reassuring to their patients. Here, their predictive claims take on prescriptive force relative to their own behavior. But they do so only insofar as the doctor enters into the perspective of the patient by way of sharing concern for the patient's health. It does not matter whether the concern is direct or only instrumental to an external interest. The point is that they have prescriptive force for the doctor only relative to his aim to serve the patient's interest. However, the doctor does not confuse himself with the patient. Philosophers are less acute in their distinctions.

Admittedly the distinctions are more subtle when the practice in question is itself a theoretic activity. Much philosophic confusion has been wrought by the fact that from the perspective within which values are valued and rules rule, they guide immediate activities of our own--indescribable by virtue of their immediacy and indeterminacy. On the other hand, from the detached standpoint within which they can be described they are either not actively being

XUM

valued or are at least hypothetically "disarmed" and thus, strictly speaking, are no longer our own immediate activities. They thus appear as mere facts. From an external perspective, one man's activities and accomplishments become another man's procedural data and consequences, even when they are our own from a reflective perspective. For example, the full meaning of a proposition is a method of verification only if it is a proposition about methods of verification. In this case it may express a rule exemplified in practice but cannot, at the same time and in the same sense, be ruled by it. Unfortunately, it is characteristic of the Humian tradition to answer questions about that which we know with statements about the means by which we know it.

The isolation of fact and value in the Humian tradition, together with Moore's perplexity over the vanishing good, can both be understood in terms of the notion that matters of value are matters of fact but not on the same level of discourse and not in respect of the same function of theory. It follows from the view being developed that to translate "Killing is bad" as equivalent to "I disapprove of killing. Do so likewise," is logically equivalent to translating "Oxygen is colorless" as "I do not see oxygen. Do so likewise." Each substitutes for the proposition a reason for believing that it is true and invokes the appeal to immediate appearances as a rule governing further expectations. The appeal to appearances is unquestionably one

ultimate guide of cognitive activity. However, appearances can be deceiving. We correct them by appealing to a broader perspective of appearance or to a theoretic ground for the interpretation of experience. I may correct the visual impression that a stick is bent in water by appealing to a viewpoint including the sense of touch or by invoking the theory of refraction. Similarly, I may modify my moral impressions of an individual either by appealing to experience of his actions in a broader range of circumstances, i.e., placing them in a new perspective, or by appealing to general standards of conduct.

In particular, neither of the above translations are acceptable because: (1) Even if we accept a phenomenalistic interpretation of the meaning of the proposition, we are not interested only in how things appear to us, here and now, but how they will appear from other perspectives in other circumstances. A scientist does not assert that "it seems to me that oxygen is colorless now." The normative function of the evidence, relative to theory, suffers from its narrow base. (2) Non-phenomenalistically, these translations replace a statement of what we claim about the potentialities of the object with a statement about one of our own perceptual achievements in relation to it--obscuring thereby the dependency of the accomplishment upon both subject and object (i.e., visibility and vision, moral value and moral sensitivity).[11]

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[11]Of course, what is meant by "moral sensitivity"

The Humian attribution of arbitrariness to an "inner experience" and primitive givenness to an "outer and sensory experience" is itself quite unempirical. For instance, we often heartily wish that we could shut off our consciences as easily as we close our eyes. Moreover, from the standpoint within which we cognitively peruse our feelings of value, they are neither more nor less "active" than any other experience and, as datum, no less external to the immediate perspective. This is to say that while I may verbally decide to approve or to see whatever I choose, whether or not I succeed is another matter. In An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume stresses the activity of feeling whereby this

> . . . productive faculty . . . gilding or staining all natural objects with the colors borrowed from internal sentiment raises, in a manner, a new creation.[12]

However, it is a matter of empirical fact that my visual perception is no less a subject of active modification. A constant process of focus, attention, and selection is involved in the act of seeing. Moreover, I find it less difficult in many ways to modify the specific content of visual perception than to modify my own specific emotional feelings toward a certain individual.[13] I do however, like

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remains to be shown.

[12]David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Charles W. Hendel (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1957), p. 112.

[13]This point does not seem so obvious to either

most of us, devote far more effort and attention to modification of the latter than the former. Feelings, taken as a datum, are inert--like visual perceptions--since they are past events; but they cannot be taken as a datum from the same perspective within which they are actively felt, neither can acts of vision.

There are far too many interrelated problems involved here to pursue them thoroughly. But there is a point which must be made in respect of the categorical distinction of fact and value, as well as theory and practice. It depends upon the claim that from the immediate perspective within which we act and value, we grasp our objects as indeterminate potentialities while cognition can grasp them

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Stevenson or Hare, although Stevenson is quite careful in recognizing the extra-linguistic factors involved. Hare, however, in asserting that ultimate decisions of principle are arbitrary seems to confuse the freedom of merely verbal behavior, wherein we can make an arbitrary and purely verbal decision, with concrete practical decisions which must be forged within a context of well-founded practice. As a matter of fact, decisions of principle that are purely verbal are widely recognized as comprising a species of morally deplorable conduct, i.e., hypocrisy, "cheap talk," etc. Concrete decisions of principle can be dealt with adequately only through appeal to the psychological context within which the symbols are endowed with meaning. For example, Hare's analysis of imperatives presupposes a context of solicited advice. Consider the different meanings and functions which attach to imperatives in contexts of unsolicited advice. Surely most moral judgments, expressed to others, fall within this latter category. To interpret decisions of principle in terms of the features of merely verbal decisions is roughly equivalent to interpreting the genesis and structure of ordinary language in terms of the stipulative construction of an ideal model. Both are equally misleading and involve the same misinterpretation of the nature of well-founded rules.

only as determinate facts or determinate projections. However, the conclusion that evaluative concerns are non-cognitive results from the failure accurately to distinguish facts about valuation from the valuing of fact itself. The claim that facts about valuings are not the valuings themselves no more implies that value is inaccessible to knowledge than does the claim that facts about the moon are not the moon imply that the moon is inaccessible to knowledge.

Basically, there are two foremost ways in which I can justify the claim that something is valuable: by the appeal to the fact that it is valued (and the appeal to this fact should not be confused with the valuing to which the appeal is made) or by appeal to interpretation in terms of a theoretic framework within which I am led to expect that something will be valuable under appropriate circumstances. Unfortunately, philosophers have confused the justification of this theoretic claim with the practical justification of the valuings themselves. Value theory has seesawed back and forth from the overemphasis of one of these factors to the other.

This confusion is understandable insofar as the moral theorist attempts to fit moral practices within a framework of interpretation constructed in the effort to express that which he "finds" exemplified within moral phenomena. Morality, insofar as it is informed by theory, then seeks to exemplify these interpretations. Moral theories are peculiarly endowed with the qualities of self-fulfilling

prophecies. In respect of verification, the successful practice justifies the theory. However, moral theories have varying success. The concept of a success, as opposed to that of a mere "result," involves the notion of a contrast between aim and achievement. The aims of the practice, characterized by the theory, must either be self-justifying from the practical viewpoint or else be justified in terms of that which is self-justifying, external to the practical viewpoint. Thus the justification of morality, as opposed to moral theory, must either be in terms of non-moral values--independently entertained--or else in terms of an appeal to the agent as himself already accepting a moral perspective. In other words, when asked "Why should I be moral?" I may give a non-moral reply--or else answer with a theory which explains how the individual is, in fact, already engaged in moral practice and how the effectiveness of that practice may be enhanced. (I.e., I may offer answers that either tell him why he should do what he is not doing--in terms relevant to his present perspective--or else answers that tell him how he can do what he is already doing, but better. Again, it is generally acknowledged that the moral viewpoint appears self-justifying only from the moral point of view. Less often acknowledged, in recent literature, is the possibility of degrees of effectiveness in moral practice.) In either event, the first determinant of the effectiveness of any moral theory will be its success in giving definition to that which is valuable to the

individual. In one of its most common meanings, moral philosophy is just the search for a meaning of 'human life' that is adequate to all the meanings within human life.

Theoretic intensions express practical intentions, whether of overt behavior or acts of interpretation. As such they define the aims of practice as well as its methods. The major objection to definitions that are purely stipulative is that they are likely to be totally irrelevant to anything. On the other hand, if they are relevant, then their relevance is derivative from some source other than the mere act of stipulation. Admittedly, defining is a business of constructs. But it is carried out in a process of struggle, shifting from the effort to isolate that which is being defined back to effort at re-definition--each end of the process contributing determination to the other and compounding the difficulty. Definitions of real importance are neither wholly matters of fiat nor wholly matters of fact.

It is a commonplace that every predicate, at one time or another, is employed both evaluatively and descriptively. The investigation of the systematic character of this dual function of language has been inhibited by the belief that such usage is fortuitous and the conviction that evaluative terms comprise some special sub-category of vocabulary. Mill's famous dictum, "The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it" has been called a "pun," a

"fallacy," etc. He is said to have "confused" the value term "desirable" with the descriptive term "desirable" as expressing a natural potentiality. However, I see no obvious reason to assume that he was confused in this manner. His other examples show quite clearly that he thought he was, in fact, talking about the capacity to be desired. Mill's error was one of order, not equivocation. Its explanation also resolves the Hedonistic Paradox as a similar confusion of orders. The Hedonistic Paradox expresses the claim that men do what they do for the sake of happiness yet must aim at something other than happiness to secure it. The confusion results from the fact that the realization of the object of an aim is experienced as a satisfaction (Butler's dictum, "A desire enjoys its object"). The experience of the enjoyment is the means by which we verify the achievement of the aim. But the perspective from which we verify the achievement is a theoretic perspective within which we attempt to <u>identify</u> it. It is not the same perspective as that of the practical fulfillment. It is for this reason that quite often when we are un-selfconsciously immersed in an activity, we must pause to ask ourselves reflectively whether we are enjoying it and what it is about it that we enjoy. But the conscious identification of the valuing is not the immediate valuing. From this perspective, the enjoyment itself becomes the object of a second-order desire, issuing in subtler satisfactions. We may thus confuse the identity of the satisfying object or objects of

which we are initially aware with the satisfying awareness whereby we know of them.[14] The next step is to confuse the desire for the object with the desire for the awareness itself.

There remains only the identification of each satisfaction under a generic concept of satisfactory feeling, such as pleasure, and the ignoring or denying of the specific characteristics of our various sorts of satisfaction and its individual instances. Bentham commits this error in its extreme and more common logical form when he confuses the "sort" of awareness involved with the individual awareness itself--treating pleasure as some one individual thing present in all of our satisfactions and varying only in quantity. Mill almost avoids this error entirely insofar as he recognizes specific differences in happiness and even goes so far as to say that the particular object of desire is "part of"[15] the happiness--thereby virtually acknowledging the uniqueness of each enjoyment, and each object to its aim. However, he still seems to persist in holding that the object is desired for the sake of the satisfaction rather than for its own sake, as if the realization of the aim itself were not an instance of satisfaction but merely a means to it.

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[14]Again confusing what we know with how we know it.

[15]John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Oskar Piest (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1957), pp. 46ff.

Such a conclusion could be reached only from the reflective perspective within which the valuing of the original object appears as a mere means to a result, rather than itself as an active value. The "first-order" valuing of the object, which as an active process is necessarily indeterminate, is then reduced to the "second-order" valuing of the determinate outcome of the process which is the specific feeling by means of which we are aware of what we have accomplished. Mill himself asserts of any object (other than happiness) that is desired for its own sake, that we desire it

> . . . either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain . . . .[16]

This is a perfect example of confusing the valuing of the object, as a positive experience, with the valuing of the reflective consciousness of that experience and attributing the satisfaction found in the former to that actively being taken in the latter. Again, in Mill's own words, such a result ". . . can only be determined by practiced self-consciousness . . . ."[17] Insofar as this recognitory process itself involves an active valuing, it also possesses indeterminacy. But the object at which it aims and which it determines is an awareness which has only a symbolic relationship to the original attainment. All fallacies of

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[16] Ibid., p. 48; italics not in the original.

[17] Ibid., p. 49.

logical order derive from the confusion of our symbols with that which they symbolize. I am here suggesting that, at least in this regard, they are predicated upon a confusion of epistemological and ontological order. Insofar as such symbols are not mere acts of indexical reference, they comprise variables with a range of values extending beyond any single instance.[18] Logical fallacies become value theoretic errors when we attribute the valuing of an instance to the valuing of the variable of which it is an instance and in respect of which we attempt to identify it, distinguishing them while attributing the value of the former to the latter. The variable in question may be either a verbal or non-verbal concept.

Explanation moves from the general to the specific, seeking exemplifications of theoretic variables. Practical justification is either given in the immediate valuing or else must involve the appeal to exemplification of that which is only theoretically valuable and valued. From the purely symbolic perspective, the active valuing of that which is symbolized is lost (or at least set to one side, since we are not so simple-minded). Practical activities appear as mere emotional and behavioral data. The Hedonistic Paradox is the confusion of the valuing of happiness as

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[18] Of course, as given in experience these variables are variable only as actively related to other factors in experience. Taken as objects in themselves, they are individual. But this is from still another perspective.

the symbolic consciousness of desire in process of satisfaction with the valuing of the primitive objects of desire. This is a relative distinction, since what is primitive on one level of experience may be derivative from another. It is this which lies behind the ontological dichotomization of fact and value but it has been confused with a further hierarchical complication involving what Moore called the "Naturalistic Fallacy." But Moore partially misplaces the blame since the real problem is one of reduction, having been recognized ever since Plato and Aristotle explicitly dealt with it. There are three traditional forms of this fallacy: (1) attributing to the particular only the characteristics of the generic; (2) attributing to the generic the characteristics of one individual instance; and (3) attributing the characteristics of one specific sort to another, rendering it generic.[19]

We never demand the justification of that which is valued from the same practical perspective and level of generality within which it is valued. We are, at least hypothetically, in a position of reflective detachment towards it. Thus men have traditionally insisted upon the importance of a passionate commitment to what is valued but a dispassionate judgment of what is to be valued. The phrase "to be valued" expresses the object as a mere potentiality

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[19] As employed here, the terms 'generic' and 'specific' are not intended to imply any strict Aristotelian conception of genus and species.

for valuing apart from its being valued--as such it is only a theoretic possibility. The word, 'valuable,' expresses both this theoretic sense of "capable of being valued" and the practical sense of "indeterminate object of an immediate and active valuing." If the objects of our aims and needs were always self-justifying and obvious there would be no practical appeal to theory. At the same time, if our theories were always self-evident there would be no need for the appeal to practical objectives. It is the effort to reconcile the gap between our apparent and actual aims which validates the practical claims of reason.

The non-naturalism of Moore seems to reflect his persistent belief that predicates of value comprise some special set of identifications within the broader wealth of language. However, it is not by chance that words like 'meaning' and 'significance' have both a logical function in respect of our concepts and a practical function in respect of our valuings. It could hardly be put better than in Quine's slogan "To be is to be the value of a variable." But "being" belongs to the order of logic and "becoming" to the order of immediate practice. Thus logical variables determine the being of values in the effort to express the potentialities inherrent in the becoming of active valuations. The reason that value cannot be derived from fact is that the concern with fact is a type of valuation from which

"facts" themselves are derivative.[20] All theoretic claims express determinations of value but not all valuings are theoretic. However, the range of 'value' being greater than that of 'fact' by no means precludes the ability to determine the facts of individual "values" or "valuings." The domain of value has been lost at that point where Hume isolates the activity of that which we observe from the determinate object of observation, postulating for it the role of an independent agency. Foremost among his examples are judgments passed upon the activities of others. Such "given examples" have the great practical disadvantage of having been done and not "doing." Much of this is implicit in the two commonsensical recognitions that the potential scope of our ambitions always lies outside our present dreams and accomplishments and that immediate experience is far richer in detail and potential than the wealth of all our concepts.

Ideal standards are theoretic grasps for this potential. As valued, they are contrasts with given achievements. From a theoretic posture, they are mere ideas, facts of consciousness, in opposition to more concrete data. It is from within this posture that Moore points out that given any

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[20] 'Facts,' as employed in this instance, would refer to either that which is determined by the practice of theoretic interpretation, or that which is taken as epistemologically primitive in the manner of Quine's relative analytic statements, or Margenau's "p-plane." They comprise a subcategory of facts where 'facts' is employed to mean the "determinate outcome of activity."

complex offered in definition of 'good,' it is always possible to ask, "is it good?"[21] This question can only be answered, "yes, it seems so" from a concrete practical perspective of enjoyment (Moore's naturalist), or "yes, it ought to be" from an accepted theoretic perspective of explanation (Moore's metaphysician), or "maybe not" from a hypothetical vantage point of differing scope than that expressed by the theoretic ideal or from a more detailed discrimination amid the variety of values. In making this point, which involves an issue that is really independent of his claim about the definability of 'good,' Moore is repeatedly taking advantage of our ability to step outside of any practical perspective and demand justification in terms of that which is external to it. The demand for justification of any claim is itself a meta-theoretic act.

Unlike the doctor and his patient, ethicists often seem to confuse their moral theorizing with moralizing. Their criticisms of Mill correctly point out that many of our desires are undesirable but then proceed to charge that his dictum confuses the naturalistic meaning of 'desirable' with its evaluative meaning. But while a criticism is in order, this one is not to the point. Here I would contend that such individuals themselves are likely to be confusing the morally desirable, which is a species of value, with the

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[21] G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 15.

generic identity of value and, in practice, pre-empting the concept of value to its moral sphere. Such a confusion is both logical and ontological. Mill himself does not commit it, at least overtly. The Utilitarian definition of moral value appeals not merely to the objects of the individual's own desire but to the objects of desire for the greatest number. Mill would surely be among the last to suggest that it is the mere desirability of a thing which comprises its moral value. It is, in fact, what is desirable to others--including the present individual on future occasions--that is stressed by the Utilitarian in defining moral value. Surely few would deny that the morally desirable or valuable is distinct from the non-morally desirable. However, this is no basis for asserting that the non-morally desirable is not valuable in its own right, which is the claim implicitly made by those who charge Mill with equivocation of descriptive and evaluative usages.

I contend below[22] that the mere immediate desiring of an object is the fundamental empirical proof only of its being <u>aesthetically</u> valuable to me. To claim on that basis that it is desirable without qualification presupposes that my own immediate experience is sufficient to determine the potentialities of the object from other perspectives and in other contexts, to other individuals and on other occasions.

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[22]Cf. the first section of Chapter Two and the main body of Chapter Three.

XUM

Without invoking a broader range of support, empirical or theoretic, my claim is apt to be reductionistic and false, even from a purely aesthetic viewpoint. But this is a cognitive failure. Another factor contributing to the fact-value dichotomy is the failure to give proper relational qualification to the predicates employed in our judgments, thereby leaving others to find them irrelevant and judge them non-cognitive.

I further contend that the perspective within which every predicate is intrinsically a value term (expressing the fulfillment of a potential for its own sake) is fundamentally an aesthetic perspective. The moral perspective, relative to which the morally valuable is to be determined, is at once more narrow and more broad. It is more narrow in the sense of rejecting as adequate to moral value that which is desirable only for the sake of my own immediate satisfaction. It is more broad in the sense that it involves an explicit concern for what is valuable to others, including my future self. The moral perspective is distinguished by the rational desire for sociable objects. Like aesthetic judgments, moral judgments of value may range in context from the most individually relevant to the most general. Unfortunately, we again tend to make our judgments universal, intentionally or inadvertently, through the failure to qualify our predicates. In a nutshell, purely aesthetic aims and values are self-fulfilling while moral aims and values are self-transcending. Only with this special

qualification carefully drawn can morality be regarded as self-realization.

These qualifications are never clearly dealt with by Mill. Perhaps they involve an adventure into the ontology of experience that is too speculative for his inductive tastes. In any event, in Utilitarianism it is by his famous fallacy of collection that he moves from the concern of the individual for his own happiness to a concern with the happiness of society--rather than by any adequate analysis of the growth of the "fellow-feelings" which he invokes elsewhere. I have included the speculative assertions of the preceding two paragraphs only to suggest an approach to specifying the characteristics of two basic sorts of evaluative activity. They are not directly relevant to the metatheoretic arguments and conclusions of this section.

I have argued against non-cognitivism by sketching elements of an explanation of its origins in a specific confusion. As one implication of the notion that statements about value are statements about activities in the world, I hold that a general theory of value must make explicit ontological commitments or be so vague, in the attempt to leave its ontological options open, that it runs the risk of irrelevance. From the vantage point of historical retrospect, with developed languages and formal systems, we can make analytic claims about our concepts--one such being that they are ultimately analytic. To place fundamental importance on such claims is to ignore the tedious origination of

symbolic variables in the effort to express immediate insights and concrete experience, insights into relationships as well as more substantive notions. Theoretic interpretation determines what is given in experience as the value of a variable, biological, physical, ethical, logical, or otherwise. Practical application determines the value of our theoretic variables in respect of their concrete relevance.

In this sense, philosophy is a practical activity insofar as it critically seeks to preserve in our theoretic constructs the fundamental meanings inherent in the richness of experience. Oddly, but not paradoxically, it must do so through the search for notions sufficiently general to interpret immediate factors given in experience, while at the same time interpreting the selective interpretations imposed by our several theoretic interests. With regard to these latter, philosophy takes as subject to analysis what they take as primitive. Philosophy is both theoretical and meta-theoretical and insofar as philosophers disavow adequacy at the outset, constantly studying their own insufficiencies, philosophy serves as its own meta-philosophic judge.

Moral philosophy differs from natural philosophy only insofar as the latter is concerned with the interpretation of the most common processes in nature, seen as operating independently of the intervention of more limited and complex evaluative activities. Insofar as human nature is part of nature, moral philosophy is a species of natural

XUM

philosophy concerned with interpretation of the world as subject to the processes of evaluation. At the same time, it is more broad in its interest since it presupposes natural philosophy yet criticizes its presuppositions in respect of the added considerations relevant to its own special domain. Thus moral philosophy must deal at once with natural processes as independent of evaluative consciousness and evaluative consciousness as that element in nature which transcends the operation of blind impulse to impose its values on the world--for better or worse.

The general theory of value is philosophic only in respect of its generality and the fact that it serves a meta-theoretic function relative to subordinate areas of explanation. It is simply the attempt to construct a conceptual apparatus adequate to interpretation of the most general features of all evaluative activity, determining the generic character of value and at the same time specifying the scope and values pertinent to more specific areas of concern such as ethics and aesthetics. It does not actively evaluate these relative to each other. Its attitude is detached and theoretic, determining differences and mutual relations. The data which it attempts to explain must embrace both the evaluative activities of individuals in practice as well as the activities of value theorists in subordinate special areas. Thus, for example, it is the attempt to interpret the generic character of morality and specify the concerns of moral theorists, to interpret the

generic character of aesthetic experience and specify the concerns of aestheticians. Relative to the latter in each case, it does serve a direct regulative function while to the former its service is indirect and derivative. Ethics and aesthetics, among other theoretic domains, comprise the practical range of the general theory of value.

In general, there is no reason why ethics or aesthetics cannot be pursued independently of grounding in a general theory of value. For the main, they have been. Indeed, the insights of such specific investigations provide much of the substance of a general theory of value. However, the general theory, by virtue of its overview, seeks to repair the inadequacies and rectify the growth into irrelevance of the specialized areas of interest. Theoretic ethics in the twentieth century has become specialized and piecemeal almost to the point of despair.

Although specifying the function of ethical theory is itself a function of the theory of value still to be presented, there are some general points which can be made. Clearly an ethical theory must be more immediately concerned with what is conventionally conceived to be the practical than is the general theory of value. Its interpretations of phenomena and situations must be adequate for enabling us to determine what to <u>do</u>. Thus the concepts afforded to ethical theory by a general theory of value must be such as to be applicable, with adaptation, to the resolution of concrete moral problems as well as the explanation of the nature and

origin of these problems.[23] Similarly, the best test of the meta-ethical theory itself will be its resolution of

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[23]There is one final illustration to be made here of how the practical perspective takes its objects as indeterminate while the theoretic takes them as determinate and how this fosters the dichotomizing of fact and value. Namely, insofar as moral judgments determine what is to be done, they describe that which is not yet done and might not be done. They explicitly deal with possibilities or at least that which is seen as possible relative to the practical perspective. Thus when passing judgment upon our own past actions or the actions of others, we stress the importance of "putting ourselves in his place" and asking ourselves, "What would we have done? What could we have done?" This is the direct contradiction of Hume's repeated claim that, in moral judgments, we judge only when the "facts are all in." Indeed, when they are, we have to act as if they were not.

Yet surely cognitive claims as to what <u>is</u> the case are no less assertions about the potentialities of a given object in the future based upon its present performance (i.e., statements about what ought to be found to be the case, other things being held constant). Thus I am contending that the difference between the predictive use of 'ought' and the imperatival use is only that of acknowledging human potentialities as among the elements in nature determining future events. Unfortunately, moral deontologists have set man outside of nature and attempted to attribute to moral principles the same compulsive status that scientists have attributed to their descriptions--namely that of universal laws.

In utilizing his complex capacities, man reforms nature--including himself--for better or worse. The principles which we regard as "ideal" reformative agencies are facts of operative consciousness. The less they serve the symbolic function of describing facts of human achievement, the less likely they are to be effective and the less likely to express real human capacities. Thus the stress upon the universal in moral principles results in our treating as irrelevant what is of the essence to moral relevance. Similarly, the contemporary analytic emphasis upon moral discourse has carried a de-emphasis of the importance of concrete moral exemplars. As Aristotle recognized, practical morality is most likely to be achieved through the imitation of a moral individual. Without such examples, or when they fail us, we tend toward cynicism. But this is only to suggest again, as I did at the outset, that "well-warranted statements of methodological rules are characterizations of successful procedures."

traditional problems in ethical theory and the explanation of phenomena of general concern to ethicists.

Among these must be included the egoism-altruism conflict, the subjectivism-objectivism conflict, the relativism-absolutism conflict, the free-will-determinism conflict, the conflict between duty and inclination, and conflicts between various sorts of ethical theory including deontological, teleological, hedonistic, and formalistic. It must explain the relationship between reason and moral feeling, moral action and moral motivation, the origin and general means of determining moral values, moral responsibility, and moral identity. In respect of the latter, it must provide an adequate ontological foundation to guarantee relevance to the concrete situation of the individual involved in the world while being of sufficient generality not to exclude any relevant situations.

This is to say that a general theory of value must be able to incorporate the insights of moral theorists and moral traditions or at least explain the error of those which it rejects. An aberrant theory will not falsify it, since one theory cannot be held responsible for another's inadequacies. However, in spite of its generality it must be sufficiently applicable to the main features of individual moral experience and practice to be falsifiable by these. However, a specific ethical theory, determining the valuation appropriate to a specific situation, may be falsified by the detailed outcome of the events in question, yet this

XUM

may occur without the falsification of the general theory of value from which it is derived.[24] If this were not the case, there would be no point in distinguishing the general theory from the ethical theory. The point is that the meta-ethical dimension of the general theory of value is limited to determining the features present in any ethical evaluation while the determination of further details adequate to more complete specification is the task of ethics itself. In fact, I contend eventually that there will be final details relevant to judgment in every situation which can only be determined by the individual himself. However, while repudiating the claims of moral universalists, this by no means exonerates the general theory and the ethical theory from falsification by misconception in their own domains.

Ultimately the best answer to the question of what sort of definition is required is to specify the purpose it is to serve. The loose definition of a general theory of value given above is intended to serve in evaluating the theory extracted from Whitehead in this dissertation. The test of the theory itself becomes its conformity to the definition, which includes the specification of conformity to the facts of our value experience. The general theory of value is unphilosophic insofar as it halts the search and proposes categories of interpretation to be pushed so far as

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[24] "Falsifiable" here may best be understood to mean proven "inapplicable" or "inadequate."

they go.

PROSPECTS

Whitehead's moral philosophy, with its general theory of value and specific theory of morality, can only be understood in terms of his basic account of experience. He explains human nature, like non-human nature, in terms of its constituitive processes. Process comprises the actual world. All process is analyzed in terms of perceptual activity and all activity is evaluative, but the processes involved in human functions (and those of other highly complex organisms in varying degrees) are distinguished by the inclusion of consciousness. Thus, for Whitehead, moral philosophy is essentially the study of conscious organic activity in relation to the world from which it arises, including the relationships of the individual to himself and those around him.[25]

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[25] I briefly mention some of the Whiteheadian concepts which are central to understanding his moral philosophy and which are explained in the third chapter. The remainder of this section is devoted to summarizing his views in more familiar terms. These generic notions include the following: Importance, or intrinsic and extrinsic value defined respectively as "the value of an individual for himself" and "the value of the individual for others"; Essential Relativity, or the doctrine of internal relations expressed in terms of relational activity rather than in terms of static relationships; Organic Atomism, or an ultimate ontology of individuals who are externally discrete but internally related; Conceptual Activity, or the spontaneous creativity whereby novel determinants are continually introduced into natural process; Enjoyment, as both "satisfaction," or the teleological fulfillment of given aims or potentials, and "anticipation," or the present aim at a future

In essence, Whitehead's notion of morality involves a return to the idea that moral theory must concentrate upon an understanding of human nature in respect of its social dimension. The development of a conscious social identity within man is predicated upon two factors: first, the individual is both a product of his environment and a producer of his environment; second, through consciousness the individual is able to become aware of his past origins and project their future character.[26] Man is dependent upon his environment insofar as he incorporates it within himself: he eats, he breathes, he feels. But these actions involve the subordination of one part of nature to another, namely, the appropriation of the environment for the sake of my own immediate need. Man starts out life as a minuscule entity filled with potentials to be realized at the expense of the world. In the process of this realization he is transformed by that which he appropriates and transforms it, both in the

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fulfillment; Conceptual Reversion, or the process whereby elements in experience which largely replicate other elements in experience are united with them in a condition of symbolic contrast comprising the basic form of consciousness; Objective Immortality, or the preservation of the past within the present through the fulfillment of its potentials and the limits which it imposes as the initial origin of all activity; finally, Society, or the means whereby the individuality of the actual world is overcome within individuals through their incorporation of enduring structure shared with the past and with the future.

[26]Social identity is primitively achieved in concrete feelings but is elevated into conscious social identity only through the reflective activities of cognition. Cf. latter pages of this section.

process of the consumption and by his presence in the world. The individual is his own transformation of the environment. In the notions expressed so far Whitehead shares company with many other thinkers, including Marx. However, man is not merely subject to the material conditions of life, even when imposed by his own nature.

For Whitehead, the individual is creative and not merely productive. There is a spontaneous origination of novel identity in the course of the interaction with the environment. This spontaneity causally interrupts the continuity of natural process. This idea of the spontaneous introduction of novel potentials is held to be necessary in order to adequately account for evolution. There is evolution at all levels of nature. Contrary to Aristotle and Marx, individual man is not merely the representative of a determinate species whose aims or needs are wholly given. In part, the individual determines his ends as well as his means, determining what he is to do and be as well as how he is to do it. Indeed, Whitehead argues that the separation of these notions is itself an achievement of abstraction requisite to morality proper but not to be confused with the concrete conditions of activity.

Whitehead's theory of value introduces the notion of a variable degree of subjective originality imposed upon a largely given determining ground of objective potential, thus fusing subjectivism and objectivism. Further, it combines the relativistic notion that the value of each object is

determined in relation to the subject for which it is a value and the concrete situation within which it is valued, with the absolutistic notion that what has value for the individual is incorrigibly valuable in that respect, regardless of its relationships in other occasions. This latter point is a feature of the ontology of individuals within which, as Butler and Moore held, "A thing is what it is, and not another thing." For Whitehead, this finality is secured by his epochal theory of time according to which each moment, within the process of transformation described above, possesses its own individuality. Thus if a thing is found to be valuable relative to a given moment of experience, it has value absolutely in that moment even if it is never again valued. Indeed, it can never again have value in precisely the same way.[27]

However, as opposed to the views of Marx and Hegel and other evolutionary moral theorists, evolutionary transformation is not necessarily for the better. In terms of

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[27] For Whitehead, as for Moore and others, intrinsic value is value experience. However, in general disagreement with many philosophers, Whitehead holds that all experience is value experience and that it is activity. Existence is active evaluation. All value is either the active enjoyment of objects for the sake of the individual who is the enjoyment of them (whose identity is determined by the things that he enjoys and which he also determines), or else it is the enjoyment of an object for the sake of its contribution instrumentally to that which is enjoyed. Thus 'value' refers either to immediate satisfaction or to the potential of things as contributors to such satisfaction. Amid the variety of human experience, there is to be found both material and intellectual satisfactions and exclusive preeminence can be given to neither.

Marx's materialistic categories, appropriation externalizes man in the world, alienating him from himself as part of the inevitable process whereby he will eventually find himself in the moral millenium of a "human world," adapted to fulfill humanity. Hegel's categories are categories of thought, whereby man internalizes the world, ultimately to find it within his ideas and to see the material world as merely the expression of those ideas. For Whitehead, whose categories are experiential, the appropriation of the environment by the individual is a creative act which simultaneously internalizes the world, transforming it for the sake of the individual, while determining the identity of the individual relative to the environment. Thus the addition of the individual himself to the world is the addition of a novel determinant to future process. The act of appropriation is also an act of giving, for better or worse. Since the act of creative appropriation, like all change, is destructive as well as productive, it may destroy more than it creates. Moreover, if the process of evolution were inevitably for the better, there would be neither the need for nor the possibility of morality.

Whitehead's idea of morality bridges the gap between Marx and Hegel. The function of morality is to correct the overemphasis of the purely practical which reduces life to the fulfillment of immediate concrete needs and reduces thought to an instrument of that fulfillment. At the same time, it corrects the overemphasis of the purely theoretic

which reduces the concrete to a mere object of inquiry, of interest only insofar as it exemplifies abstract thought. Perhaps the best examples of such overemphasis are afforded by the short-sighted use of technology which is destroying the ecological balance and the excess detachment from daily affairs which has been characteristic of many of the academicians who should have foreseen and worked to forestall this process. However, morality is much older than heavy industry and advanced inquiry.

The crux of this problem of overemphasis resides in the fact that consciousness immensely enhances the individual's creative ability to select and employ elements in the environment which satisfy him, while eliminating those which frustrate him. Moreover, he is able to select among his own interests for facility of satisfaction. The result is to increasingly emphasize factors of individual interest in experience, imposing a subordinating influence on the rest of the world and separating the individual from it. The further this individual departure proceeds, the greater the likelihood of conflict with other interests and the more the world is regarded as composed only of objects to be used for the sake of present objectives. The initial effect of conscious creativity is to throw nature out of balance.

For Whitehead the function of morality is to correct this imbalance and convert mere change into consciously controlled creative progress. It does so by affording foresight. The foresight requisite to progress can only be

derived from insight of the individual into the origins of his own satisfactions. Aesthetic insight grasps these origins as limits and instruments of its own needs, as obstructive or useful objects. The aesthetically oriented individual submits in his aims to the world only insofar as he is compelled by it to do so. Aesthetic enjoyment is appropriative consciousness, taking satisfaction for itself. Moral insight begins with the recognition of our own dependence upon other subjects and the dependence of other subjects upon ourselves.

This notion of the conscious recognition of another subject implies a reversal of the purely aesthetic process. It requires that I recognize the dependence of my own aims upon aims other than my own. But to recognize these aims as active aims and not mere objects requires that I have taken interest in them. They have in a sense become my own. Grateful acceptance is the first gift of the moral individual to his benefactors. Gratitude itself implies recognition of another. I am not grateful to a stone. I take satisfaction in the satisfaction of another for his own sake. Moral consciousness opens the perspective of the individual outward. It is social consciousness, embracing an awareness of differing subjects sharing common interests and rendering mutual satisfactions. But there is a strange feature to this complex feeling. Namely, to achieve it I must detach myself from my own immediate interests in order to call to awareness other interests, seen as external to them. But in

doing so, I have created a new perspective--one from within which I have accepted both those interests which I call my own and those which I regard as other. I thereby make the latter my own, changing myself. Art transforms objects in order to fulfill the individual. Morality transforms the individual himself for the sake of a wider fulfillment. It is the adoption of a reflective attitude toward my own interests wherein I "take stock of them" and uncover other interests. This moral perspective cannot be achieved from the same perspective within which I am dominated by my own immediate interests. The moral perspective involves a transformation of myself for the sake of a new subjectivity. But this involves recognition of the importance of the present for the future.

The paradigm example of moral consciousness is the grateful recognition by the individual of the importance of past aims and enjoyments in his own experience to his present enjoyment, giving rise to a concern for his own future. But "his own" is being employed here in a traditional rather than a Whiteheadian sense. Since each moment is discrete in its individuality, such an aim is a present concern for another individual with whom I identify myself. The egoism-altruism controversy is a product of the failure to recognize that the concern for the well-being of my future self is the concern for the self-enjoyment of another individual. He is, in fact, one who does not as yet exist. Morality is prudence, provided prudence be understood to include the

indefinite incorporation of the interest of others into my own. Moreover, since the enjoyment of an individual for his own sake must always be realized in the future relative to my present aim, moral aim itself is not terminal. It suspends present self-enjoyment for the sake of the self-enjoyment of others. However, so far as we anticipate their enjoyment, morality rewards itself.

Moral feelings are organic feelings, wherein we find ourselves bound to others by common interests. Love, sympathy, benevolence, fellow feeling, all express the emotional capacity of man to enjoy the self-enjoyments of others--past and future. Since the enjoyment of an individual for his own sake constitutes Whitehead's definition of intrinsic value, moral feeling expresses the recognition of the mutual interdependence of the intrinsic value of individuals. In place of Kant's "Kingdom of Ends," Whitehead suggests a "society of friends" joined by common concern. However, while for Kant the intrinsic value of the individual is predicated upon the freedom or autonomy of his rational will, for Whitehead it is predicated upon the responsibility of the individual as a creative center of feeling. We are morally responsible insofar as we determine our own feelings to a variable degree. What we do is derivative from what we feel and how we feel it.

However, there are a number of qualifications to be made. The concept of progress requires the concept of movement toward ends to be achieved. For morality, the ends are

to be served. They are the individuals to whom moral service is rendered. Morality is the aim to increase the enjoyment of other individuals--it is the maximization of value and not the determination of value. My appreciation of others for who they are, and not what they are, is in a sense an aesthetic awareness which determines the specific content of moral aim. It is the moral sense of beauty, the sense of character. Moral beauty finds its proper object in the sense of moral character. This is the awareness in myself and others of the conscious intention to serve each other. It is in this regard that the full sense of moral "service" replaces the sense of mere aesthetic instrumentality. This positive sense of devotion is the awareness of good in ourselves and others, but the awareness itself is a form of beauty.

The good of the world is the potential which it offers for the fulfillment of aim. This potential is submerged by the concrete determination of aesthetic appearances. Aesthetic achievement limits potential in fulfilling it. Morality elevates this potential in two ways. It conserves by restoring to us a concern for interests outside of our own, which suffer destruction from our self-preoccupations and in turn destroy in their own defense. It increases this potential by the introduction of novel interests which achieve reconciliations of interests which were previously incompatible. The child who convinces her brother that they can both be happy by breaking a candy bar in half, rather

than fighting for it, has done a moral act. It is a triumph of persuasion over force. The aim at satisfied individuals is morality for aesthetic purpose. Morality for its own sake is the aim at better individuals. Here 'better' means a higher potential for the service of satisfaction. Moral aim is the non-terminal intention of indefinite improvement. It is concerned with recovering, preserving, and increasing the potential which the world offers for the experience of value. By recovering the interests of others submerged beneath our own interests, morality restores and improves the balance of nature rendering due regard to each interest. Moral feeling is rational feeling where "rational" implies "duly proportioned." But this is the generic character of moral aim and sentiment.

The specific criteria of moral decisions, whereby they determine the precise services to be rendered, must always be determined relative to the individual to be served and the detailed situation. Concrete moral feeling affords both motive and criteria in identifying the subject to be served. But a dispassionate understanding of the subject and his conditions of enjoyment is likely to afford a far more effective choice of means than blind reflex. No doubt the behavioral expression of moral feeling in a dog is determined by the vaguest of grateful and devoted feelings wherein he shares the apprehension of a threat to another and, in that very apprehension, responds appropriately. For man, the grasp of a moral situation is subject to intellectual

interpretation whereby the tools of understanding tremendously increase moral effectiveness. But the dispassionate use of thought as a tool of concrete devotion itself gives rise to more elevated passions. We pass from the admiration of another individual to the discrimination of that which is admired in the other and on to the admiration of other individuals for the same reasons. Rational ideals are born in the form of general conceptions of the individuals to be served together with the general conditions of their enjoyment. Provision for the latter is expressed in the rules, principles, and maxims inductively derived in particular societies by their members for the sake of their mutual service. Of course, such principles are often no more accurate than alchemy. It is for this reason that a moral science is needed.

The danger of moral idealism is that it confuses the ideal, valued for its characterization of the individuals to be served, with the individuals themselves. The individuals become irrelevant and morality becomes the dedication to a vacuous abstraction. Marxists destroying men in the name of man, Jeffersonians destroying creative beings in the name of freedom, and moralists demanding the subordination of happiness and desire to formal principles, are all committing a moral "fallacy of misplaced concreteness." It is a logical error of order, confusing symbol with what is symbolized. In practice it becomes an error of value, producing evil.

Moral deontologists have a perfectly comprehensible

cause for their confusion. There are no moral necessities. Amidst the creation of experience, moral aim flickers and surges. We externalize our own moral motivations from ourselves in acts of aesthetic appropriation. In these acts, our own better interests are reduced to compulsive agencies imposing limits and restrictions on enjoyment. They are felt as duties rather than willing devotions. Also we are first exposed to moral generalities by teachers who rarely trouble to concretely elicit the reasons which lay behind them. Moral reasons are ultimate ends, not immediate ends, and the only ultimate ends are individuals. Morality converts the cognitive concern with efficient causes to a cognitive concern with final causes. Practical reason, in the form of wisdom, emerges to enlighten blind moral intuition. Morality is the aim at making the most of each individual for himself and for those around him. It is the art of mutual self-respect.[28]

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[28]Naturally, there are a great many traditional problems of moral theory which have not been touched in this section. Also, the details of development are of the essence and are omitted. However, this was intended only as a sketch and not a full depiction. The main task is undertaken in Chapter Three.

Chapter 2

MORAL AND AESTHETIC SYSTEMS

> . . . You cannot consider wisdom or folly, progress or decadence, except in relation to some standard of judgment, some end in view.[1]
>
> . . . The first part of this book is occupied with the most general aspect of the sociological functions arising from, and issuing into, ideas concerning the human race . . .
> . . . In any human society, one fundamental idea tingeing every detail of activity is the general conception of the status of the individual members of that group, considered apart from any special preeminence. In such societies as they emerge into civilization, the members recognize each other as individuals exercising the enjoyment of emotions, passions, comforts and discomforts, perceptions, hopes, fears, and purposes. Also there are powers of intellectual understanding involving discrimination of details of characters, judgments of 'true or false,' and of 'beautiful or ugly,' and of 'good or bad.' We pass our lives vaguely and flittingly entertaining groups of such experiences, and we attribute like ways of existence to others.[2]

ETHICS AND AESTHETICS

In this section, I offer a refutation of the charge that Whitehead "reduces" ethics to aesthetics. I do so by arguing initially that Whitehead's use of aesthetic terminology is intentionally metaphoric in a manner which he defends

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[1] AI, p. 12.

[2] Ibid., p. 17; italics not in the original.

as essential to all philosophic activity. Second, I argue that his metaphoric use of aesthetic terminology is not arbitrary by placing him within a well-established tradition of Platonic ethical thought. In connection with this, I indicate why representatives of this tradition closely associate the aesthetic and ethical (concentrating upon Leibnitz, Shaftesbury, and Plato). Also, I suggest that the distinction of these spheres of interest is primarily Humian and Kantian and discuss some essential factors of Whitehead's deviation from each.

The charge that Whitehead held no ethical theory is most effectively presented by Victor Lowe and Paul A. Schilpp. According to Lowe:

> . . . Unlike most systematic philosophers, he [Whitehead] never wrote an essay or a chapter on ethical theory; in fact he disliked the subject. He was more concerned with tragedy, the disclosure of ideals, and the union of these two. One implication of his work is that instead of separating ethics and aesthetics we should bring them together in such notions as "harmony," "feeling," "adventure," and, of course, "value." <u>But these terms are first aesthetic terms; they are moral terms in a derivative sense</u>.[3]

Unfortunately, Lowe does not elaborate at length on his claim. However, Schilpp levels the same charge within the context of a fifty-five page article devoted to consideration of Whitehead's moral thought and containing substantial critical detail. Schilpp's emphasis is slightly different. Much of his article is devoted to arguing that Whitehead's

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[3]Lowe, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 111; italics not in the original.

writings do in fact exhibit a strong interest in moral philosophy. But having claimed Whitehead's dominant concerns to be "beauty" and "mathematical pattern," he concludes:

> . . . I think it is undeniable that Mr. Whitehead finds no place for Goodness alongside of Truth and Beauty, but subordinates Goodness to Beauty . . . .[4]

> . . . Professor Whitehead's theory of the close connection between morality and beauty . . . does not seem to be able to stand up under critical analysis. . . . There would . . . appear to be sufficient differences, both of kind and in number, between the two types of value-judgment and value-experience to warrant a rather precise method of differing analysis, procedure, and conclusion for the two areas. A reduction of ethics to aesthetics would appear to be just as disastrous as would a reduction of aesthetics to ethics.[5]

Lowe's claim is initially misleading since, as Schilpp acknowledges, Whitehead devoted significant portions of his later works to topics of moral interest. Admittedly, no major section in them is exclusively ethical, but this only reflects the fact that his discourse is suffused throughout with the effort to exhibit the interrelatedness of all concerns. The more relevant part of Lowe's remark is the assertion that Whitehead's theory of value is dominated by aesthetic terms. This latter charge must be granted.

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[4]Paul Arthur Schilpp, "Whitehead's Moral Philosophy," The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (N.Y.: Tudor Publishing Co., 1951), p. 607.

[5]Ibid., pp. 614-615.

The explanation is partially implicit in the point noted by Lowe that:

> . . . Although "morality" and "art" name comparable species of Importance for human beings, we are here reminded that Whitehead has a generalized concept of the aesthetic . . . . [6]

In the first chapter of Process and Reality, Whitehead remarks of speculative philosophy that:

> . . . the conditions for the success of imaginative construction must be rigidly adhered to. In the first place, this construction must have its origin in the generalization of particular factors discerned in particular topics of human interest; for example, in physics, or in physiology, or in psychology, or in aesthetics, or in ethical beliefs, or in sociology, or in languages conceived as storehouses of human experience.[7]

In the "Analysis of Meaning," he comments:

> My own belief is that at present the most fruitful, because the most neglected, starting point is that section of value-theory which we term aesthetics.[8]

In Process and Reality, Whitehead stresses that:

> . . . The success of the imaginative experiment is always to be tested by the applicability of its results beyond the restricted locus from which it originated.[9]

Whitehead's controversial views on the need to stretch language metaphorically for philosophic purposes derive from this conception of philosophic generalization. Terminology

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[6]Lowe, loc. cit. [7]PR, p. 7.

[8]Alfred North Whitehead, "Analysis of Meaning," Science and Philosophy (N.Y.: Philosophical Library, 1948), p. 138.

[9]PR, p. 8.

expressive of generic notions in a special area of concern must be given new meaning in its application to novel areas. Otherwise, the outcome will be reductionistic.

In Adventures of Ideas, wherein Goodness is subordinated to Beauty, according to Schilpp, Whitehead discusses the role of morality relative to:

> . . . the more distinctly human experiences of beauty, and of intellectual fineness, consciously enjoyed. Here the notion of intellectual distinction, or of fineness, is somewhat broader than that of 'truth,' which is ordinarily cited in this connection. There is a grandeur of achievement in the delicate adjustment of thought to thought, which is independent of the mere blunt question of truth. We may term it 'beauty.' But intellectual beauty, however capable of being hymned in terms relevant to sensible beauty, is yet beautiful by stretch of metaphor. The same consideration applies to moral beauty. All three types of character partake in the highest ideal of satisfaction possible for actual realization . . . .[10]

In the next chapter I distinguish between these three types of character. Here it need only be pointed out that insofar as we speak of the immediate experience of these values, they are realized as modes of satisfaction to which the term 'beauty' is not wholly inappropriate. Yet Whitehead does clearly assert that the use of 'beauty' is to be understood metaphorically. The failure of a metaphor to be understood metaphorically is first of all the fault of the author and only secondarily that of the reader. But this failure is one of style and need not be of content. Surely it is ameliorated by the fact that the reader's attention has been

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[10] AI, pp. 18-19; italics not in the original.

explicitly drawn to the metaphoric character of the usage.

Were the metaphor successful, the result would be to expand the meaning of 'beauty' to a greater generality than it possesses in conventional usage. This expansion does not consist in attributing a greater extension to the term while retaining an intension appropriate to more limited contexts. Such usage comprises the most basic form of reductionism. If one presupposes a meaning for terms like 'aesthetics' and 'beauty' that is more limited than Whitehead's and then examines his usage in respect of these meanings, his work is bound to appear reductionistic. In fact, this seems implicit in the comments of both Lowe and Schilpp. Each interprets 'art' as meaning 'fine art' and 'aesthetics' as meaning 'philosophy of fine art.' Except insofar as he treats fine art as one species of art, Whitehead only infrequently employs the terms in this manner.

As indicated in the first chapter,[11] a theory may be reductionistic either by generalizing that which is relevant only to a limited context or by explaining the particular and specific in terms of unqualified generalizations. Whitehead is being accused of both sorts, i.e., he is accused both of applying the peculiar features of aesthetic values to areas beyond their domain and of failing to provide principles of differentiation adequate to distinguish moral and aesthetic value from each other. However, given Whitehead's

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[11] Cf. p. 25.

doctrine of philosophic metaphor which he explicitly invokes in this instance, his use of aesthetic terminology provides no sufficient grounds for either allegation. This question can only be determined by examining whether he does in fact succeed in developing a concept of value adequate to the characterization of the essential features of both moral and aesthetic value, and whether he does in fact provide the requisite differentia. In a sense, the remainder of this dissertation is devoted to arguing that he fulfills both demands.

I certainly do not mean to imply that Whitehead simply redefines aesthetic terms to make them non-aesthetic. Such a move would be justly condemnable as arbitrary. The result would be a more or less private language, possessed of the limited meanings given its terms by the system. Surely it would not fulfill Whitehead's conception of philosophy as the attempt to exhibit the commonsensical and concrete while yet expressing ultimate generalities. Much of Whitehead's work is devoted to drawing out historical precedents of his own usage in order to establish that his views are predicated on features of experience that are widely witnessed and not merely contained in the aberrant perceptions of an exceptional individual.

The philosophic "stretching" of terms is itself required by the paucity of language relative to the needs of philosophic generalization and by the abstractness which inhibits a wholly novel vocabulary from achieving "concrete"

expression. Indeed, Whitehead does argue that concepts of aesthetic value express the most fundamental and widespread sorts of value found within experience. However, while involving aesthetic value, moral value is held to transcend primitive aesthetic experience, where "primitive aesthetic experience" is defined to mean "the immediate enjoyment of objects by an individual for his own satisfaction."

Below, I have examined historical precedents of Whitehead's treatment of moral and aesthetic value both for the purpose of establishing that his usage is quite time-honored while also offering some insight into his position through its origins.

Upon investigating this question, one is struck by the fact that the categorical distinction of moral and aesthetic issues is perhaps more of an exception among philosophers than a rule. In fact, it appears to be largely a feature of some elements of the Kantian tradition. It is not typical of existentialist thought, phenomenological axiology, pragmatism, emotivism, analysts who approach value judgments in terms of grading theory, the German romantics, nor even some of the British metaphysicians.[12] It is not

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[12] In particular, I have in mind Samuel Alexander's discussion of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness in Ch. IX, Vol. II of Space, Time, and Deity (N.Y.: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966). Surely there is more than a chance similarity to Whitehead's treatment of these values. Also the definition of value in Section F of that chapter, entitled "Value in General," could almost be interchanged with Whitehead's. There is, of course, the critical difference that Whitehead eliminates the analytic apparatus of primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities.

characteristic of the British tradition of moral philosophy, including G.E. Moore, with the possible exception of the Cambridge Platonists. There is a sense in which it seems to be an Aristotelian notion, insofar as the distinction often accompanies a clear concept of rational will as exemplified in the Critique of Practical Reason and in other deontologically oriented ethical works. It certainly is not characteristic of most neo-Platonic thought. Moreover, it is not characteristic of Aristotle himself for in spite of his distinction between "deliberate choice" and "poetic making," Aristotle's Poetics seem quite clearly to subordinate art to morality and aesthetics to ethics rather than separating them.

In seeking the influences operating upon Whitehead, it is well to note his claim that he is returning to pre-Kantian modes of thought. In this regard, he must be understood as speaking of his theory of value as well as his metaphysics and epistemology.[13] Whitehead acknowledges a great debt to Leibnitz and it is striking to note that in comparing the two, there becomes apparent a pattern of axiological thought which is shared with Plato, Shaftesbury, and Moore, among others. H. Wildon Carr notes that:

> . . . . In the Principes de la Nature et de Grace there occurs the significant sentence: "We might know the beauty of the universe in each soul if we

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[13]This is by no means to discount the modern influences which Whitehead himself acknowledges. These include James, Bergson, Santayana, Alexander, and Bradley.

> could unfold all its wrappings which are only sensibly developed in time." And still more strikingly in the Preface to the Nouveaux Essais: "These minute perceptions are of greater efficacy than we think. It is they which form that je ne sais quoi, those tastes, those images of sense qualities, clear in the mass, but confused in the parts, those impressions which surrounding bodies make on us and which include the infinite, that bond which binds each being to the rest of the universe."[14]

Here Carr stresses a point that is of both epistemological and ontological import:

> Leibniz is, in fact, the first modern philosopher to lay down the principle . . . that the mind in knowing is active and constructive, not passive and contemplative. . . . The distinction between sensible and intelligible ideas is not a difference in kind. The one arises in confused, the other in distinct perception. What, then, . . . is the relation between ideas and things, and in what way do ideas represent their objects? The answer is that there are no things. The reality of the universe is not its actuality at any moment, but its possibility in every moment. Our ideas represent possibilities. "All intelligible ideas have their archetypes in the eternal possibilities."[15]

He wishes to credit Leibnitz with anticipation of Kant's concept of constituitive intellect. While experience is an activity for Leibnitz, it would be misleading to identify its "constructive" dimension too closely with Kant's account. To do so would in fact be to credit Leibnitz with treating the activity of theoretic intellect and the moral functions of rational will as categorically differing in kind from the aesthetic activity of experience.

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[14]Herbert Wildon Carr, Leibniz (N.Y.: Dover Publications, Inc., 1960), pp. 175-176.

[15]Ibid., p. 176.

However, for Leibnitz, the intellectual and the sensible, the apperceptive and the perceptive, are distinguished only in respect of their objects. Moreover, rational volition is itself an expression of the appetency of perception toward clarity and distinctness. The transition from desire to rational will is only a transition from the appetition for one sort of object to the appetition for another sort, determined in relation to the former. For Leibnitz as opposed to Kant, the activity of perception is not the product of the imposition of intellective form upon a sensuous matter. It is the teleological self-fulfillment of perceptual possibilities. The idea that order and activity derive from the appetition of the chaotic toward perfection is a Platonic notion often invoked by Whitehead as well.[16] Further, though Carr is joined by others in crediting Leibnitz with the origination of Kant's distinction between the Aesthetic and the Logic, it is important to note that Leibnitz himself does not draw this distinction (as Carr admits). Beauty is the appearance of perfection in confused perception, but its realization is one manifestation in a process continuous with the appearance of truth itself.

The transition from sensible beauty to intellectual

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[16]The rationalism of Leibnitz is reflected in the notion that the ultimate end of the process is realization of true knowledge or clear and distinct awareness of the system of the universe. For Whitehead, the awareness of a "Harmony of harmonies" is given in the sense of "Peace" which need not be highly intellective.

satisfaction embraces moral awareness en route. In his preface to the unpublished Codex Diplomaticus, Leibnitz defines justice in terms of the love of ". . . all men, so far as reason allows." He elaborates:

> . . . But to love or esteem is to take pleasure in the happiness of another, or what comes to the same thing, to adopt another's happiness as our own. In this way there is solved the difficult problem, . . . how there can be a disinterested love . . . . as the very contemplation of beautiful things is pleasant, . . . inspiring . . . something like love; so when the beautiful thing is also capable of happiness, . . . feeling for it passes into real love.[17]

Essentially, Leibnitz is making a moral application of the doctrine of internal relations, reconciling private and public interest through the concept of delight taken in the self-enjoyment of another. This is, perhaps, the essential move of all Platonic moral theory. Whitehead makes it in asserting that:

> . . . The antithesis between the general good and the individual interest can be abolished only when the individual is such that its interest is the general good . . . .[18]

Elsewhere he asserts:

> . . . Actuality is the self-enjoyment of importance. But this self-enjoyment has the character of the self-enjoyment of others melting into the enjoyment of the one self.[19]

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[17] Gottfried Leibnitz, The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings, trans. Robert Latta (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 283-286. Also note the claim on p. 283, n. 5, ". . . justice consists in a certain congruity and proportion . . . ."

[18] PR, p. 23.

[19] MT, p. 161. Indeed, one of the major points of

The origin of this approach in Plato can perhaps best be substantiated by appeal to a passage in the Republic:

> And, as we said, this way of speaking and thinking goes with fellow-feeling; so that our citizens, sharing as they do in a common interest which each will call his own, will have all their feelings of pleasure or pain in common.[20]

The Platonic connection between the moral and the aesthetic can only be understood in terms of this concept of "fellow-feeling." Schilpp is indignant at Whitehead's comment that the good has been traditionally assigned as one of the aims of art. He compains:

> . . . I rather imagine that Plato would be horrified if he were to hear such a claim being made in all seriousness.[21]

I must confess that I find Schilpp's view of Plato incomprehensible. Throughout Plato's work, "Beauty" and "Goodness" are intimately connected. Nowhere do I find Plato deviating from the view, expressed early in The Republic, that the aim of every art is the good of its subject. Surely Schilpp could not be so obtuse as to fail to notice that in

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difference between Whitehead and other Platonists, including Leibnitz, is brought out as Whitehead continues here: ". . . The most explicit example of this is our realization of those other actualities, which we conceive as ourselves in our recent past, fusing their self-enjoyment with our immediate present. This is only the most vivid instance of the unity of the universe in each individual actuality."

[20] Plato, The Republic, trans. Francis M. Cornford (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 165.

[21] Schilpp, op. cit., p. 607.

Adventures of Ideas Whitehead is using "art" in just this broad, Platonic sense. He offers the definition, ". . . art is the education of nature,"[22] and makes quite clear that art is intended to embrace the technological adaptation of nature to human society.

In fact, Plato has often been accused of defining the Good in terms of Beauty in the Symposium and the Philebus. In the Philebus, Plato examines the relationship of pleasure to the good and concludes:

> Then if we cannot hunt down the good under a single form, let us secure it by the conjunction of three, beauty, proportion, and truth, and then, regarding these three as one, let us assert that that may most properly be held to determine the qualities of the mixture, and that because that is good the mixture itself has become so.[23]

The form of the good seems always undefinable for Plato. Here Plato gives no suggestion that he is defining the good, rather he indicates he is attempting to isolate that in experience which most closely expresses it. The issue can be further clarified by calling to mind that the domain of appearance is the domain of multiplicity and the composite for Plato, while we approach distinctness and simplicity in the forms. I suggest that Plato is attempting to express the same insight expressed by Leibnitz in his notion of sensible Beauty as the confused perception of perfection.

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[22] AI, p. 270.

[23] Plato, Philebus, trans. R. Hackforth, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (N.Y.: Random House, Inc., 1961), p. 1147.

It is also reflected in the distinction drawn by G.E. Moore between the ethical concept which is:

> . . . the simple one which I denote by 'good,' . . . [and] the complex one which I have taken to define 'beautiful' . . . .[24]

The latter involves Moore's ". . . principle of organic unities."[25] With respect to this notion, Moore asserts:

> . . . to prove that a thing is truly beautiful is to prove that a whole, to which it bears a particular relation as a part, is truly good.[26]

For Moore, all the "greatest goods" are divided into "two classes of aesthetic enjoyments." He identifies the highest of these as that class in which:

> . . . the object itself is not merely beautiful, while possessed of little or no intrinsic value, but is itself, in part at least, of great intrinsic value. . . .
>
> It is evident that this additional complication only occurs in so far as there is included in the object of personal affection some of the mental qualities of the person towards whom the affection is felt.[27]

Whitehead shares with Moore the notion that the "good" is not properly definable but that "goods" can be defined with appeal to aesthetic concepts. He asserts:

> . . . 'The Good' is an ultimate qualification not to be analysed in terms of any things more final than itself. But an analogous question can be asked . . . To what sort of things does the concept apply, and in particular what sort of conditions are requisite for its evocation? The Greek answer . . . was that beauty belonged to composite things, and that the composition is beautiful when the many components have obtained in some sense their proper

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[24]Moore, op. cit., p. xi. [25]Ibid. [26]Ibid., p. 202.

[27]Ibid., p. 203.

> proportions. This was the Greek doctrine of Harmony, in respect to which neither Plato nor Aristotle ever wavers.
> . . . . . .
>
> The notions of Harmony and of Mathematical Relations are only special exemplifications of a yet more general philosophic concept, namely, that of the general interconnectedness of things, which transforms the manifoldness of the many into the unity of the one.[28]

It should be noted here that Whitehead, like Plato with his "mixture" of Truth, Beauty, and Proportion and Moore with his organically composed states of desirable consciousness, is emphasizing the importance of the composite nature of experience which realizes beauty through proportion expressing truth. Here truth is implicit in the "propriety" of proportion.

Had Schilpp extended his citation of Whitehead, we would have seen that Whitehead goes on to say:

> . . . Goodness is a qualification belonging to the <u>constitution</u> of reality, which in any of its individual actualizations is better or worse. . . . With a larger view and a deeper analysis, some instance of the perfection of art may diminish the good otherwise inherent in some specific situation as it passes into its objective actuality for the future. Unseasonable art is . . . out of place a positive evil.
> . . . . . .
>
> . . . The effect of the present on the future is the business of morals.[29]

As will be established in the third chapter, Whitehead regards beauty in its most basic form as experience

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[28] <u>AI</u>, pp. 152-153; italics not in the original.

[29] <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 267-268; italics not in the original.

satisfactory to the individual. The value of truth to beauty is that it inhibits the excessive subjectivity whereby the individual creatively finds satisfaction in a very limited set of private and immediate interests. Such forms of satisfaction provoke conflict by the frustration of those interests which they omit. This analysis applies to the plurality of interests possessed by the individual himself as well as the interests of other individuals in relation to his own.

To a greater or lesser degree, Whitehead is agreeing with Leibnitz, Moore, and Plato in the notion that moral value is concerned with the achievement of satisfactions which find their objects in interests outside of our own immediate subjectivity. In The Republic, Plato defines justice in terms of "each serving his proper function and each being properly served." In the Symposium, he develops the notion of Platonic love with its proper object in beautiful "character" which for Leibnitz becomes the notion that "when the beautiful thing is also capable of happiness, his feeling for it passes into real love." For Whitehead, this is the essential moral ingredient of civilization wherein

> . . . the members recognize each other as individuals exercising the enjoyment of emotions . . . .[30]

Moral beauty, for Whitehead, is the disinterested love of other subjects as subjects. The concept of moral beauty, as beauty of character giving rise to benevolent

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[30] Cf. p. 51.

feeling and conduct, is also characteristic of the movement in British thought which gains definition in Shaftesbury and culminates in Hume. However, there is a difference which, perhaps, may be credited to Hutcheson.

Whitehead shares with Leibnitz, Shaftesbury, and Plato the rejection of a faculty psychology. Each acknowledges with Plato that distinctions of faculties are to be drawn only in "terms of their objects." Just as apperception has a reflective status relative to perception for Leibnitz and consciousness relative to feeling for Whitehead, Shaftesbury holds that moral experience is the reflective recognition of moral objects as discriminated from the manifold composition of unreflective experience. For Shaftesbury, this is the recognition of the mutual interdependence of subjects within a common system:

> . . . Creatures, who have some one common Nature, or are provided for, by some one Order or Constitution of things subsisting together, and co-operating towards their Conservation, and Support.[31]

Virtue consists in:

> . . . a certain just Disposition, or proportionable Affection of a rational Creature towards the moral Objects of Right and Wrong . . . .[32]

It must be stressed that: (1) such "Objects of Right and Wrong" are the affections and behaviors of subjects relative

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[31] Shaftesbury, An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit, British Moralists, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1964), p. 5.

[32] Ibid., p. 18.

to the well-being of the system within which they exist; (2) "errors of Right" are errors of affection; (3) virtue is the affection toward right affections; (4) the awareness of these affections in others is an awareness of moral beauty whereby we perceive individuals whose interests incorporate the interest of the larger system.[33]

For Shaftesbury, these are natural facts about the nature of an organism in organic relation to nature at large and other members of his species. Hume acknowledges such facts as facts about ourselves but dichotomizes man and nature in a manner not characteristic of either Shaftesbury or Leibnitz. It is likely that Hume's action is due to the influence of Hutcheson who converts Shaftesbury's concept of moral sense as "the discrimination of moral objects amid experience" to the concept of a special sense or faculty of approval or disapproval, differing in kind from other powers of experience. For Hume this becomes "inner sense" and active "sentiment." After Hume, the moral and the natural tend to be held apart. However, one must turn to Kant for the final discrimination of the moral and the aesthetic.

I shall defer consideration of Kant for the moment since something more must be said about how Whitehead differs from this Platonic tradition. The differences turn largely upon Whitehead's emphasis of process. For Shaftesbury, the

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[33] Shaftesbury draws all of these distinctions in the opening pages of An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit.

System or "Constitution" which provides the basis of a moral order is afforded by the sharing of a determinate species nature and species interests. For Leibnitz, the substantial status of his monads require that they be windowless, merely fulfilling a pre-established harmony of fully determinate possibilities. For Plato, the determination of "that which is proper" is a matter of isolating the essential formal character of each function relative to its expression of an ideal order. Whitehead replaces the pre-established Harmony of Leibnitz with a concept of "real potentiality" whereby the origins of an individual event are teleologically oriented to its origination. However, the individual creatively realizes himself, modifying this determining ground of potential in an act of partial self constitution.

If the word 'constitution' in the passage cited on page fifty-nine be understood as only a noun, then Whitehead might be interpreted as saying little more than Shaftesbury. I.e., the good of an individual would be reduced to his value for the system within which he functions as determined by the specific identity which he shares with his fellows. For example, his affections as revelatory of character would indicate only the degree to which his interests had become identical with the interests of human nature at large, as shared with other humans. Similarly, in comparison with Leibnitz, it would reveal only his status in relation to the pre-established harmony of individual monads. However,

Whitehead abandons the idea of substance but shares with Leibnitz the rejection of a strict distinction of species. Experience is an act of composition which constitutes the individual as an organic moment of satisfaction. In Chapter Three, I explore Whitehead's account of how this process derives an individual reality from a composition of factors. But the main point is that the "constitution of reality" has reference both to the potential which produces the individual and the process whereby he modifies this potential. The individual outcome is a new causal determinant of subsequent individuals, a modification of potentiality itself. The real world is the world of potential, existing within the actual.

Whitehead shares with other Platonists the concept of art as the conscious transformation of appearances for the sake of composite beauty enjoyed in the experience of the individual. But the originality of his ethics resides in the fact that he credits morality with the concern for the transformation of reality itself through the creation of better individuals. But the perception of individual subjectivity, whereby moral motivation can be originated and service to mutual interests determined, can be achieved only within the field of experience or "appearance" wherein it takes the form of an enjoyment of moral beauty. Moral beauty is the appreciation of a character for the sake of its own enjoyment and its contribution to the enjoyment of others as indicated by its own affections. This notion of the plasticity of reality itself, in respect of its potentials,

is a rather un-Platonic idea.

Effective morality is heavily dependent upon knowledge for Whitehead, since the "proper" sense of proportion implicit in the affection of morally beautiful individuals initially requires a recognition of the role played by other subjects in the origination of the moral subject's own enjoyment. We are "just" in "rendering each his due" by restoring their proper emphasis in our feelings and behavior, creating a value for future subjects.

To what has already been said by way of response to Schilpp and Lowe, there is a further suggestion to be added. Perhaps Whitehead's ethics, like Plato's, is difficult to discover because it is "writ too large." Throughout the first part of Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead repeatedly recurs to the notion of the interdependence of the members of society and the notion of "the love of mankind as such." He returns to a detailed consideration of this latter concept in the concluding sections of the book. As indicated at the onset of this chapter,

> . . . The first part of this book is occupied with the most general aspect of the sociological functions arising from, and issuing into, ideas concerning the human race . . . .[34]

He stresses the explication of the role of ". . . sociological ideals in the transformation of society,"[35] and identifies ethical ideals as:

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[34]Cf. p. 51. [35]AI, p. 33.

> . . . the supreme example of consciously-formulated ideas acting as a driving force effecting transitions from social state to social state.[36]

Like Plato, Whitehead draws no hard and fast distinction between individual ethics, social ethics, and political philosophy. These shade off into each other, differing in emphasis. Plato seeks justice in the individual by designing an ideal society. My suggestion here is that Whitehead develops an organic theory of society and an analysis of social history for the sake of defining moral character. In other words, Adventures of Ideas is itself an ethical work in the same sense in which Plato's Republic is an ethical work.[37] More empirical analysis of history is evident in Whitehead's examination of elements in our own civilization fostering the development or decline of moral sentiment. Yet a similar process is evident in Plato's development of his educational theory and his critical examination of the moral influence of various factors. In any event, the emphasis is to be placed upon the fact that it is an essential feature of Platonic ethics to understand individual behavior in terms of the relation of the individual to his social system and the social system as possessing a unity realized within the individual. Since the social system cannot be arbitrarily divorced from the wider

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[36] Ibid., p. 25.

[37] It should be remembered that Plato found it necessary to take up economics, art, agronomy, etc., in the course of describing a just state.

environment, a thorough-going venture into ontology is involved.

Much of this is summarized in Whitehead's chapter on "The Humanitarian Ideal":

> . . . What we know of external nature is wholly in terms of how the various occasions in nature contribute to each other's natures. . . . Thus each occasion takes its initial form from the character of its environment. Also the laws which condition each environment merely express the general character of the occasions composing that environment. . . .[38]

Translated into moral terms this metaphysical principle becomes the claim that:

> . . .The ideals cherished in the souls of men enter into the character of their actions. These interactions within society modify the social laws by modifying the occasions to which these laws apply. Impracticable ideals are a program for reform. . . . Progress consists in modifying the laws of nature so that the Republic on Earth may conform to that Society to be discerned ideally by the divination of Wisdom. . . .
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> . . . Plato conceived the notion of the ideal relations between men based upon a conception of the intrinsic possibilities of human character. . . . At times it dies down. But it ever recurs. . . . Its victory is the victory of persuasion over force. . . . The idea is a prophecy which procures its own fulfillment.[39]

In a vague, too general, and obscure form, the essentials of Whitehead's ethics are implicit in this passage. It remains to develop the meaning.

Recent ethics has been more often concerned with individual moral decisions rather than socio-politico-ethical

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[38] AI, p. 49.

[39] Ibid.

theories.[40] One must grant that there is an apparent gap between the practical morality of daily affairs and the implementation of social design. One feature of Whitehead's ethics, and the Platonic tradition, is the conviction that this gap is a matter of degree of generality and not a difference in kind. But there is a difference of method involved in approaching each. Socio-political thought tends to deal with the individual in terms of the system. Thus Adventures of Ideas concentrates upon the conduct of individuals as expressive of an improving social system in process of evolution. But Whitehead differs from most recent social evolutionists in the emphasis which he places upon the individuality of the members of society. Here I have emphasized this opposite aspect and concentrated upon the role of the individual in the origination of moralizing influences in the social system. Thus rather than extracting Whitehead's analysis of human society, I have concentrated upon extracting his moral psychology--or what I call below, "the phenomenology of moral consciousness."

As promised above, a comment is necessary regarding Whitehead's association of the ethical and aesthetic in relation to Kant's rigid separation of the two. In this passage from Religion in the Making, cited by Lowe to support his claim,

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[40] Although this is not true if we attend either to Europe or to the young people in this country.

> . . . All order is therefore aesthetic order, and the moral order is merely certain aspects of aesthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order, and the aesthetic order is derived from the immanence of God.[41]

Whitehead is using the term 'aesthetic' in a very broad sense. Here he is comparing the philosophy of organism with Kant's account of the origins of order in the world. Explicitly he is contrasting his "aesthetic basis" with Kant's "cognitive and conceptive" approach, identifying it as a direct inversion. For Kant, the structure in experience is essentially derivative from the given conceptual frame, operating constituitively through perceptual judgment. For Whitehead's empiricism, the conceptual element, even when entering the determination of experience, must itself be derivative from antecedent experience. The allusion to "inversion" is particularly appropriate since, for Kant, the aesthetic dimension is just the entire domain of feeling, particularly of felt value. Thus the passage cited is nothing more than an extension of the philosophy of organism's protest against "the exclusion of value from the essence of matter of fact" and an indication that Whitehead's view of morality will involve an appeal to his doctrine of feelings rather than a purely formalistic approach such as that offered by Kant in the "categorical imperative."

Kant's rationalism is reflected in his Critique of Practical Reason which repairs Hume's inadequate regard for

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[41] RM, p. 101. Cited by Lowe, op. cit., p. 111.

the role of reason in moral judgment. Yet, in his notion of a "good will" as a purely "rational will," determined by form alone, he separates the moral from the theoretic and the aesthetic and strips the entire content from moral character. Indeed, at this point, Whitehead parts company with teleological rationalists as well. Leibnitz is the Platonic rationalist par excellence. The ultimate end of appetition is the clear and distinct understanding of a perfectly ordered universe, the Truth. However, Whitehead insists upon a balance. Beauty need not be good nor need truth be good either. Both are requisite to the good and yet are exceeded by it. Moreover, the order within which the individual finds himself, and which he finds within himself, is an unstable order. It must always improve or decline. We create truth from ideal falsity.

In conclusion, I can remark only that if Whitehead be condemned as an ethicist for the use of aesthetic terminology and held not to possess a moral philosophy, then he is condemned with good company. But few moral philosophers are left us. On the other hand, I am inclined to suggest that any definition of moral philosophy which excludes Plato, Shaftesbury, Leibnitz, the "moral sense" theorists through Hume, G.E. Moore, and others, must itself be idiosyncratic and arbitrary in the extreme.

POINTS OF CRITICISM

This section is devoted to a brief summary and

transcription of the criticisms brought against Whitehead's moral philosophy in Schilpp's article. As mentioned above, the exposition in the third chapter is devoted to answering these criticisms. This article is well representative of the critical literature. The only extant criticism of major import omitted by Schilpp is dealt with in an article by Donald Sherburne. I have reserved discussion of the latter for the next section of this chapter.[42]

Foremost of Schilpp's objections is the charge, already considered, that Whitehead subordinates ethics to aesthetics and "goodness" to "beauty." In developing his

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[42]Schilpp also lists some points of agreement with Whitehead. I have included them here since they do reflect an accurate understanding of Whitehead on certain points and may perhaps assist the reader by distinguishing what Schilpp is not rejecting. Included among these notions are:

". . . a) Professor Whitehead's generally negative attitude towards most accepted 'moral codes' . . . ;

"b) his denial of the existence of absolutely valid universal moral laws . . . ;

[and the claims:]

"c) . . . that . . . ideals . . . are 'universal' only in the sense that 'the spirit which should permeate any behaviour-system in the circumstances of its adoption' is universal;

"d) . . . that ideals are aims at "perfection," which ideals are nevertheless 'dated' . . . ;

"e) . . . that morality itself is also "processive," not substantive;

"f) . . . that morality has deep roots in interest and feeling;

"g) . . . that in morality man is aiming at the achievement of unity . . . ;

"h) . . . that real morality needs to be based on rational (not ratiocinative) perspective and selection;

"i) . . . that morality is a creative, adventurous function . . . ;

"j) . . . that 'personality is the extreme example of the sustained realization of a type of value' . . . ;

"k) . . . that true morality aims at social perfection . . . beyond the individual person in question."

Schilpp, op. cit., pp. 609-610.

argument,[43] Schilpp emphasizes a remark of Whitehead's regarding the excessive stress placed upon the moral good, which Whitehead holds is only one species of the good. In addition to points brought out in the preceeding section, Schilpp makes capital of the following Whiteheadian sentiments: ". . . the real world is good when it is beautiful;"[44] ". . . beauty, moral and aesthetic, is the aim of existence."[45]

> . . . Truth and Beauty are the great regulative properties in virtue of which Appearance justifies itself to the immediate decision of the experient subject.[46]

I suggested in the preceeding section that "good" is pertinent to the "real" world of potential while "beauty" identifies the immediate value realized within the composite appearances of experience. Thus "beauty," when truthful, reveals the good of the real world. It is "Appearance" which is justified in terms of "Truth and Beauty." The good itself is a feature of the ultimate individuals which are the singular outcome of experience and which are the elements of the communal origin which lie behind it. Within experience, the moral goodness of individual subjects is felt as beauty of "character." So far as moral aim is conscious, it

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[43] Ibid., pp. 606-608. [44] AI, p. 267.

[45] Alfred North Whitehead, "Autobiographical Notes," The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (N.Y.: Tudor Publishing Co., 1951), p. 8.

[46] AI, p. 240.

is also felt as a type of beauty. But it is the beauty of good subjects in a system of mutual service, not the aesthetic beauty of good objects in service to ourselves. Once again, the complete answer to this objection requires the exposition of these notions. But I wish to underscore the point that it is characteristic of the Platonic tradition, to which Whitehead belongs, to assert (in various ways) that "the real world is good when it is beautiful." This only means that truthful beauty is the means by which we know the world's goodness. Mere "beauty" may of course be quite misleading.

Schilpp's second major criticism[47] consists in the claim that Whitehead arbitrarily links mathematics and the good in terms of "pattern."

> . . . it is questionable whether there is anything in what has yet been said by Mr. Whitehead to demonstrate the proposition that the good must be patterned. Nor has he proved the proposition that "pattern is good."[48]

Schilpp further charges inconsistency on the grounds that Whitehead claims that mere pattern is devoid of value while identifying the good with pattern. Yet, according to Schilpp, Whitehead provides us with no criterion of "pattern."[49]

Schilpp's third and final major point concerns his interpretation of Whitehead as a "moral interest"

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[47] Schilpp, op. cit., pp. 593-601. [48] Ibid., p. 595.

[49] Ibid., p. 616.

theorist.[50] Here he objects:

> . . . At the same time it would seem that the founding of real morality upon the quicksand of largely emotional reactions provides a treacherously thin foundation for morals. It would hardly seem possible that Mr. Whitehead could be satisfied with such a flimsy and all too shifty foundation.[51]

The remaining points play a less significant role in his article but nevertheless should be answered: (1) Whitehead does not justify the subsumption of morality under the scope of "Importance" as the ultimate category of value theory; (2) Importance, as discussed by Whitehead, is not "ultimate" but is a composite of "interest" and "unity"; (3) Whitehead is inconsistent with his own relativism in asserting,

> . . . Our intuitions of righteousness disclose an absoluteness in the nature of things, and so does the taste of a lump of sugar.[52]

(4) Whitehead's predilection for mathematical models in metaphysical analysis may preclude the possibility of a moral theory.[53]

POSITIVE ANTICIPATIONS

From authors who are sympathetic to Whitehead's work

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[50] If by "moral interest theory," Schilpp means an egoistic theory, then a misinterpretation is involved, as will be seen below. However, the point is not clear with respect to Schilpp's usage.

[51] Schilpp, op. cit., p. 611. [52] MT, p. 165.

[53] These points are all summarized in Schilpp, op. cit., pp. 610-614.

only three notable pieces on his moral philosophy have come forth. Interestingly, each overemphasizes the importance of Whitehead's religious views to his moral views. Distinguishing religion and morality is difficult in Whitehead's work, since both are treated as concerned primarily with our status as subjects while at the same time religious thought is regarded as a major vehicle of moral thought. However, Whitehead holds that they do differ.

> . . . Morality emphasizes the detailed occasion; while religion emphasizes the unity of ideal inherent in the universe.[54]

Insofar as I take exception to the work of these three authors, I trace my objections to their failure to note the intricacies of this distinction.

In his article, "Responsibility, Punishment, and Whitehead's Theory of the Self," Donald Sherburne deals with one of the more interesting problems of Whiteheadian moral theory. He attempts to resolve the difficulties posed by a theory of

> . . . actual entities whose free decisions . . . [are] responsible for . . . deeds [but] have perished. There is no concrete, actual element present in the post facto person which was actual at the time of the deed. It seems impossible to find a resting place for the responsibility usually regarded as correlative to free decision; in short, responsibility seems to be incompatible with this Whiteheadian theory of the self . . . .
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> It is now clear why Weiss and other substance philosophers find Whitehead's theory objectionable on moral grounds. . . . since actual entities perish immediately upon becoming, nothing endures which

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[54] MT, p. 39.

could assume the responsibility or guilt.[55]

Sherburne is particularly concerned with the appropriate status of punishment, which is of course only one ramification of the problem of moral responsibility. He associates Whitehead with Schlick, Hume, and Ayer in the course of concluding that there is in fact no enduring basis of responsibility in Whitehead's theory of the self and thus no place for a retributive theory of justice and punishment.

Sherburne is quite right in concluding that there is no place for a retributive theory in Whitehead's ontology. Further I take no exception to his conclusions that we cannot be responsible for past decisions, given Whitehead's theory of the self and that

> . . . punishment, to be justified, must be goal creating; it must literally be creative punishment in that it seeks to reveal possibilities leading to depth and harmony of experience.[56]

However, I do disagree with his exposition of the concept of moral responsibility in Whitehead's thought. He concludes that responsibility is always only the immediate responsibility of an individual occasion to God, who is the sole judge. He wishes to:

> . . . retain in cosmology the notions of responsibility and judgment, each properly grounded in a direct relationship with the divine element in the world.[57]

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[55] Donald W. Sherburne, "Responsibility, Punishment, and Whitehead's Theory of the Self," Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, ed. George L. Kline (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 182-183.

[56] Ibid., p. 187. [57] Ibid.

XUM

He is led to this view by consideration of the fact that, for Whitehead, personal identity cannot sustain continuity of responsibility since it has the status of an enduring object or "nexus" (a pattern of order enduring through change and not a substantial reality) and all decisions are a function of actual occasions which do not endure.

Below, I argue we are morally responsible to other individuals and ourselves; and insofar as we are morally responsible to God, it is only in his status as an individual. The divine has no special moral prerogative. Further, I contend that while we are responsible only <u>for</u> the present and <u>to</u> the future, there is yet a derivative sense of responsibility for the past which does involve the appeal to the concept of personal identity. Namely, insofar as I affirm the identity which I inherit, I renew past decisions in the present and make them mine once again.[58] Thus, as Aristotle saw, moral responsibility for the past involves consideration of my knowledge of my actions and my present feelings of regret, approval, or indifference towards them. Moreover, without such a notion, involving appeal to the role played by elements within the <u>nexus</u> of my identity, I do not see how Sherburne could justify even his reformative theory of justice and punishment. "

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[58] 'Affirm' is perhaps too strong a word, since it suggests a conscious process. The critical question is whether the same dispositional tendencies are latent in the present individual and whether, conditions being similar, he would willingly gratify them as before.

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Daniel D. Williams in "Moral Obligation in Process Philosophy"[59] brings out the importance of:

> . . . the way in which the timing of any action is related to our obligation to perform it.[60]

He depicts Whitehead as reconciling the situational and absolutistic approaches to ethical decision through the notion that:

> . . . the absolute obligation to participate in the integrity of God's aim toward the fuller good also involves the obligation to reckon with the concrete possibilities in actual processes . . . .[61]

Professor Williams effectively brings out the relativistic and process side of Whitehead's moral thought together with the view that morality is the aim and effort toward progress (the standard of progress remaining vaguely defined in terms of the "fuller good" of "God's aim").

I think he is quite correct in concluding that:

> . . . moral obligation means present identification with a line of creative advance, or resistance to an evil tendency,[62]

provided that 'moral obligation' be replaced with 'morality' or else defined to mean 'self-commitment to a moral aim.'

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[59] Daniel D. Williams, "Moral Obligation in Process Philosophy," Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, ed. George L. Kline (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 189-195.

[60] Ibid., p. 194. [61] Ibid., p. 192.

[62] Ibid., p. 195.

Like Sherburne, Williams has misplaced emphasis upon the divine and also upon the concept of "moral obligation." In Whitehead's metaphysics, all "obligations" are "objective limitations" upon the creative freedom of a subject. They are imposed by his given origins and comprise the compulsive conditions within which he acts. Absolute obligations would be merely unavoidable necessities, representing ultimate mechanisms in the universe rather than free moral options. To suggest the priority of obligation over aim, as does Williams in claiming we are obliged to aim at the good, is to introduce an inappropriate Kantian conception of obligation to Whitehead.

Given Whitehead's views, statements of moral obligation could only express conditions for the realization of moral aim and, depending upon the flexibility of the situation, individually may or may not be mandatory. But as imperatives, they must be hypothetical. Moreover, if one interprets moral aim as itself being mandatory this would only be equivalent to holding that moral aim is induced by compelling non-moral reasons, one of which might be an irresistable divine teleology. I have argued below that none of these alternatives would be acceptable to Whitehead. The latter, in particular, would identify him far more closely with the Idealists than is warranted.

* * *

In general, the excessive identification of Whitehead

with the Idealists (particularly Bradley) is the principle shortcoming of Mr. Belaief's dissertation, "The Ethics of Alfred North Whitehead." It is impossible to fully acknowledge the points in respect of which Belaief has anticipated my own work. In some form or other, practically every major concept which I stress as essential to Whitehead's ethics is touched upon by Belaief. In each case, however, the meanings are somewhat different and occasionally quite opposite. These differences stem from a few fundamental disagreements in the interpretation of Whitehead's thought. Here I will ignore the many agreements and mention only the following claims of Belaief which are critically rejected in Chapter Three:

1. Whitehead "mistakenly and arbitrarily" concludes that there can be no useful interplay between "speculative and practical reason," an exaggeration which is opposite to and as equally mistaken as Dewey's belief.[63]

2. For Whitehead, God takes metaphysical priority over "Creativity" and all process is the finite "appearance" of change relative to the reality of a timeless and actually infinite deity. (Contrary to Whitehead's explicit insistence,

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[63] Lynne Belaief, "The Ethics of Alfred North Whitehead" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Columbia University, 1963), p. 28. This one misinterpretation may well lie behind the others. On this point, I must confess I am at a loss as to how Belaief could have so misread Whitehead since he insists upon the mutual importance of the practical and theoretic repeatedly in every one of his later works.

this involves the notion that God is atemporal and more "ultimate" than "temporal" actual entities.)[64]

3. Morality originates in religious insight into the unity of the universe within God and the ultimate and unattainable ideal of achieving this unity within finite existence. Further, Belaief claims that Whitehead agrees with Bradley in holding that the:

> . . . ethical self is a particular kind of life purpose, namely the aim to achieve relations of concern beyond his narrow self, ideally, with the entire universe.[65]

4. As a result of this moral aim at achieving an unattainable and infinite love, the ethical individual is plunged deeper and deeper into tragedy and despair, from which he can only be rescued by a divine gift of peace.[66]

5. Belaief speaks of the behavior of an actual entity in different situations as if it were a substantial being enduring change.[67] This may account for retention of

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[64] Ibid., pp. 29-42.

[65] Ibid., p. 116. Again, by failing to note the focal concern of morality with individuals ("the detailed occasion") and religion with an ultimate unity ("the unity of ideal inherent in the universe") Belaief "leap-frogs" over the moral perspective to leave it swallowed in the religious.

[66] This is the most persistent of Belaief's claims and among the most dubious. Indeed, there is a tragic "element" in Whitehead's notion of moral perspective but it is of far lesser significance than Belaief gives it and is greatly outweighed by the positive importance of "hope" and "love." The latter Belaief recognizes but not the former. Also there is a complete failure to note the self-rewarding character of love for other individuals.

[67] Belaief, op. cit., p. 74.

a concept of responsibility as "guilt" for the past. (Otherwise, the concept of responsibility in Whitehead's thought is effectively presented.)

Further, Belaief inadequately examines Whitehead's theory of feeling and the moral role of conceptual and emotional factors. This involves an ineffective treatment of Whitehead's distinction between "pure" and "real" potentiality with the consequent failure to recognize that a central function of morality is the consciously creative incorporation of novel possibilities into the real potential of the world. Thus the complex network of fact out of which events arise is restructured by the addition of novel facts. In failing to note that morality is the attempt to restructure features of reality itself, changing the world, Belaief misses the most fundamental distinction between Whitehead and Bradley, Hegel, Leibnitz, Royce, and others. Belaief repeatedly suggests that the world of actual change is an inferior shadow of a changeless reality which must be recaptured. The suggestion is even made that metaphysics is itself a hopeless but moral effort to achieve the knowledge of all situations, a knowledge which is possessed only by the infinite divinity.[68] All of these are static conceptions fundamentally alien to Whitehead's philosophy of Creativity.

Moreover, insofar as Belaief has postulated infinite

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[68] Nowhere have I found in Whitehead the concept of an "actual infinite" or an omniscient divine. It is not wholly clear that the divine is even actual for Whitehead.

and unattainable ideals for morality, such as self-identity with the universe and perfect knowledge, he argues that the ethical perspective is fundamentally irrational and requires an appeal to religion to be made rational. The irrationality is most intense with respect to the fact that man "as natural" desires happiness but "as ethical" has the conflicting obligation to be virtuous. The ultimate ethical tragedy is found in the fact that there is no guarantee of ultimate reward for this virtuous self-denial. Thus Belaief can raise

> . . . the rationalistic demand for the existence of a transcendent religious dimension. It is in this manner, and in this manner alone, that it could be shown that the irrational tension inherent in the natural world is not the final ethical reality.[69]

One "transcendent" resolution is the "peace" mentioned above; another is developed in an appendix where Belaief constructs a Whiteheadian argument for subjective immortality, requisite in order that there be an unending temporal scope for the realization of these objectives.

In my own interpretation of Whitehead's ethics, as distinguished from his philosophy of religion, I find no place for any of these notions. Indeed, they seem to be little more than an adaptation of the "postulates" developed by Kant in the latter portion of his second critique. They ignore the fundamental importance of creative process to

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[69]Belaief, op. cit., p. 206.

Whitehead's thought, and Whitehead's rejection of the attempts to treat value as transcendent to ordinary experience and his rejection of attempts to set man outside of nature. Moreover, Belaief's insistence that Whitehead believes morality must begin with religious experience flatly ignores Whitehead's claim that we discern signs of moral behavior in the higher non-human animals but do not observe signs of religion.[70] Whitehead's moral philosophy is more complex in its content than Belaief makes it but it is also more concrete. Morality is to be found in commonplace feelings and actions and not merely in the exotic tribulations characteristic of extreme sensitivities and extreme situations. Finally, Whiteheadian moral theory must begin with an analysis of experience, not a detailed description of God and his cosmic intents.

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[70]This is not to say that we might not encounter them someday. Cf. MT, pp. 38-39.

Chapter 3

THE MORAL PROCESS

> . . . Take any demand, however slight, which any creature, however weak, may make. Ought it not, for its own sole sake, to be satisfied? . . . Any desire is imperative to the extent of its amount; it makes itself valid by the fact that it exists at all.[1]
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> . . . Actuality is the self-enjoyment of importance. But this self-enjoyment has the character of the self-enjoyment of others melting into the enjoyment of the one self.[2]

VALUE

Elements of Morality

In this chapter, I offer a detailed exegesis and elucidation of the elements of Whitehead's moral philosophy in the course of answering objections which have been brought against it. Insofar as the ethics rests upon a metaphysical axiology, I have also incorporated justifications of several relevant metaphysical and axiological claims. However, these are only incidental to the discussion and no pretense to a thorough defense of Whitehead's metaphysics is intended.

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[1] William James, "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," Readings in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, ed. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1967), p. 32.

[2] MT, p. 161.

Such a task could not be handled incidentally.

As indicated at the conclusion of the preceding chapter, the examination of Whitehead's moral thought must begin with his account of experience. Indeed, this is true of all facets of his work, if only because of the importance of experiential categories in his metaphysics and the novelty of his concept of experience. In Modes of Thought, Whitehead defines morality as:

> . . . the control of process so as to maximize importance. It is the aim at greatness of experience in the various dimensions belonging to it.[3]

He goes on to claim that a general theory of morality is not concerned with stipulating specific rules of behavior.

> . . . What is universal is the spirit which should permeate any behaviour-system in the circumstances of its adoption. Thus morality does not indicate what you are to do in mythological abstractions. It does concern the general ideal which should be the justification for any particular objective.[4]

Elsewhere, Whitehead indicates that this moral "aim" or "ideal" is closely akin to "generality of outlook"[5] and that it may also be identified as ". . . the aim at a social perfection."[6]

In interpreting Whitehead's moral philosophy, I have structured this chapter around the task of explaining the elements involved in these definitions and indicating how they relate to each other. Taken apart from the fuller

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[3] MT, p. 19. [4] Ibid., p. 20. [5] PR, p. 23.
[6] AI, p. 289.

context of his thought, phrases like "maximize importance," "greatness of experience," "generality of outlook," and "social perfection" are apt to ring somewhat hollow, vague, and perplexing. For example, while the concept of aim as the controlling element of process is a familiar notion establishing Whitehead's moral theory as teleological, it yet remains that Whitehead's notions of "aim," "process," and "teleology" differ somewhat from those of other moral teleologists and process philosophers. The differences are directly traceable to his ontology of experience. Even less obvious is the equation of maximizing "importance" with the effort toward achieving "greatness of experience" in its "various dimensions." It is necessary to clarify the concepts of "importance," "experience," and the notion of magnitude involved together with that of "dimensions" of experience. Further, while the general attempt to treat value as "value experience" is a popular axiological strategy, the equation of maximizing "importance" with the aim at "social perfection" is less so. The latter seems to suggest elements of formalism not necessarily implicit in the former.

Again, the concepts of "society" and "perfection" must be developed, together with the relationships between the individual and the social. In particular, I have devoted some attention to distinguishing Whitehead's view from that of classical Utilitarianism. Certain statements make it tempting simply to identify Whitehead as a Utilitarian

XUM

(i.e., ". . . The effect of the present on the future is the business of morals."[7]). Also, Utilitarianism may be said to equate the increase of value experience, as the greatest happiness for the greatest number, with the perfection of society.

In his most detailed discussion of Utilitarianism (and Comte's "Religion of Humanity"), Whitehead praises its practical influence while criticizing its failure to provide adequate justification of moral motivation or explanation of either "fellow-feeling" or the notion of "The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number."

> For example, in the statement of the Utilitarian Principle, we find the phrase 'The Greatest Happiness of The Greatest Number.' Evidently this phrase has a meaning, at least sufficient for us to take it as a rough guide to action. . . . The 'Happiness' is evidently a recurrent, and it is differentiated into grades of intensity, so that one occurrence may be more intense than another in point of Happiness. But what is meant by the addition of the Happinesses of different occurrences. There is no occurrence with the Happiness of this addition sum. At least, if there be such an occurrence, it ought to be indicated in the principle . . . .[8]

He concludes his discussion with a general objection to the vagueness which results from not developing the ontological underpinnings of the theory:

> As usually employed, the phrase refers to the greatest number of men. It therefore refers to endurances and not to occurrences. But can we really correlate the happinesses of three short-lived men with that of one longlived man? Then again there are the qualitative differences between different types of happiness. Finally we conclude

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[7] AI, p. 268. [8] Ibid., p. 47.

> that before we can profitably proceed with this discussion, it is necessary to attain some clarity in our metaphysical notions respecting endurances, occurrences, and things that recur.[9]

It is worth observing at this point that Whitehead consistently stresses the notion of morality as a certain sort of "aim"; moreover, it is not a particular aim at a particular result but a component of other aims comprising their moral character. Thus like most teleologists but unlike most Utilitarians, Whitehead does not distinguish between moral intentions or motivation and moral actions. As is shown below, Whitehead holds that the effects of an individual's actions may be said to have moral value apart from his intentions only insofar as they contribute to the morality of other agents. Otherwise, their value is non-moral.[10] In this sense, he also differs from Frankena with respect to the latter's claim that moral teleologists advocate the aim

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[9] Ibid., pp. 47-48.

[10] The emphasis which Mill places upon the independence of the morality of an action and the virtue of the agent's intentions is dubious at best. If it is meant literally, then the Utilitarian Principle applies to evaluating the effects of an event and the origin of that event in a conscious agent is irrelevant. Thus we should be obliged to speak of the morality of hurricanes and pleasant weather insofar as they contribute to the general happiness. While we do occasionally speak of the "moral value" of such events, i.e., as contributing to the embittered or benevolent disposition of a populace or causing men to "pull together," it certainly seems odd to speak of their morality. Moreover, when natural events are found to have moral value it is often when their effects re happiness are calamitous rather than propitious. The moral value may then be identified as a solace for the non-moral loss.

at non-moral value.[11] For Whitehead, moral aim may be at non-moral value, moral value, or both.

Finally, in developing his own alternative to the Utilitarian concept of happiness, Whitehead suggests three generic features of "value experience" which are themselves examined in the latter portion of this chapter.

> . . . Morality is always the aim at that union of harmony, intensity, and vividness which involves the perfection of importance for that occasion.[12]

In the same context I also examine Whitehead's views on several central topics of moral philosophy, including the relationship between practical and theoretic reason, Good and Evil, moral feelings and moral ideals, and the relationship between morality and religion.

Creative Values

The axiological import of Whitehead's work has never been given the attention that has been devoted to some of its ontological, epistemological, and theological implications. This is strange, since it is not an exaggeration to say that Whitehead's concept of value is the most fundamental notion in his metaphysics. The explanation may lie in the fact that Whitehead is most often approached by individuals with an interest in process metaphysics who turn to Process and Reality as their definitive source. In this work, Whitehead

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[11] William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 13.

[12] MT, p. 19.

employs the term 'Creativity' to identify his ultimate metaphysical category. While 'Creativity' brings out the emphasis upon process, it customarily is regarded as identifying a generic concept of value only within the field of fine art. Perhaps it was this narrowness which led Whitehead to replace it with 'Importance' in Modes of Thought. In any event, 'Creativity' is employed comparatively infrequently in works written after Process and Reality.

It is in Modes of Thought that Whitehead defines actuality as "the self-enjoyment of importance."[13] Later in the same work, he adds:

> . . . Everything has some value for itself, for others, and for the whole. This characterizes the meaning of actuality. By reason of this character, constituting reality, the conception of morals arises.[14]

In his critique of mechanistic materialism in Science and the Modern World, Whitehead had already stressed this notion in arguing against the separation of fact and value:

> . . . The organism is a unit of emergent value, . . .[15]

and

> . . . The event constitutes a patterned value . . . .[16]

Thus to exist is to be an instance of value and to express a "type" of value. 'Importance' and 'Creativity' are employed

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[13] Cf. the opening citation from Whitehead in this chapter.

[14] MT, p. 151. [15] SMW, p. 101. [16] Ibid., p. 111.

as virtual synonyms for 'value' and 'worth.' Unfortunately for Whitehead's purposes, the latter have certain static connotations which are not as conducive to bringing out the notion of process.

From the above, it is obvious that Whitehead's theory of value is most emphatically a realism. However, it is not a realism in the classical Platonic sense of a view holding that values are transcendent realities. Indeed, in my argument against the separation of fact and value in the opening chapter, I have already suggested that value transcends fact. But it transcends fact only insofar as it is a broader metaphysical category, in relation to which "fact" has the status of being one basic type of value. Whitehead's realism is also a naturalism. In his objection to the dichotomizing of fact and value, he is as much opposed to a transcendentalism which sets values outside of nature as he is to any view which treats them as irrelevant to explaining events. Moreover, it is precisely Whitehead's insistence upon man, and thus human value, as being part of nature that leads Whitehead to reject Hume's treatment of value judgments as facts about ourselves but not facts about the world.[17]

However, while most naturalists have fallen into the trap of reductionism by attempting to define value in terms of one species of fact, Whitehead avoids this by recognizing value as the generic notion. Thus, for example, while Mill

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[17]Supra, pp. 15-17.

treats value as one aspect of experiential fact characteristic of sentient beings, Whitehead argues for a concept of value applicable to all individuals in nature. Obviously the attempt to define such a notion poses great dangers of anthropomorphism.[18] This task is further complicated by two facts. As an ultimate notion, "Importance" can not be defined by the appeal to more basic constituents or more general categories. At the same time, like most axiologists, Whitehead places great stress upon intrinsic importance and he claims that intrinsic value is possessed by every complete existent. One essential feature of Whitehead's moral theory is the claim that extrinsic value is in part a function of intrinsic value.

When Whitehead refers to "everything" having "some value for itself" he is expressing his concept of intrinsic value. Together with his "principle of essential relativity," expressed in the concept of "value for others, and for the whole," it embodies the basic foundation of his moral philosophy. Again these are given in the statement:

> . . . Actuality is the self-enjoyment of importance. But this self-enjoyment has the character of the self-enjoyment of others melting into the enjoyment of the one self.[19]

I have reserved discussion of "the principle of essential

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[18] In fact, 'prehension' is one term introduced by Whitehead in the effort to avoid an anthropomorphic interpretation of his analysis of primitive entities.

[19] MT, p. 161.

relativity" for the moment. The point to be stressed here is that ". . . the phrase 'intrinsic importance' means 'importance for itself.'"[20] Traditional concepts of intrinsic value have been developed in terms of the notion of that which has value "in" itself. It is the attempt to make sense of this notion which has most often led to transcendentalism of various sorts. Moreover, the notorious difficulty of agreeing upon that which is valuable in itself has always been a major bulwark of subjectivism and relativism in their most extreme forms.

The defining of value in terms of "value experience" and intrinsic value in terms of satisfactory objects has been one strategy in the axiological effort to avoid these difficulties. However, there is often an ambiguity about the locus of value in the works of those who argue for a concept of that which has value for "its own sake." For example, in Moore's analysis, intrinsic value seems to be a characteristic of that which is satisfactory in its own rights--apart from any other consideration--rather than consisting in the satisfaction which is felt. Again, where satisfactory states of consciousness are regarded as intrinsically valuable, they are treated as objects of interest possessed of the property of value. Such an approach is still subject to all of the criticisms raised by those who stress disagreements on the desirability of the same object.

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[20] Ibid., p. 162.

Moreover, in attempting to make clear this notion of value, Moore has to take recourse to his "non-natural" properties.

For Whitehead, an entity has value "for its own sake" or "in itself" in the sense that it has value "for itself." This is to say that Whitehead's concept of intrinsic value replaces the idea of satisfying objects with that of satisfied subjects. Thus he contends that:

> . . . if we discard the notion of vacuous existence, we must conceive each actuality as attaining an end for itself.[21]

The problem then is that of developing a concept of having "value for itself" and of "subject" which enables Whitehead to attribute value to every existent without becoming excessively anthropomorphic. At this point, Whitehead's concepts of Importance, Creativity, Value, and experience all come together in terms of his "ontological principle."

His argument is basically empirical, contending that experience is fundamentally a "sense of importance," that the first glimmering of awareness

> . . . reveals, Something that matters.[22]

The Important is essentially that which makes a difference, which has an effect and every effect must be grounded in some actuality.[23] Of course, the idea of a mere effect is a high abstraction, since every effect, as a value, will have

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[21] _FR_, p. 30. [22] _MT_, p. 159.

[23] This is one of the reasons why Whitehead argues that evil must be conceived as a positive existent and not a mere lack.

its own specific character. Philosophers of value have concentrated upon only those things which make a major difference in human life, arrogating value to this domain. Moreover in the tradition of Humian empiricism, the activity of elements in experience (whereby their effect is felt) is arbitrarily isolated from them. It is then opposed to them as a subjective activity independent of what are regarded as passively given objects. One might expect pragmatists to be in sympathy with this conception of value. However, the notion of "making a difference" is often limited to overtly observable behavior. Again a line is drawn amidst the content of nature.

If Importance is taken to mean "mattering" or "making a difference," the idea of an entity having "importance" for itself thus becomes the idea of every entity in nature having some effect upon itself. Thus when Whitehead asserts that ". . . we must conceive of each actuality as attaining an end for itself," he is only asserting that even in the most primitive existences we must acknowledge an element of self-determination or creativity. Thus it should be stressed at the outset that Whitehead's concept of intrinsic value, as the ultimate feature of an existent, does not attribute consciousness to primitive life forms or atoms. He is holding that in any complete actuality there must be an element of internal functioning which contributes at least something to its identity not wholly traceable to external

causes.[24]

Whitehead acknowledges that 'importance' is often used conventionally to identify the notion of extrinsic or instrumental value and suggests that the term "Interest" might have technical advantages for expressing his notion of intrinsic worth--at least with respect to human individuals. However, as indicated above, he argues for the dependence of extrinsic value upon intrinsic value. The effect of this move is to deny emphatically the view which treats placement and gradation of "importance" as a subjective imposition of perspective onto a neutral datum. Thus he defines extrinsic "importance"[25] as:

> . . . 'Interest, involving that intensity of individual feeling which leads to publicity of

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[24]The arguments as to why one should hold to such a broad concept of value are much the same as the arguments as to why one should do metaphysics. If concepts are applicable throughout all spheres of cognitive interest and allow for the interpretation of more specific notions, then they are at least as desirable as more specific concepts which are equally effective but do not allow of such applicability. Moreover, they secure communication between diverse areas of cognitive interest and forestall potential conflicts, while affording cross-fertilization of ideas. Even if no other justification were forthcoming, one might always appeal to the persistent human desire for a unified vision of things. In this instance, one can point to the classical difficulties of introducing a concept of value at the human level where it is not recognized at more primitive levels of nature. Man is constantly set outside of nature or else that which he feels as most important in life, his own sense of importances, is reduced to the arbitrary or irrelevant.

[25]Presumably the shift to lower case implies that 'importance' is no longer being employed in its strict technical sense. This seems to be a common piece of Whiteheadian style.

expression.'[26]

'Interest' is the term which Whitehead employs to identify both sides of the function by which the "objective," or public, worth of an entity is derived from its antecedent realization of intrinsic worth. 'Interest' has a dipolar ambiguity that is most useful to his purpose. If we speak of the "interest" of an individual, we may be referring either to his capacity as an object of appeal to seize our own interest or to those elements which dominate his own subjective concern.

However, the emergence of the individual is the self-realization of an identity expressed in his final form.

> . . . To be an actual entity is to have a self-interest.[27]

> . . . The essence of existence lies in the transition from datum to issue. This is the process of self-determination. . . . Actuality in its essence is aim at self-formation.[28]

The point to be made is that the attribution of "interest" to the object itself as a datum in the former sense requires the operation of 'interest' in the latter sense, now rendered public in the self-realized identity attained by the individual.

> . . . My importance is my emotional worth now, embodying in itself derivations from the whole, and from the other facts, and . . . reference to future creativity.[29]

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[26] MT, p. 11. [27] RM, p. 97. [28] MT, p. 131.

[29] Ibid., p. 160.

The individual is an occasion of value achievement which realizes itself and is what interests it.

In Whitehead's ontology, an individual occasion comes into being as an event of experiential synthesis involving the interaction of subjective interest or "aim," as an element of subordinating and organizing structure, and the antecedent world, given as "datum." This "datum" defines the domain of "fact" and limits the process of self-determination through the definite character and effective value of its component elements. The importance of the occasion resides in the quality and intensity of the value experience realized within itself which will determine the ultimate significance of the emergent character.

> . . . this doctrine of feelings and their subject is best illustrated by our notion of moral responsibility. The subject is responsible for being what it is in virtue of its feelings. It is also derivatively responsible for the consequences of its existence because they flow from its feelings.[30]

> . . . Such responsibility is conditioned by the limits of the data, and by the categoreal conditions of concrescence.[31]

Thus within the process of self-formation, there are three major factors which may be characterized abstractly as: "subjective form" constituting a teleological urge toward particular identity involving limiting conditions; "physical data" constituting the material of the past submitting to present synthesis and resisting it; and the creative

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[30] PR, p. 339. [31] Ibid., p. 390.

resolution whereby the indefinite outcome is spontaneously given a unique and final definiteness. The "issue" of the process is the entity itself, as a completed moment of value experience, creatively ordering and representing the data, and now passed into a fact of value. The intrinsic value of the individual is his emotional attainment, in part of internal origin, considered with respect to the internal viewpoint of its emergence. The instrumental value, or "value for others," is this same attainment made public.

In Modes of Thought, Whitehead objects to "subjectivism":

> We may well ask whether the doctrine of perspective is not an endeavor to reduce the concept of importance to mere matter-of-fact devoid of intrinsic interest. Of course such reduction is impossible. But it is true to say that perspective is the dead abstraction of mere fact from the living importance of things felt. The concrete truth is the variation of interest; the abstraction is the universe in perspective . . . .[32]

Here, he is attempting to show this concept of intrinsic worth in its most concrete form. The "variation of interest" to which he refers is interest of the object as realized for itself in present subjective experience. Simply put, this is to say that some entities are in fact more interesting than others. But now the "object" can be said to be realized "for itself" only in the sense that it has now become an identifying component in the present subject. The ordering of significance is not merely the imposition of subjective

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[32] MT, p. 15; italics not in the original.

value onto the neutral. Moreover, the distinction between the subjective and objective is itself an abstraction which can be misleading. It is more concrete to say that the specification of an "interest" is the identification of an activity of qualitative relation involving necessary reference to the characters of both subject and datum for its adequate analysis.

The doctrine of intrinsic worth does not imply the existence of a static quality "worth" to be predicated of enduring substantial entities. Rather the realization of "importance" is itself a complex relational activity. Teleological self-determination requires that the objective identity finally realized by the emergent subjective activity be capable of relating the subject to itself as a satisfying fulfillment. By this I mean that what enters the experiential synthesis as an antecedently realized individual, having instrumental value for the presently emerging individual, becomes a component of the final identity which the present individual determines for himself. Thus, it becomes an element in the intrinsic value of the present individual. This is the precise import of Whitehead's principle of essential relativity whereby he holds that past events become components of the identity of present events and not merely external causes of their origination. "Intrinsic worth" presupposes in an event an activity of self-appreciative interaction with its own constituents within which it realizes its "self-interest."

Whitehead's account of the epochal character of change depends in part upon the above considerations. In general, he holds that experience reveals events in nature as wholes spanning durations the character of which can not be fully understood in terms of their partial identity at a moment. In defending this claim he appeals not only to the organic processes of biological study but also the vibratory phenomena of physics. The quantified character of change is traced to the expression of this internal activity of an individual occasion wherein it determines its own becoming in causal independence of its contemporaries. The causal independence of contemporaries is a familiar interpretation of relativity physics. The epochal character of becoming is a prerequisite of self-determination within which the completion of a novel identity requires closure. Whitehead applies genetic analysis to this activity but holds that temporal analysis is inappropriate, since temporal analysis of an individual occasion can only express one aspect of its relationship to other occasions and a cross section of the duration of an individual occasion would not concretely relate one occasion to another. It would only impose relation onto an incomplete actuality, i.e., an abstraction. The becoming of individual occasions does not occur within time since temporality is derivative from the becoming of the individual occasions. However, the theory of final causation is one factor invoked to explain the observed epochal character of change. The latter is not invoked on

behalf of the former.

In summary, the intrinsic value of an entity comprises the identity which it realizes for itself, involving elements of character derived from antecedent individuals. Just as it is constituted in part by its incorporation of other occasions, the value which it realizes for itself will constitute an element in subsequent occasions. It may be said to have intrinsic value for other occasions, i.e., to be part of their intrinsic value, in the degree determined by the role it plays in shaping the subjective self-determination of the new occasions. By virtue of this function, an entity exerts a self-replicative influence on his environment.[33] However, the self-replication can not be absolute, for even were it not for the presence of other determinants in a novel occasion, the novel emergent would have to deviate by virtue of at least adding another increment of value achievement. Otherwise there would be no new occasion.

In a process philosophy, there is no enduring substance to sustain reality through change. Moreover, any novel event will comprise the realization of novel value, constructive or destructive. It follows that in an ontology of events there must always be progress or regression, otherwise there will be literally nothing. The explanation of continuing process necessarily involves an account of the means whereby novel possibilities for self-realization can

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[33]Whitehead's concept of "objective immortality."

be entertained. This requires a further examination of "Importance."[34]

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[34]The justification of an event ontology itself is somewhat outside the scope of this paper. Its principle advantages over a substance or "thing" ontology have to do with explaining change itself and the relationships of individuals. In particular, an event ontology lends itself to a doctrine of internal relations in a manner which a "thing" ontology does not. As I indicate in the sections of this chapter dealing with society and social consciousness, the doctrine of internal relations has great value for moral philosophy--both by way of explanation and resolving such problems as the egoism-altruism conflict. Moreover, the disadvantages of the classical conception of "substance" are sufficiently well known to obviate the need to rehearse them. While "substance" metaphysicians have occasionally charged that the concept of personal identity in an event ontology is inadequate for moral purposes, I contend below that, on the contrary, it has advantages.

One of the most prominent critics of an event ontology is Wilfred Sellars. However, to the extent that I am familiar with them, I do not see that his criticisms apply to Whitehead's views. In "Time and the World-Order," he argues that "episode-expressions" are derivative from "thing" or "substance" statements. However, there are two difficulties here. First of all, Sellars appeals to Reichenbach's Introduction to Symbolic Logic for the demonstration of his point. Even if Reichenbach's arguments (and Sellars') be accepted, I do not see that they establish anything other than the equipollence of thing-language and event-language. Such a demonstration would establish the derivability of each from the other with no primacy assigned to either.

Moreover, Sellars' paradigm of an 'episode-expression' is "S {is becoming, became, will become} ϕ." Such an expression would not constitute an event statement in the ontology of any contemporary process philosopher. It treats "S" as a subject of change enduring a modification of properties. This is merely to recast substance metaphysics. The whole point of Whitehead's account of becoming is to argue the inadequacy of such a notion. We must speak of the becoming of "S" himself. Endurance is merely replication.

Sellars acknowledges that this analysis does not apply to Whitehead's usage, and goes so far as to grant that an "event-language" differs from a thing-language only as a "reaxiomatization" of the latter. He continues:

". . . Which is the 'correct' axiomatization? If this is interpreted as a question concerning the structure of 'ordinary' temporal discourse, it seems to me perfectly

Importance

As indicated above, in Modes of Thought Whitehead makes importance the "category of the ultimate." Subsequent remarks in the same text occasioned Schilpp's criticism that Importance is a composite which may be analyzed into more

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clear that the basic individuals of this universe of discourse are things and persons--in short the 'substances' of classical philosophy. It is, I believe, only when the deeper levels of physical theory are approximated that the framework of 'events'-in-Time ceases to be a mere reaxiomatization of the framework of changing-things-in-Time and becomes, instead, the anticipation of a scientific (rather than metaphysical) framework in which the temporal dimension of the macro-world finds its adequate theoretical counterpart in a dimension of physical content." Wilfred Sellars, "Time and the World Order," Scientific Explanation, Space and Time, Vol. III, Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, ed. Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), p. 594. Thus Sellars concludes with an appeal to ordinary language which falls rather hollow after the quantity of extraordinary and formal language employed by Professor Sellars himself. However, it is not obvious that "ordinary temporal discourse" (whatever that may be) refers to persons and things in the manner of classical substances. Indeed, the characterization of both animate and inanimate individuals in terms of modes of functioning or activity is a feature of quite a bit of our talk. Even if his claim were correct, it would only underscore Whitehead's emphasis upon the metaphysical influence wrought upon our language by the Aristotelean tradition.

Again, I am not familiar with any event ontology that attributes metaphysical primacy to "'events'-in-Time." For Whitehead, all systems of temporal analysis are abstractions characterizing orders of relation derived from events or imposed onto them. Further, Sellars acknowledges that these languages are not really equipollent, and that there are domains where event-language finds application beyond thing-language. Is not this in itself a reason for preference of the former? A reconstruction of ordinary language might help save us from having to make the difficult distinction which Sellars draws between theoretical physics and metaphysics (not to mention the possibility which it offers for resolving the problem of relationships in a more effective manner than denying their existence).

fundamental elements. Further, Belaief has made the claim that Whitehead's concept of Importance is to be identified simply with his concept of deity. Among the references in question are the following:

> . . . there are two aspects to Importance; one based on the unity of the Universe, the other on the individuality of the details. The word 'Interest' suggests the latter aspect; the word 'Importance' leans towards the former.[35]

> . . . Importance is primarily monistic in its reference to the Universe. . . . In some sense or other, Importance is derived from the immanence of infinitude in the finite.[36]

> . . . It [the universe] includes a factor of unity, involving in its essence the connexity of things, unity of purpose, and unity of enjoyment. The whole notion of importance is referent to this ultimate unity. There is also equally fundamental in the Universe, a factor of multiplicity. There are many actualities, each with its own experience, enjoying individually, and yet requiring each other.[37]

Whitehead does not mean here that there are two "parts" which in combination constitute "importance." For Whitehead, an "aspect" of a thing is its character as viewed from one perspective. However, differences of perspective are differences in the analytic approach taken toward the object. To say that there are two aspects to Importance is only to say that there are two ultimate approaches which can be taken to

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[35] MT, p. 11. [36] Ibid., p. 28.

[37] Ibid., p. 70. It should be noted that in this citation, Whitehead is employing 'importance' with the lower case as expressing only one aspect of "Importance" in its technical use.

considering it in abstraction.[38]

Here Whitehead says that in essence the universe is a process of the realization of Importance.[39] 'Importance' identifies the activity of achieving value in uniting an objective plurality of individuals within a subjective unity of present experiential realization. This unity itself comprises one individuality among a new many, actively

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[38]Similarly, there are an infinite number of aspects in terms of which I may describe an individual's face. This is true, even if I ignore the vast variety of approaches to description and limit myself to differences of apparent shape as viewed from different angles. Although the description is necessarily limited by perspective, to call it perspectival is not to deny that the character of the description is primarily a function of the face described. It is the face as encountered from a limited viewpoint. I might wish to say that my concept of the face was a construct relative to which each of these descriptive approaches would have the status of a "part." However, I can not imagine attributing primary ontological status to them as "parts" of the face itself. Whitehead seems to hold throughout his works that ultimate metaphysical perspectives involve a dipolarity. Incoherence can be avoided only by recognizing the opposing factors as complementary extremes of emphasis in a single process separable only by abstractive intellect. I take it that Whitehead's intention here is to express a claim about metaphysical principles highly analogous to the interpretation of 'complementarity' in physics by Niels Bohr, R.J. Oppenheimer, and others.

[39]In answer to Schilpp's objection to Whitehead's subsumption of morality under importance, I can remark only that if morality has any place within the universe it must be dealt with in terms of Importance. This is a point which Schilpp seems to miss. Moreover, I can not believe that Schilpp would either deny that morality is important or deny that there are other things than morality which are also important. Of course, it might be another matter if Schilpp had attacked the metaphysical priority of this category. However he did not do so. But the real point is that whatever matters is important and whatever exists matters. Otherwise, we would have no grounds upon which to assert its existence.

originating novel "concrescence." These are not independent processes, they are opposite sides of the same ontological coin. Passage into objective individuality is simultaneously participation in the generation of novel subjective unification. This is implicit in the definition of "importance" as:

> . . . 'Interest, involving that intensity of individual feeling which leads to publicity of expression.'[40]

The process of reality is always "toward" unity but from the multiplicity which it constantly achieves.

Importance is primarily referent to unity insofar as a process is to be identified in terms of its goal. The process of "interest" is the process of importance, but now viewed in the light of the realization that any presently attained mode of unification will involve an element of inadequacy resulting in its abandonment to new unifications.

> . . . Thus, for the sake of reminding ourselves of this aspect of 'Importance,' the word 'Interest' will occasionally be used as a synonym. But 'Importance' is a fundamental notion not to be fully explained by any reference to a finite number of other factors.[41]

The doctrine of "essential relativity" in relation to the concept of "importance" expresses the notion that the universe be understood as the organic realization of value. The process is the growth of an organismic event, constantly surpassing itself. The organism is at once a unity and a

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[40] MT, p. 11. [41] Ibid.

plurality, but these concepts are themselves inadequate for the expression of organism. "Interest" is that manifestation of importance which becomes apparent to us when we view the world given to us as "other." It is the realization of individual unities. Within this perspective it characterizes both the world as given in its plurality and myself as subjectively active.

"Importance" is "primarily monistic" in that the fundamental direction of process is toward higher types of realized unity. Whitehead's reference to the "immanence of infinitude in the finite" is by no means necessarily to be taken as a suggestion that the emergence of importance is a function of the intervention of deity. Such a Deus ex machina concept would be fundamentally inconsistent with Whitehead's insistence that God be regarded as only another actual occasion, subject to the same fundamental metaphysical principles as all lesser entities. Belaief's interpretation becomes another attempt to place value in a transcendent domain. Moreover, this notion seems to assume the conception of deity in traditional terms of an "actual infinite."[42]

The "infinite" for Whitehead is that which is devoid of static limitation, but in the special sense of surpassing itself. When the importation of antecedent values into the unity of a present subject becomes the objective postulation of one more realized individual among the many, we achieve

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[42]Cf. the conclusion, Chapter 2, pp. 86-91.

"Expression" as ". . . the activity of finitude impressing itself on its environment."[43] However,

> . . . Importance, limited to a finite individual occasion, ceases to be important.[44]

'Importance' primarily refers to the activity of subjective incorporation. The actual world is the determinate world and within it there are only disparate individuals, regardless of the internal connexity of their origins. Whitehead's concept of the infinite requires only the notion of ongoing process freed from final determinations.

> . . . Now process is the way by which the universe escapes from the exclusions of inconsistency. Such exclusions belong to the finitude of circumstance. By means of process, the universe escapes from the limitations of the finite. Process is the immanence of the infinite in the finite; whereby all bounds are burst, and all inconsistencies dissolved.[45]

By the "infinite," Whitehead here need mean nothing more than the element of creative freedom in the individual occasion by which it generates novel aim transcending its own present identity.

It is the spark of mentality which is the ability to introduce novelty of function.

> . . . the swing over from re-enaction to anticipation is due to the intervening touch of mentality. Whether the ideas thus introduced by the

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[43] MT, p. 28.

[44] Ibid. It does so, literally, because it would cease to exist. This is to say that which has importance only for the individual perishes with him.

[45] Ibid., p. 75.

> novel conceptual prehensions be old or new, they have this decisive result, that the occasion arises as an effect facing its past and ends as a cause facing its future. In between there lies the teleology of the Universe.[46]

> . . . conceptual registration is conceptual valuation; and conceptual valuation introduces creative purpose.[47]

> . . . desire is consequent on . . . [conceptual feeling] rather than . . . [conceptual feeling] on desire; for the . . . [conceptual feeling] is the starting point.[48]

The finite is that which is actual. The infinite identifies the realm of possibilities which though definite in character are indeterminate in their mode of entrance into actuality. Simply to identify the infinite with the divine would also be to identify all conceptual activity with the divine.[49] The result is very likely to be a static absolute monism of the sort presented by Bradley. Indeed, this is in fact the conclusion arrived at by Belaief. It is a notion explicitly

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[46] AI, pp. 195-196. [47] PR, p. 380.

[48] Ibid., pp. 522-523.

[49] Moreover, it would both theologically and ontologically contravene Whitehead's desire to avoid an anthropomorphic interpretation of his metaphysical categories. Indeed, for this purpose "conceptual registration" is preferable to "mentality" and "prehension" to "feeling." Basically, Whitehead argues that if complex realities are analyzed in terms of simpler entities, and the concepts of these simpler entities do not adequately account for phenomena in the more complex, then reductionism will result. On the other hand, if categories can be found adequate to deal with both, then the problem can be avoided. Here "conceptual" need mean only "originative" and the conceptual activity of primitive occasions might be limited to the spontaneous origination of position.

rejected by Whitehead. Only by ignoring Whitehead's manipulation of meaning and unique sense of humor, together with some of his most fundamental methodological and metaphysical principles, can we interpret his meaning here as indicating the dependence of objective value upon the intervention of an "actually infinite" deity.

The unity of the universe, to which Whitehead refers, is realized in the integrity of each individual occasion of existence just as the infinity of importance is referent to the potential of its origins and the potential in its own creativity prior to finite determination. To interpret this in the manner of Belaief (and Sherburne) as the assertion that value is a gift of divinity to the individual while individuality is the provision of a means of finite realization for divinity would be to impose upon these passages a very unfortunate traditional Christian concept and to defeat entirely Whitehead's solution to the problem of "the one and the many." It is rather the case that, from the perspective of the finite occasion, God would have the objective status of only one more individual among the many. Although Whitehead opts explicitly for the concept of a divinity as a supreme unity of experience, the status of the divine is one of the most controversial issues in Whiteheadian scholarship and there is sufficient latitude within his metaphysics to allow for a concept of "emergent divinity," in which case divinity could refer only to the creativity of each occasion. When Whitehead asserts that:

> . . . Deity expresses the lure of the ideal which is the potentiality beyond immediate fact,[50]

the interpretation depends upon where one places the emphasis. The concept of divinity may be an expression for the operation of ideality, or ideality may be an expression of divine operation.

Whitehead's ontology is an ontology of individuals, and individuality bridges the gap between the multitude and the one. Unification is individualization and individualization is addition of novelty generating an element in a new plurality.

> . . . The individual immediacy of an occasion is the final unity of subjective form, which is the occasion as an absolute reality. This immediacy is its moment of sheer individuality, bounded on either side by essential relativity. The occasion arises from relevant objects, and perishes into the status of an object for other occasions. But it enjoys its decisive moment of absolute self-attainment as emotional unity. . . . The creativity of the world is the throbbing emotion of the past hurling itself into a new transcendent fact.[51]

The clarification of this notion of essential relativity and "conceptual valuation" requires examination of Whitehead's unusual concept of emotion.

Emotion

For Whitehead, expression is itself emotion. Within the tradition of classical empiricism, the account of experience and particularly of emotion is a passive account. This same account seems to be presupposed in Schilpp's objection to Whitehead's basing morality upon "the quicksand" of

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[50] MT, p. 139. [51] AI, p. 179.

the emotions. Experience is treated as something that simply happens. Although in the Kantian tradition, the concepts of perceptual judgment and constitutive intellect assign a role of active agency to the perceiver, nevertheless the manifolds of "inner" and "outer sense" seem to retain their Humean character. Within the Whiteheadian account, both of these elements of experience constitute activities which start out being done "for" some yet unrealized individuality and wind up being done both "by" and "to" the emergent subject. This is perhaps the single most difficult element to interpret in Whitehead's ontology. In Process and Reality, he attempts to express this notion with the phrase, "the feelings aim at the feeler."

If I am correct in my understanding of Whitehead on this point, he is saying that the final determination of the perishing actual occasion is the externalization of experiential activity. This activity co-operates with other such expressions to realize at one and the same time the emergence of novel conceptual activity in a subject as well as the objective presentation of itself as a datum to this subjectivity. In other words, the termination of one actual occasion is simultaneously the ground of origination of another which, though deviating in the realization of its own individuality, nevertheless involves the "representational" preservation of the other within itself.

"Emotion" used in this generalized sense might be defined as simply "that which moves"; it is another

expression for 'Importance':

> . . . The basis of experience is emotional. Stated more generally, the basic fact is the rise of an effective tone originating from things whose relevance is given.[52]

The affective tone arises from given objects whose "givenness" is to the subject comprised by the activity of their affective tones. As actual, the "things" are just this activity.

> . . . The key notion from which . . . [a metaphysics] should start is that the energetic activity considered in physics is the emotional intensity entertained in life.[53]

Express emotional activity is subjective insofar as it fuses in its affective tone with the affective tone of its environment to generate a new unity of experience; however, it is seen as passively given or "objective" insofar as it is regarded in its individuality. Whitehead employs the term 'physical' to identify those elements in the complex of feeling which are directly derivative from antecedent individual feelings.

Aside from this application of experiential categories to the interpretation of physical activity, Whitehead underscores two ways in which his account of experience differs from traditional, particularly Humean, empiricism. Initially, he wants to reject the primacy of sensory experience:

> . . . Undoubtedly there are these sensa, such as

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[52] AI, p. 178. [53] MT, pp. 231-232.

> sensations of colour, sound, and so on. But it is then assumed that because they are definite, therefore they are fundamental.
>
> The other factors in experiences are therefore to be construed as derivative, in the sense of owing their origin to these sensa. Emotions, aspirations, hopes, fears, love, and hate, intentions, and recollections are merely concerned with sensa. Apart from sensa, they would be non-existent.
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> This is the doctrine which in this lecture is being denied.[54]

Sense experience is not only not basic but is an abstractively sophisticated and limited mode of selective emphasis in experience.

> . . . Sense-experience is an abstraction . . . It increases importance,[55]

by adding greatly to the vividness of experience and our means of emphasis. Of much more importance to the primitive processes of experience are the "non-sensuous modes of perception" whereby the immediate past is preserved within the present and continuity of aim is established between successive occasions. Also noteworthy is the claim that while sensa are derivative from more basic modes of emotional experience, they are themselves emotional in character.

> . . . Every impression of sensation is a distinct existence, declares Hume; and there can be no reasonable doubt of this doctrine. But even Hume clothes each impression with force and liveliness. It must be distinctly understood that no prehension, even of bare sensa, can be divested of its affective tone . . . .
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> . . . our habitual interpretations of these barren sensa are in the main satisfying to common sense, though in particular instances liable to error. But the evidence on which these interpretations are based is entirely drawn from the vast background and

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[54] MT, p. 152. [55] Ibid., p. 154.

> foreground of non-sensuous perception with which sense-perception is fused, and without which it can never be. We can discern no clean-cut sense-perception wholly concerned with present fact.
>
> In human experience, the most compelling example of non-sensuous perception is our knowledge of our own immediate past.[56]

Epistemologically, Whitehead's point is simply that sensory experience is one mode of emotional activity not meriting any preferential regard in the attempt to comprehend actuality. All perception is emotional in character and all emotion is the realization of value either in the subjective form of aim or the objective form of individual achievements. Unfortunately, the pressure of more basic necessities and the tedium of repetitions tend to dim our recognition of the affective quality of such sensa as colors. It is more important to children and artists who strongly feel emotional aspects of experience that emerge for the rest of us only in fortunate moments. Essentially the claim is that the loveliness of an experienced apple is not a reaction to the redness, rather the satisfaction felt has the character of an enjoyment of the apple redly. The enjoyment of the redness itself is a secondary reaction of higher order consciousness.

Ontologically, it affords an account of the continuity of nature whereby it is possible to have ongoing process embracing the plurality of occasions. The activity of the immediate past directly enters into the constitution of the present with the primitive subjective activity of the

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[56] AI, pp. 182-183.

novel occasion being comprised by the terminal subjective self-appreciation of antecedently realized characters.

> . . . our immediate past is constituted by that occasion, or by that group of fused occasions, which enters into experience devoid of any perceptible medium intervening . . . . Roughly speaking, it is that portion of our past lying between a tenth of a second and half a second ago.[57]

> . . . The mere word 'memory' explains nothing. The first phase in the immediacy of the new occasion is that of the conformation of feelings. The feeling as enjoyed by the past occasion is present in the new occasion as datum felt, with a subjective form conformal to that of the datum. . . . This continuity of subjective form is the initial sympathy of B for A. It is the primary ground for the continuity of nature.[58]

Determinate fact is discontinuous. Continuation depends upon the inheritance of "interest" by the present occasion, involving the past both immediately and mediately.

Thus Whitehead conceives emotion as underlying the continuity of nature itself. Moreover, as is shown below, this function of "conformation of feelings" is also held to underlie the continuity of order in the universe. Thus if Schilpp wishes to object to the "founding of morality upon the quicksand of the emotions" he should also object to the founding of actuality upon the same quicksand. Of course, given Whitehead's definition of emotion, there is no more solid empirical foundation to be found, for it embraces all experience. The belief that emotions are themselves "quicksand" is itself based upon identifying as emotional only

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[57] Ibid., p. 183. [58] Ibid., p. 185.

those elements of experience which seem most active and variable. One might only wish the irritation of a discomfited digestive tract or the oppressiveness of a hot day were as easily modified as the excessive intensities in visual experience. Moreover, in these hills outside my window the rancor of a personal slight has occasionally endured longer than a sturdy house and the several generations which felt it and fought about it. Ultimately, this question can only be settled by the appeal to experience itself. For example, is vision a matter of "having color sensations" or a matter of looking or attending in an activity involving selection, emphasis, and visual reaction.

Extreme subjectivists have made much of the fact that individuals may be conditioned to react differently to the same stimuli and may also do so without special conditioning. These data also are part of the doctrine of emotions being challenged. However, Whitehead does not deny the plasticity of nature, in fact he insists upon it. The question to be posed is what feelings may be so conditioned and how fundamental are they? Because of their obviousness against a great background of similarity, we tend to stress differences and ignore consistencies--particularly where we explicitly recognize the emotional values of that to which we attend. Thus white Americans are apt to ignore the overwhelming community of human feeling shared with a neighbor because of the color of his skin. Both often stress the incompatibility of their values. Yet the very pre-requisites

of survival are shared by them. In fact, the ultimate contention of Whitehead's moral philosophy is that survival and growth do not depend upon the dominance of the non-emotional over the emotional. Rather, they are held to depend upon the success of communal emotions in the reconciliation of conflicting individual emotional deviations. But reconciliation is not mere elimination.

Valuation

My discussion has been somewhat strained thus far due to the lack of an adequate account of "aim," constituting the controlling and distinguishing element of process. The continual re-emergence of factors in present feelings which in some sense are the "same" as corresponding elements in past feelings, and in some sense different, depends on this account for its explanation. In "Immortality," Whitehead distinguishes the dimensions of determinate fact and indeterminate possibility as a "World of Value" and a "World of Activity."

> . . . the World of Values must be conceived as active with the adjustment of the potentialities for realization. This activity of internal adjustment is expressed by our moral and aesthetic judgments. Such judgments involve the ultimate notions of "better" and "worse." This internal activity of the World of Value will be termed "Valuation."[59]

"Valuation" is an activity which transpires entirely in relation to the diverse prospects which are the various

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[59] "I," p. 685.

definite forms of potential given for realization. Whitehead presents two notions of potentiality. The first sense is that which he calls "real potential," which is the objective mode of entrance of the past into the emerging present--determinate in its individuality but indeterminate in the outcome of its fusion. This distinction merely expresses the notion that once an event is completed, what it is in itself is immutable. However, what will become of its effects in relation to other events is an open question. A thing "is what it is," but what it may become in respect of its influence in other occasions is not wholly determined. In this connection, valuation is the conformal feeling which is derivative from the actual (though it itself is "merely real" as the initial phase of an emergent occasion not yet actual). Conformal feeling is the potential for identity given by the pressure of the past imposing itself in the present. Actual occasions enter individually into the constitution of the present as objects having the status of efficient causes and, in their perishing, become the ground of new objectives as they characterize emerging subjective activity derivative from their collective interrelation. Though determined in its "value for itself" with the passage of its subjective immediacy, the actual in its "value for others" becomes a "merely real" ground of indeterminate aspiration.

> . . . There are two species of process, macroscopic process, and microscopic process. The macroscopic process is the transition from attained actuality to actuality in attainment; while the

> microscopic process is the conversion of conditions which are merely real into determinate actuality. The former process effects the transition from the 'actual' to the 'merely real'; and the latter process effects the growth from the real to the actual. The former process is efficient; the latter process is teleological. The future is merely real, without being actual . . . . The present is the immediacy of teleological process whereby reality becomes actual.[60]

"Valuation" in this first sense will always involve reference to the particular individuals from which it is derived. It is this reference which produces the persistent sense of "externality" in experience whereby we feel the world as extending beyond the immediate focus of experience. It is the appreciative recognition of worth attained, or actual value. It is this world of concrete achievement that Whitehead calls the World of Activity or Origination. Its component events may be abstracted from their concrete embodiment of intrinsic worth and treated as simply a "World of Fact." However:

> . . . When we enjoy "realized value" we are experiencing the essential junction of the two worlds. But when we emphasize mere fact, or mere possibility we are making an abstraction in thought. When we enjoy fact as the realization of specific value, or possibility as an impulse towards realization, we are then stressing the ultimate character of the Universe.[61]

Whitehead identifies this primitive sense of valuation as "physical appetition." It accounts for the determination of an occasion by others. But to account for the self-determination of an occasion it is necessary to appeal to the second sense of 'Valuation.' This is "conceptual appetition"

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[60] PR, pp. 326-327. [61] "I," p. 688.

and is the element abstractly identified as "mere possibility." It is the ground of radical innovation and is essential to the higher order consciousness requisite for morality.

"Conceptual Valuation" is the capacity to entertain possibilities for realization going beyond any actual attainments:

> . . . Human intelligence can conceive of a type of things in abstraction from exemplification. The most obvious disclosures of this characteristic of humanity are mathematical concepts and ideals of the Good--ideals which stretch beyond any immediate realization.[62]

The ideal is a component of actual feeling but it is a feeling creatively realized. It is novel possibility going beyond that which is given by past actuality and is achieved by the spontaneity of the individual occasion. Mentality is idealization, internal to the emerging occasion.

> In its essence, mentality is the urge towards some vacuous definiteness, to include it in matter-of-fact which is non-vacuous enjoyment. This urge is appetition. It is emotional purpose; it is agency. . . .
> . . . It is the appetition of appetitions.[63]

Mentality is the aim at the achievement of novel aims.

The denial of the existence of any such experiential function as "conceptual valuation" is one of the most well respected dogmas of Western thought. It is typical of both classical rationalism and classical empiricism. Repeatedly one encounters the axiomatic dictum that imagination is

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[62] "MG," pp. 672-673. [63] FR, pp. 32-33.

limited to the "rearrangement" of that which is already given. While this notion might be defended on various theoretical grounds, it is a fundamentally unempirical claim. If the desire is to avoid attributing "real creativity" to the individual, then the claim avails nothing, since the same problem remains of explaining the "rearrangements" that obtains for explaining the origination of novel "parts" to be arranged. Moreover, as is well known, Hume himself points out that we can imagine for ourselves a color which we have never seen to fill a gap in a scale of shades. Yet Hume, his predecessors, and successors have assiduously avoided coming to grips with this fact. Such creativity is a major feature of human experience.

However, even if it were a minor feature, to ignore it would be like ignoring a little pregnancy and the comparison is apt. One is perplexed by the vision of philosophers arguing for the purely stipulative origin of components of theoretic models which themselves deny the possibility of the notion of pure stipulation by denying the possibility of creativity. Although Locke's concept of "power" embodied a notion of experienced potentialities, the classical strategy of empiricism has always been to deny the experiential basis of any such notion. Indeed, if one examines experience with the reflective detachment of Berkeley and Hume and particularly if one concentrates upon visual sensations, he will find his sensations possessed of the determinate passivity of objects. The past is what it is

XUM

and it is the function of reflective contemplation to eliminate present modifying activities in eliciting the product of past experiences.

But the bulk of our immediate experience is shot through and through with the sense of effort in process of expenditure, of alternatives being realized and rejected, of resistance and support, of vague indefiniteness being given definition. We realize the force of events as circumstances overwhelm us and acknowledge the possibility of avoidance in the injunction "don't let it affect you so." From an empirical viewpoint the problem of potentiality is not merely one of explaining statements in the subjunctive mood, it is one of explaining the experiences expressed by those statements. Surely the senses of hope, uncertainty, responsibility, etc. have at least as fundamental a status in human experience as the awareness of a clearly articulated sound or color.

Rigid determinism is at best an expression of faith, indeed it is one that is losing its traditional support in the tendency to statistical expressions of physical law. In "Meaning and Verification," Moritz Schlick acknowledges two sorts of possibility which correspond to some extent with the notions of "real" and "pure" or "conceptual" potentiality developed here. "Empirical possibility" is defined by Schlick as embracing that which is not contrary to the laws of nature. "Real potentiality" might be similarly defined except that, for Whitehead, the "laws of nature" are merely attempts to express the system of order embodied in the

mutual influence of actual occasions. The regularities achieved as "averages" in statistical descriptions admirably fit this notion. Added to this is the notion that these regularities are subject to modification through the creativity of "conceptual valuation." "Logical possibility" does not correlate as effectively with the notion of "pure potentiality." It does acknowledge the ability to originate conceptions which have not been encountered in experience and, perhaps, could not be so encountered. But it is customarily defined as "that which can be conceived without self-contradiction." The most striking feature of conceptual valuation is precisely the ability to entertain notions which would be mutually incompatible in actuality. This <u>is</u> the sense of alternatives.

Morality requires: the freedom derived from the real potentiality of the past for adaptation to a variety of present achievements; the responsibility derived from the ability of individuals to entertain and enact real alternatives; and the creative idealism which involves the conceptual ability to introduce characterizations which have the descriptive status of fictions but the potentiality to shape fact. Value extends beyond fact because it embraces the domain of potentiality whereby the actual world is constantly renewed. But this domain exists only within the actualization of real individuals.

I return to this topic in the sections dealing with moral responsibility and moral ideals. But it should be

stressed once more that "physical valuation" and "conceptual valuation" are components within the actual. In particular,

> . . . 'conceptual recognition' must of course be an operation constituting a real feeling belonging to some actual entity.[64]

Conceptual valuation is the conception of a possibility and its investment with moving interest in a judgmental

> . . . process of unification. It involves the necessary relevance of values to each other.[65]

Evaluation

In conceptual valuation, the values so associated would be other conceptual valuations. Valuation embraces both conceptual valuation and physical valuation in a synthetic resolution articulating a complete prospect for realization. The World of Value is the world of subjective aim.

> . . . an intention towards realization, which is the basic character of the World of Value. But this intention is itself a realization within the Universe.[66]

The World of Value (or Valuation) and the World of Fact (or Origination) abstractly characterize two fundamental elements in the genetic analysis of the actual occasion. Its

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[64] PR, p. 70. [65] "I," p. 685.

[66] Ibid., p. 688. One of the underexamined topics in the history of moral philosophy is that of the emergence of ideal intentions. We tend to treat ideals as simply given and concentrate upon their realization or frustration in practice. Yet surely the translation of a mere possibility or "idea" into a moving ideal is often an arduous achievement. Ideals are elements in actual consciousness and must be realized as ideals before they can secure any broader significance.

completion requires the operation of a function fusing conceptual valuation with physical valuation and determining the final expression of a complete actuality. This final expression is the realization of the individual satisfaction which is a fact of worth entering into the further transformation of the World of Activity.

> Value is also relevant to the process of realization in the World of Activity. Thus there is a further intrusion of judgment which is here called Evaluation. This term will be used to mean the analysis of particular facts in the World of Activity to determine the values realized and the values excluded. . . .
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> Evaluation involves a process of modification: the World of Activity is modified by the World of Value. It receives pleasure or disgust from the Evaluations. It receives acceptance or rejection: It receives its perspective of the past, and it receives its purpose for the future. This interconnection of the two Worlds is Evaluation, and it is an activity of modification.[67]

'Evaluation' refers to the process of adjustment between conceptual valuation, physical valuation, and the objective individuality of the past. It is the process whereby the many individual data, each with its individual significance, are synthetically related to a perspective of Valuation to produce the final unity of value experience which is the actuality of the individual occasion. As "analysis," evaluation is the effort at identification of actuality in terms of the constituents of valuation. The outcome of the process of identification is the realization of an identity as the enjoyment of a contrast.

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[67]"I," p. 685.

> Evaluation functions actively as incitement and aversion. It is Persuasion, where persuasion includes "incitement towards" and "deterrence from" a manifold of possibility.[68]

The contrast is an "appearance" having a character in part conformal to the actual individuals and in part conformal to the pattern of valuation. It persuasively imposes onto the actual an approximation toward the conceptual ideal and imposes onto the conceptual ideal an approximation toward the actual. The resultant "satisfaction" is the intrinsic worth of the final individual. Indeed, it is precisely this notion of "contrast" which is essential to understanding Whitehead's concept of "organism" and the moral organicism which follows from it. The unity of an organism, wherein one finds an identity not reducible to its parts, is explained in terms of the creative achievement of contrasting feeling by the self-forming occasion. The final individuality of an actual occasion is a compromise reconciling a real plurality within itself. This is the ultimate creativity of the universe, the achievement of a singular and determinate feeling as a character embodying the limiting influences of its origins but surpassing them in its individuality.

Where conceptual valuation plays a dominant role in valuation, the outcome of the evaluative process will be experience dominated by the affective tone of anticipation.

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[68] Ibid., p. 687.

In terms of human experience, this becomes the persistent seeking of conscious ideals inadequately realized in present achievements. This anticipation is itself a component in the origination of a novel subject. Thus the actuality, incomplete in its self-fulfillment, finds a completion in a realization going beyond itself and entering into the origination of other individuals. In this manner the attainment of value for itself has value for others and the attainment of value for others has value for itself. In the passage from reality to actuality, ideal value is transformed into actual aim. The actual aim is not the ideal, since the contrast realized is only an approximation toward it. However, the ideal is a component of the actual, internal to it and having the status of only an abstraction apart from it. If it were not for the fact that the achievement of aim going beyond present attainment is itself an element in present enjoyment, then there would be neither progress nor morality.

Evaluation is the emergence into effectiveness of value, involving both subjective and objective dimensions. Insofar as the impetus toward novel realizations derives from this process, the ongoingness of the universe itself is a function of evaluation. In essence, the process of Reality is the process of evaluation, involving valuation and evolving originative value.

XUM

Society

The actual world is a multiplicity of causally independent entities. Its social character is to be found only within its passage into physical valuation as the real potential for an individual occasion. Its unity is achieved only in the subjective form of the final evaluative appearance. However, the passage of subjective unity into final objective individuality involves the entrance of the individual into the social identity of a real potential for a novel emergence. According to Whitehead:

> . . . A society is only efficient through its individual members.[69]

The corollary should be added: an individual is only final through the society he joins. This is the whole significance of the doctrine that anticipation is the completing element in present satisfaction. Individual identities are merely efficient causes apart from their membership within a society. And social identities are merely final causes apart from their inclusion within individuals.

The concept of "joining a society" is an interesting notion. In the Western tradition of individualism the tendency is to think of entering a society only in terms of inclusion within a group, the group being only the totality of its membership. However, if the society is only the total

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[69] PR, p. 139.

of the individual activities, then the addition of a novel member changes the total and produces a new society. Thus, while it might be possible to form such a society from a plurality it would be impossible to join it without destroying it and creating another. One can readily understand Hobbes' preference for the social contract theory and his difficulties in dealing with the criticisms involving the claims of society upon subsequent non-signatories. Within the materialistic ontology of individuals there is further an attempt to reduce the external relatedness of the individuals to a vacuous function possessed only of characteristics which can be expressed in terms of the characteristics of its members. Such a notion is a sheer disjunctive plurality.

The significance of the use of the phrase "only a totality" lies in its expression of a minimal definite relatedness. However, external relation is the inclusion of diverse factors within a common function. Summation is such a function determining a social identity not expressible in terms of the elements of a disjunctive plurality prior to its derivation. Either the society involves more than the individuals united to form it or the individuals are transformed by their entrance into society, in which case society is not reducible to a matter of external relatedness or the characteristics of a plurality of "given" factors. Although often ignored, all of this is explicit in Hobbes' idea that the consummation of a social contract involves the laying

down of individual rights and the acceptance of an authority embodying the state.

Unfortunately, the idea of a single agency "embodying" the state is meaningless in terms of a doctrine of external relatedness and a materialistic ontology of individuals. It is a disservice to Hobbes' society, rendered by his metaphysics, that it can neither be joined nor formed. However, there is another sense of the word "join," utilized often in formally acknowledging the convening of meetings, which suggests the artificiality of the distinction between joining and forming a society. In this sense, 'join' means 'to conform' through the sharing of a common element of interest. As a plurality of individuals they join "in" an interest which is a purpose for the future, and as individual members of a society they have been joined "by" the inclusion of a common set of past circumstances. To assert that an individual joins a society is to assert that he is the element which "convenes" the plurality. In an ontology of individuals the only way in which a plurality can be unified is through its incorporation within an individual.[70] Thus

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[70] For some reason nominalists have often ignored this fact. They thus tend to treat verbal tokens as "third Terms" securing relation between individuals by common association with them. As Plato pointed out long ago in his "Third Man" argument, such a strategy achieves infinite regress. However, the regress is not only vicious but pointless as well. A third individual accomplishes no relationship between other individuals unless we presuppose external relations joining all three. Such external relation (i.e., the association itself) is accomplished by inclusion within the experience of the subject. Where the act is one of direct

individuals joining the same society would have to convene the same initial plurality. However, this is a doctrine of internal relations which does not lend itself to classical materialism.

Internal relation is just the inclusion of common factors within diverse individual functions. The individuals constituting the common plurality to be incorporated within the society will be externally related by the function imposed upon them. However, although they will be included within the society formed, they cannot actually be members of it. This follows from the notion that the individual who is a member of the society by virtue of joining it must include the plurality within himself. Unless there is more differentiation between the individuals who include the same plurality than a bare act of social inclusion, then there will be no individuals and no society. And, strictly speaking, any addition of novel elements within the society

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verbal association, the verbal token merely characterizes the identity of the contrast realized at that moment. To assert that relationships are verbal entities would be merely to assert that the association of individuals is realized only within individuals whose experience is dominated by verbal evaluations. The radical anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism of such a view renders it implausible in the extreme.

The nominalistic use of language to resolve ontological problems, and the concomitant failure to recognize the same problems as developing in the ontology of language itself, is perhaps only one more instance of setting man outside of nature. In this instance it ignores the need to explain the ostensible act of explanation itself. This is not intended as a general criticism of nominalism, but only of nominalisms which restrict themselves to a doctrine of external relations as imposed by verbal functions.

XUM

will change it to a new society. Given this definition of society, it follows that: (1) no individual actually included within a society can be a member of it; (2) the converse of "1"; (3) a society will retain identity while growing quantitatively through its incorporation in new members; and (4) a society to which there has been an additional inclusion will be included within the novel society as an identifying element, but only in this special sense can it be said to be capable of growth in quality while retaining identity.

In an ontology of individuals there can be no actual societies but there can be social actualities. This is to say that society can be a component internal to actual individuals. On the one hand there is the appreciative membership in real societies derivative from perished actuality incorporate in the present individual. On the other hand there is the anticipation of passage into inclusion within a further social fulfillment. This should have been Hobbes' monarch embodying the Leviathan. The sovereign individual reigns final in his incorporation of the authority of social purpose and efficient in the consummation of social service, yet derives from a social reality lying below appearances and is dependent for his power upon social possibilities yet to appear in reality.[71]

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[71] See Appendix.

Individual Consciousness

The plurality of occasions are joined by their inclusion of common factors (including the potentials for their respective emergence) and are included in common functions, the potential for which rests within them. However, the individuals differentiate in their present manner of joining these factors. Again:

> . . . This immediacy is its moment of sheer individuality, bounded on either side by essential relativity. The occasion arises from relevant objects, and perishes into the status of an object for other occasions. But it enjoys its decisive moment . . . .[72]

Evaluation is a selective process which introduces abstractive limitations unto numerically complex data. Its terminal realization is a simple identity having the internal structure of a contrast embracing a plurality under the abstractive valuation of a single aim. The contrast is the realization of a social character within a mode of inclusion having unique identity. Conceptual valuation affords a basis of originality in the present determination, but evaluation is the emphatic resolution which realizes a distinctly uniform character.

In dealing with moral agents, one discusses entities whose inherited data exhibit an extreme degree of complexity and organization. For Whitehead, what is conventionally identified as "the body" is only that portion of the immediate environment which most directly determines the final content

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[72] AI, p. 179.

of inherited experience.[73] It affords perspective to the percipient occasion. The development of evaluation leading up to the realization of consciousness is a process of increasing specialization in the proximate environment such that the dominant elements contributing to physical valuation are far removed from those given for other contemporary occasions. Evolutionary evaluation passes from relatively undistinguished non-living entities, replicating their general environment, through the attainment of non-living specialized regions, to the achievement of life. An entity lives when the specialized region of immediate inheritance is sufficiently distinct to dominate subjective form apart from the remote environment. The result is a "self object," dominating elements from the remote environment in evaluative contrast and capable of growth expanding into the environment.

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[73] Once again, the drawing of a rigid dividing line between the immediate physiological system and its broader extension in the whole eco-system has unfortunate implications of both a biological and sociological nature. Biologically, it obscures the dominance of symbiotic systems and cooperativeness as exemplified in the immense complexity of organisms within a single animal system. The result is to treat cooperative complexes as merely singular entities and stress the importance of conflict and competition between them. Presumably, it is unnecessary to recount some of the disadvantages of the doctrine of "survival of the fittest" as applied to the interpretation and justification of social functioning. Further, this outlook tends to generate an ignorance of the obvious. I recall a cultural anthropologist who employed Denmark as an excellent example of the environment compelling man to adapt himself to it. Yet what is most striking about the Danes is their compelling conviction that they can adapt their environment to themselves and what is most striking about their environment is the extent of their success.

Life is a victory of social organization, achieved through environmental specialization affording a dominant character to coordinate a vast plurality of factors.

For Whitehead, there is a conceptual element operative at all levels in nature. Here "conceptual" need mean nothing more than "originative." In primitive organisms it is blind, random, and minimal. Mere life is characterized by the emergence of subjective activity, within a highly specialized area, preserving a dominant selection of inheritance through a further specializing adaptation of the region comprising the proximate environment.

> . . . The essence of life is the teleological introduction of novelty, with some conformation of objectives. Thus novelty of circumstance is met with novelty of functioning adapted to steadiness of purpose.[74]

The operation of conceptual innovation, where shared in cellular co-ordination, is self-enhancing. Thus a dominant inherited character, served by successful selective adaptation, replaces randomness with a mechanism of adaptive selection further promoting its own preservation through further specializing the environment. The result is a greater selectivity in admission of the data shaping the contrast which finally characterizes emergent occasions. This increases the "distance" between the character realized and the broad base of its derivation. The massive impact of the pressure for physical conformation is lessened.

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[74] AI, p. 209.

Consciousness requires still further specialization of regions within the "body" to furnish selective emphasis coordinating data lying beyond.

> The growth of consciousness is the uprise of abstractions. It is the growth of emphasis. The totality is characterized by a selection from its details.[75]

Consciousness itself is merely an awareness of a dominant self-object so characterized by distinctness from its remote environment that conceptual valuation surpasses physical conformation in forming it.

However,

> Our consciousness does not initiate our modes of functioning. We awake to find ourselves engaged in process . . . . This primary procedure which is presupposed in consciousness, I will term Instinct. It is the mode of experience directly arising out of the urge of inheritance, individual and environmental.[76]

The spontaneity of conscious intellect is initially subservient to the satisfaction of inherited habits of appetite defining the dominant self-object. So far as we know, consciousness is the highest product of nature for the intensification of self-satisfaction. The emergence of spontaneous possibility achieves partial dominance over conformal demands, yet submits to the ordering influence of inherited aim.

Consciousness could be defined as the intense awareness of some details making possible the ignorance of the remainder that is requisite to extensive freedom of decision.

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[75] MT, p. 168. [76] AI, pp. 53-54.

> . . . The conceptual entertainment of unrealized possibility becomes a major factor in human mentality. In this way outrageous novelty is introduced . . . .[77]

However, ignorant bliss is apt to be short-lived. Radical novelty of behavior blindly directed toward immediate satisfaction produces frustrating conflict. The result is a further adaptive concentration upon the selection of possibilities themselves. Frustration in assimilation of the remote environment produces the incorporation into the proximate environment of modifications derivative from conceptual elements selected for their reduction of frustration. Such concepts must contain an expanded emphasis of elements alien to the proximate environment. Secondly, the awareness of consciousness dominated by characters not exemplified in the mass of physical inheritance produces subjective functions characterized by pre-occupation with the conceptual novelty as an end in itself, distinct from the familiar routine of activity.

Self-consciousness is the final product of selective abstraction. For self-consciousness, it is necessary that the dominant inheritance be characterized by abstraction so extreme that the given appearances involve an overwhelming subordination of the environment to simplicity. Given this basis of subordination, two opportunities are afforded to the terminal occasion. There is definiteness of aim given in physical valuation by a highly co-ordinate body of mutually

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[77] MT, p. 36.

re-inforcing anticipations. Further, this simplification itself makes possible the dominance of conceptual valuation introducing novelty of enjoyment in service of inherited aim. The role played by conceptual valuation increases in direct proportion to the degree of abstract specialization. For example, an occasion of conscious hunger is one in which the relevant occasions of enjoyed gratification are given only through an increasingly mediate route of social inclusions. In each instance the conceptual valuation of the possibility of further gratification is terminated in an anticipatory affective tone enhancing its dominance in the next occasion. When anticipatory feeling dominates the individually given objective data, unfulfilled conceptual valuation has come to outweigh given gratifications. The result is an occasion characterized by consciousness of immediate purpose or artfulness.

> Consciousness itself is the product of art in its lowliest form. . . . But consciousness having emerged from Art at once produces the new specialized art of the conscious animals--in particular human art.[78]

Self-consciousness requires a sufficient coordination of subordinate regions within the organism such that in the contrast characterizing the self-conscious occasion there is both the recognition of a plurality of interesting objects and the recognition within consciousness of a complex of objects as central in the present activity, i.e., a

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[78] AI, p. 270.

"self-object." One outcome of the distinct complexity of the central nervous system is the sense of self as opposed to others. It is the result of realizing systems of coordinate activity too novel and complex for immediate realization under the guise of a simplification. The latter instrumentally relates the plurality of interests to a highly selected portion. The selectivity of consciousness and self-consciousness tremendously increase the ability to overcome environmental limitations in novel activity. They give birth to practical reason in a process continuous with the most primitive functions in nature.

> . . . The essence of Reason in its lowliest forms is its judgments upon flashes of novelty, of novelty in immediate realization and of novelty which is relevant to appetition but not yet to action. . . . Reason is the organ of emphasis upon novelty. It provides the judgment by which it passes into realization in purpose, and thence its realization in fact.[79]

Moral Instincts

Throughout the preceding pages I suggest that fundamental problems arise in moral philosophy from the attempt to place human value and consciousness itself outside of nature. The purpose of the immediately preceding genetic sketch is to suggest Whitehead's manner of accounting for the emergence of consciousness as a development continuous with "blind" evaluative processes occuring at the most primitive levels of nature. Viewed externally, this process

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[79] FR, p. 20.

is the development of complex organisms composed of simpler organisms and component complexes with all elements exhibiting adaptation for mutual dependence. In sophisticated organisms, the central nervous system exhibits directive mechanisms for selective response to remote stimuli. These are mediated by the selective stimuli afforded by the proximate systems "within" the organism. In other words, the central nervous system reacts to its bodily environment which in turn reacts to the broader environment. The result is manifested in an emphasis of behavior patterns securing survival, growth, and apparent enjoyment of the system. However, such an external perspective may be secured only with respect to "past" processes within which the elements related are already exhibited as public objects, subject to external relation within the viewpoint of our own analytic perspective. The internal relatedness of their mutual adaptation is apparent only in the inclusion of common structures by the elements within the organism such as the chromosomes in individual cells.

The immediacy of present activity can only be grasped by focusing upon the experiential process of our own perspective. The internal analysis of experiential activity reveals the environment comprising that which constitutes experience. It is a composite of compositions, each imposing its own selective evaluation. The overwhelming majority of these compositions have only an instrumental status. I notice objects of visual interest with my eyes. I do not notice my

XUM

eyes unless they are the source of specific organic dysfunction or pleasure, as when they are sore or gently touched. Such subordination is the outcome of conscious interest whereby perceptual behavior is directed to the noticing of specific objects, transforming the terminal enjoyment of an organic gratification to a symbolic representation of that which is more or less immediately given within its own experience. Conscious interest favors specific sub-systems of organic interest. It is precisely the preponderance of conscious interest which is the basis of self-consciousness. I am self-conscious when I notice my own acts of conscious noticing.

> The survival of personal identity within the immediacy of a present occasion is a most remarkable character of the World of Fact. It is a partial negation of its transitory character. It is the introduction of stability by the influence of value. . . .
>
> . . . A whole sequence of actual occasions, each with its own present immediacy, is such that each occasion embodies in its own being the antecedent members of that sequence with an emphatic experience of the self-identity of the past in the immediacy of the present. . . .
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> . . . "Personal Identity" is exhibited when the change in the details of fact exhibits an identity of primary character amid secondary changes of value.[80]

The point to be stressed here is that the sense of personal identity is initially a self-conscious emphasis of personal individuality which may have the effect of a destructive and devisive force.

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[80]"I," pp. 689-690.

One of the striking features of contemporary science is the revival of the notion that complex behaviors, or dispositions toward acquiring specific behavioral tendencies, may be genetically determined. While ethologists and geneticists may differ on the question of whether the behavioral tendencies of men are more or less specific, there is wide-spread concurrence in the opinion that inherited factors play a larger role in determining behavior than was popularly believed in the recent past. Moreover, even from the viewpoint of an environmentalist, it would be necessary to acknowledge that component factors of conditioning comprise a social heredity of custom. The central feature of Whitehead's moral philosophy is the claim that morality must be based upon the understanding of human nature as an element within nature, exhibiting both the instinctive enjoyment of social relations and the socializing influence of institutions. Such habits and emotions do not comprise morality insofar as they may be the outcome of blind adaptive processes. Whether man's most recent primate ancestors were agressive carnivores or gregarious herbivores, it remains that there does exist a degree of:

> . . . respect and friendliness between man and man . . . . These emotions are at the basis of all social groups. As relatively blind emotions they must pervade animal society, namely, the urge to cooperate, to help, to feed, to cherish, to play together, to express affection.[81]

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[81] AI, p. 44.

> . . . All these feelings can exist with the minimum of intellectuality. Their basis is emotional, and humanity acquired these emotions by reason of its unthinking activities amid the course of nature.[82]

The point here is to suggest that the existence of "fellow-feeling," at an instinctive level, is a pre-requisite of morality which rests upon the inherited enjoyment of co-operative activities. The foundation of enduring social order is routine which may operate upon a purely reflexive level. Thus:

> . . . The elaborate social organizations of insects appear to be thoroughgoing examples of routine. Such organizations achieve far-reaching, complex purposes: they involve a differentiation of classes, from cows to serfs, from serfs to workers, from workers to warriors, from warriors to janitors, and from janitors to queens. Such organizations have regard to needs in a distant future, especially if the comparatively short space of life of the individual insects is taken into account as the unit of measurement.
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> These insect societies have been astoundingly successful, so far as concerns survival power. They seem to have a past extending over tens of thousands of years, perhaps of millions of years. . . . We can observe insects performing elaborate routine actions whose purposes they cannot possibly understand, which yet are essential either for their own individual survival or for race-survival.[83]

However, the importance of morality for man is due to the difference between human individuals and societies and those of the insect world. The latter

> . . . are not progressive. It is exactly this characteristic that discriminates communities of mankind from communities of insects. Further, this great fact of progressiveness, be it from worse to

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[82] Ibid., p. 106. [83] Ibid., p. 97.

XUM

> better, or from better to worse, has become of greater and greater importance in Western civilization as we come to modern times.[84]

Systems of order are established as routines of cooperation between organic elements of individual organisms and individual members of social and symbiotic complexes. The cooperation derives from the mutual re-enforcement of enjoyment by the participants and the internalization of structure comprising the ground of the social system. I rest my eyes when they are weary or suffer the consequences of sharing their intensified pain. Similarly, I share in the pains and pleasures of friends.

Hobbes' "State of Nature" and Rousseau's "Noble Savage" suggest extremes of instinctive humanity, the character of which no doubt lies largely in between. Like Marx, Whitehead argues the derivation of human society from the family group.

> . . . Evidently the existence of each family group involves a mixture of love, dependence, sympathy, persuasion, and compulsion. There can never have been any period when the gentler modes of human relations were wholly absent. Indeed the ferocity may have been the later development, due to the increase of intelligent self-interest.[85]

Intelligent self-interest can increase "ferocity" by facilitating the independence of the individual from reliance upon co-operative forms of enjoyment. The satisfaction of social necessities may give way to individual expediency.

However, the same phenomenon is characteristic of

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[84] Ibid., pp. 97-98. [85] Ibid., p. 76.

the operation of self-consciousness relative to the internal organization of the individual himself. The blind processes of nature develop their own systems of checks and balances, such that the aggrandizement of individual species is kept in check by other species, and the organic expression of interest by the individual, when gratified, gives way to other interests. However, the conscious recognition of certain objects, together with the self-conscious recognition of a personal interest relative to these objects, can unbalance the habitual function of the individual organism. Thus for example, an infant will cry when it needs food but a young child (or an adult) may so emphasize the valuation of pleasant foods that he destroys his own health. It is an instance of intelligent self-interest in its destructive form when a child creatively outwits his mother to get at the cookie jar or a man outwits his physician. In these instances self-conscious creativity works to reductively subordinate the complex interests of the whole organism to the enjoyment of component interests. The same reduction may be exemplified in the tyrant who ingeniously enslaves his fellows. As Plato saw, such a man enslaves himself to elemental appetites at the cost of his human identity. However, the emergence of a murderous tyrant is likely to be more dependent upon the decay of the social system than deranged individual ingenuity.

Our membership within human society is expressed in the enjoyment of satisfactions themselves resting upon the

XUM

satisfaction of others. These social instincts comprise the organic basis of our human identity. Self-consciousness operates to alienate us from these blind mutual concerns. The recovery of these social feelings in conscious motivation is the business of moral ideals. They transform social instincts into moral instincts just as self-consciousness transforms individual feeling into self-interest. Morality reverses the selectiveness of individual self-consciousness. It is:

> . . . the removal of inhibition and not its introduction. It results in a wider sweep of conscious interest. It enlarges the field of attention. . . . at the width where the 'self' has been lost, and interest has been transferred to coordinations wider than personality.[86]

> Philosophy is the self-correction by consciousness of its own initial excess of subjectivity. . . . An actual individual . . . has attained its individual depth of being by a selective emphasis limited to its own purposes. The task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by the selection. It replaces in rational experience what has been submerged in the higher sensitive experience and has been sunk yet deeper by the initial operations of consciousness itself. The selectiveness of individual experience is moral so far as it conforms to the balance of importance disclosed in the rational vision; and conversely the conversion of the intellectual insight into an emotional force corrects the sensitive experience in the direction of morality. The correction is in proportion to the rationality of the insight.[87]

Conscience is the inner voice of organic feeling demanding creative recognition in rational self-direction. Yet

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[86] AI, p. 284.

[87] PR, pp. 22-23; italics not in the original.

personal ambition is its first manifestation. In order to clarify these claims and bring out the role of reason in morality, it is necessary to briefly examine Whitehead's concept of reason.

Practical and Theoretic Reason

According to Whitehead, practical reason is the pursuit of "methodology," or:

> . . . Reason criticizing and emphasizing the subordinate purposes in nature which are the agents of final causation.[88]

Practical reason is conscious intellective activity

> . . . governed by the purposes of some external dominant interest . . . .[89]

As opposed to it, "speculative" or "theoretic" reason comprises

> . . . operations of Reason governed by the immediate satisfaction arising from themselves.[90]

However, speculative and practical intellect are not to be rigidly dichotomized.

> . . . The concept of completely passive contemplation in abstraction from action and purpose is a fallacious extreme.[91]

Indeed:

> . . . The secret of progress is the speculative interest in abstract schemes of morphology.[92]

For Whitehead, reason is the recovery in consciousness of the organic unity buried beneath its symbolic

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[88] FR, p. 28. [89] Ibid., p. 39. [90] Ibid.

[91] AI, p. 264. [92] FR, p. 73.

contrasts. Consciousness is the ability to concentrate which reduces the world to a background of individual feelings. However, moments of individual consciousness are themselves the background of thought. Thought is a complex activity. Intellectual structure is like the social structure of the ant colony, incorporate in each of its members yet surpassing their own duration in its complete fulfillment. In the process of thought which directs my pen, I experience the gradual satisfaction of a relatively remotely anticipated conclusion. Various punctuations enter the experience. The persistence of function leading to the completed achievement requires that component moments in the process each join their plurality of fellows organically by incorporating the structure of the entire project. The restoration of organic unity to the individual posits of consciousness is accomplished through the expression of ideas in activity.

'Practical Reason' identifies the emergence of directive ideas which secure massive coordination of active feeling at a pre-symbolic level. 'Theoretic Reason' identifies the emergence of ideas whose primary function is to secure coordination of the symbolic content of consciousness itself. However, it must be stressed that the coordination of consciousness is itself a purposeful activity. There are two primitive extremes of intellectual activity which might be said to be primarily "aesthetic" in the values realized by each. One of these is represented in "crass cunning." The

other is represented in sheer imaginative fancy. In the former instance the locus of action is concrete and the impact of the idea is forceful, but the dominant purpose is fragmentary. In this role, reason is limited to the emphasis of ideas valued for their role in identifying objects capable of gratifying immediate appetite. In this instance, intellect serves the maintenance of established aim--of possessive self-interest. At the other extreme, the dominant factor is the intrinsic enjoyment of the idea itself as affording satisfactions in a freedom of activity which is inaccessible in more concrete activity. However, the reality is thin and the satisfaction afforded easily flags. Creative intelligence must tread a precarious path between the brutality of self-gratification taken in momentary desires and the escapism of idle day dreams.

When Whitehead claims that "the essence of Reason in its lowliest forms is its judgments upon flashes of novelty," he is suggesting the basic character of emergent intellect. It is evaluative activity in which novel occasions of consciousness, individual in themselves, are identified with the broader bases of experience and acquire relevance to future activity. A new "idea" is initially realized for its own sake as an expression of consciousness dominated by conceptual valuation, or spontaneity. The emphasis upon novelty is to be expected in a conscious organism due to the increased coordinate role played by novelty and conceptual

valuation in conscious experience.[93] The idea as an occasion of consciousness is itself realized as a symbolic contrast and contributes its share of affective tone to forming novel subjective activity. However, as a completed datum given in subsequent experience, it is an individual object, a fact of cerebral activity.

Moreover, as opposed to a mere flash of consciousness, thought emerges from complex consciousness coordinated by the inheritance of highly selected organic interests. Thus as a datum, the importance of the novel idea will be determined relative to entrenched subjective anticipations. If the rational occasion, in its self formation, secures satisfaction from the novel idea as placed in contrast with the remaining data, it may acquire a secondary symbolic status and introduce novelty of purpose in the anticipatory feeling realized by the occasion. Similarly, if this anticipatory feeling is itself relevant to the broader background of organic activity, the result will be the introduction of novelty in concrete activity--or in more conventional terms, overt behavior. However, the passage from thought to practice involves no novel faculties. It is like

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[93] The reader may recall that Whitehead holds consciousness emerges as coordinate environmental specialization decreases the re-enforcement of physical valuation given in less specialized systems and allows increased significance for conceptual valuation. In particular, this occurs where the novelty of function introduced by the latter is instrumental to the distinct central purposes of the organism and derives re-enforcement from them.

XUM

the spread of a rumor in a crowd, which gradually gives it cohesion.

The individual conceptions with which thought begins are immutable facts of value achieved. The aims to which they give rise are novel facts of experience which associate the conceptions with other data. This evaluative contrast itself, which has the status of unrealized purpose, will involve deviation from both the symbolically employed value and that with which it is associated. Similarly, the final realization of the broadened purpose will involve modification of both the purpose and the activities in which it is fulfilled. If the processes involved are not relevant to the concrete activity, it may be carried out only in the activity of consciousness itself. Thus I may conceive of an apple and feel hunger. The result may be that I go to the refrigerator and conclude by eating a pear with mild frustration--or I may sit and imagine myself eating the apple. In either event a complex process of subordinate purpose must be realized in service of sustained conscious aim. The latter satisfies my imagination but not my stomach. The former does the reverse.

Practical ideals begin as individual feelings which, reinforced by other feelings, give birth to extensive conscious aims to be fulfilled in more or less concrete activity.

. . . [Reason] is the appetition of

appetitions.[94]

> . . . Reason is the organ of emphasis upon novelty. It provides the judgment by which it passes into realization in purpose, and thence its realization in fact.[95]

Cognitive activity originates under the pressure of the effort toward enhanced satisfaction and the response to frustration. In imagination, the idea functions as a terminal object of satisfaction. In concrete practice, it is primarily an instrument of exterior interest.

An idea has immediate practical value when it enlightens established purpose by calling into consciousness the means of its fulfillment. However, such an achievement is only possible where the subjective aim in emerging experience restores the emphasis to factors suppressed in consciousness. In this manner, the gap between appearance and reality is reduced by the appearance in consciousness of ideas re-enforced by the elements of physical valuation. Here the elements valued by consciousness are not valued for their own affective quality, but for their role in shaping symbolic contrasts which elicit the affective quality of other elements in experience.

> . . . The very circumstance that a science has naturally arisen concerning a set of facts secures that facts of that type have definite relations among themselves which are very obvious to all mankind. The common obviousness of things arises when their explicit apprehension carries immediate importance for purposes of survival, or of enjoyment--that is to say, for purposes of 'being' and

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[94] FR, p. 33. [95] Ibid., p. 20.

of 'well-being.'[96]

A kitten's attention will be drawn to a moving object. The movement is a variable element of novelty in consciousness, it offers a lure for aesthetic interest. It is not essential whether the response elicited is genetically inherited or whether there is only an immediate aesthetic re-enforcement of muscular pleasure in bodily play. In any event, the conventional train of responses may culminate in cat biting rat. Immediately a defined element in consciousness is re-enforced by the gratification of an enduring interest. The result may be the birth of a specific hunger and a primitive methodology of appeasement. Thereafter the situation of "rat-movement" may be a decreasing occasion of idle play and an increasing occasion of purposeful craft. If the latter, "rat-movement" acquires symbolic value instrumental to hunger rather than an object of terminal interest in itself.[97]

In general, the variable elements in consciousness seem to acquire secondary symbolic value either when their appropriateness precipitates a rush of habitual interest in some related object, thereby submerging their own intrinsic interest, or when their intrinsic interest is itself exhausted through tedium. Inscriptions hold a relatively brief

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[96] PR, p. 14.

[97] From my own observation of cats, I would say this varies radically with the cat. Some hunt to live and others live to hunt.

fascination for a child before he becomes much more interested in their functions as words and numbers. However, cookies are contemplated for a even shorter time before they are eaten. Even then it must be stressed that the contemplation is an active derivation of satisfaction.

The increasing acquisition of symbols associated with the fulfillment of enduring habits of gratification or frustration has the effect of making possible habits of complex thought correlated with complex organic habits of feeling. Moreover, the terminal interest in a cookie or an idea is an immediate self-identification. My conscious intrinsic worth is that which I enjoy at this moment. The reduction to symbolic status of the element in consciousness eliminates a degree of subjective functioning in immediate experience. It restores a slightly broader sense of the background out of which present experiences arise. The "objectivity" or "reflectiveness" which is conventionally attributed to cognitive activity simply identifies the process whereby the symbolic transfer of interest gradually reduces the novelty of aesthetic innovation for immediate satisfaction and replaces it with objects reflecting transcendent interests. But the transcendent is to be found within the nature out of which our enjoyments derive and within which our anticipations give birth to novel events. It is the world behind us and the world to come.

> . . . Transcendence begins with the leap from the actuality of the immediate occasion to the notion of personal existence, which is a society

> of occasions. In terms of human life, the soul is a society. Care for the future of personal existence, regret or pride in its past, are alike feelings which leap beyond the bounds of the sheer actuality of the present. It is in the nature of the present that it should thus transcend itself by reason of the immanence in it of the 'other.'[98]

Moral Responsibility

The persistent success of cognitive activity itself comprises an enduring habit of activity capable of re-enforcing purpose. The result is the birth of a purely intellectual motive, the attempt to realize a structure in consciousness which objectively re-embodies the basic components of experience--purely for the sake of symbolic reference.[99] The search for explanations, as the attempt to regain reality amid the content of appearance, may run the gamut from specific myths to immensely complex mathematical models. However, for cognitive purposes, the latter have the advantage of being virtually devoid of affective tone and thereby affording superb symbolic instruments. Perhaps the ultimate ideal of speculative morphology is the notion of the "wholly uninterpreted axiom system."

"Pure practical reason" as concrete cognition and

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[98] AI, p. 290.

[99] The denial of the pursuit of "knowledge for its own sake" has been in vogue for some time. Apart from popular dogmas, the reasons are unclear. Curiosity seems a human trait which feeds itself when gratified and withers when frustrated. Moreover, there are certainly philosophers and scientists in large quantity who profess a desire to know "just for the satisfaction of knowing." This is not to deny that others may have more concrete motives.

XUM

"purely theoretic reason" as abstract cognition distinguish opposite ends of a spectrum wherein the tendency of thought in either direction can have harmful results. In the former case, intellect can be a tool of sheer self-aggrandizement imposing limited self-interest on the world in aesthetic possessiveness. Such a perspective breeds conflict in the environment and ultimate self-destruction. In the latter case, the attempt to eliminate subjective factors leads to a dichotomizing of fact and value and a sterile world of symbols and objects. It is a world with no room for creativity. The failure to recognize the activity of thought itself as behavior expressing its own purposes obscures the continuity of function between the evaluative activity of more concrete behavior and the evaluative character of intellectual behavior. Where the continuity is recognized, there is the tendency to reduce the latter to the former. On the one hand there is ignorance of novel purpose and on the other, its denial. The latter is implicit in all deterministic theories.

In human experience the processes discussed thus far may all be present in greater or lesser degrees at any moment: the selective disintegration of experience in consciousness, the intensification of purpose in self-consciousness, the coordination of consciousness in craft, and the coordination of consciousness in understanding. Yet they may also be present to a lesser degree in simpler

XUM

organisms.[100] However, morality of feeling and morality of express behavior require a complexity of coordinate consciousness sufficient to make possible novelty of terminal purpose itself. Intellect is the realization of social structure in thought, reinforced by its expression of preconscious organic feeling. But it is novelty of conception in service of routine.

> . . . there is a spontaneity of thought which lies beyond routine. Otherwise, the moral claim for freedom of thought is without meaning. This spontaneity of thought is, in its turn, subject to control as to its maintenance and efficiency. . . . This final determination is its Wisdom or, in other words, its subjective aim as to its own nature, with its limits set by inherited factors.[101]

Aesthetic and cognitive consciousness respectively introduce the subjective enjoyment of objects and objective identifications of the origins of enjoyment.

Moral consciousness directs attention to the role played by the subjective factors in experience. It replaces the sense of objects as instruments, or mere means, with a sense of subjects as responsible and responsive agents. Again, as in each previous instance, the origination of moral consciousness is continuous with the functions originating the other dimensions of experience. Where coordinate sustenance of conscious purpose endures sufficiently to

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[100] The excessive fear of anthropomorphism in interpreting complex animal experience often seems to reach the extreme of an anthropocentric isolation of man from the animal world.

[101] AI, p. 54.

reinforce a symbolic contrast with itself, the result is a recognition of personal agency. Morality is born with the sense of self, not as mere clarified purpose, but as present purposiveness identifiable with past purposiveness and affording satisfaction in the present as the outcome of past intentions. The essence of moral experience in its purest form is the conscious recognition that the values which we enjoy derive from the enjoyment of value by others and that the value enjoyed by others will in turn be dependent upon our own evaluative activity.

This realization of a personal sense of responsibility has two fundamental components which I shall abstractly separate as the moral idea and the moral instinct. The former is an element of "rational vision." Its rationality is in direct proportion to the degree to which it restores the imbalance of selective consciousness by facilitating symbolic recognition of the distinct role played by a plurality of occasions in present experience. On the other hand there is the blind coordination of social instincts achieved in the enjoyment of cooperative activities at a pre-conscious level of routine. It is the raising of these instincts to conscious recognition which transforms them into moral instincts, or elements of conscious motivation while at the same time the mere idea--which enters experience as only a theoretic datum--is transformed into a conscious purpose. This fusion of vague but organically effective feeling and clear but individually ineffective

concept introduces active moral idealization. It is a wedding of cognitive and aesthetic satisfactions in a rational subjectivity. As a result the mere coordination of consciousness in the social structure of routine thought and routine purpose recaptures the lost unity of organic function in a creative unity of self-conscious experience, the activity of a moral organism.

Moral rationality differs from mere craft, or practical intellect, in that it replaces the immediate service of my own subjectivity, for my own sake, with the recognition of other subjects to be served for their own sakes; a conscious recognition of intrinsic values other than my own. The most basic form of this experience is "Care for the future of personal existence, regret or pride in its past." The moral perplexity over the opposition of egoism and altruism has arisen from the failure to recognize that personal ambition and personal pride are both other-oriented feelings. The latter reflects acknowledgement of a subjectivity which no longer exists and the former reflects present self-dedication to a subjectivity which has yet to come into being. Perhaps the confusion derives equally from the substantial concept of the self and the tendency to posit a difference in kind wherever there is a pronounced difference in degree. In any event, moral philosophy has been thoroughly hampered by the conflicting recognitions of prudence as a virtue and selfishness as a vice, self-respect as a virtue and conceit as a vice, ambition as a virtue and

XUM

avarice as a vice, humility as a virtue and obsequiousness as a vice, etc. Here the conflict is resolved if in each case the distinction is drawn in terms of the subordination of present subjectivity to cooperation with subjective activity in other occasions as opposed to the subordination of other subjects to the role of mere means for present interests. One of the most fundamental facts of moral education is that a child must be taught to accept conscious responsibilities for his actions and concern for his own future well-being. Indeed, a corollary tragedy of moral education, perhaps derived from misplaced parental affection, is the failure to recognize that this process is continuous with the recognition of the broader society of subjects from which the personal society is largely derived. The result is an inconsistent insistence upon the service of the personal social structure <u>in opposition</u> to any wider coordination of ends. By this, I mean the injunction to "look out for number one." However, this is not an injunction to behavior differing in kind from dedication to the society of fellows in which the personal society is included. It is only the difference between extreme moral parochialism and its amelioration in the heightened rationality of a more general outlook.

> . . . after instinct and intellectual ferment have done their work, there is a decision which determines the mode of coalescence of instinct with intelligence. I will term this factor Wisdom. . . .
> . . . The whole determines what it wills to be, and thereby adjusts the relative importance of its

own inherent flashes of spontaneity.[102]

Moral progress moves, not in the direction of personal disinterest, but rather in the direction of continually expanding concern. The dichotomy between egoism and altruism is overcome in a self-realizational ethic when self-realization is pursued neither at the expense of others or the self but rather in growth of self-fulfillment through growth of the self-concept. Morality is:

> . . . the sublimation of the egoistic aim by its inclusion of the transcendent whole . . . .[103]

However, in moral consciousness the whole realized is one of complex purpose in mutual adjustment as opposed to sheer individuality. The moral subject sees himself as one among an interdependent many.

A conscious act of moral evaluation embraces and is the outcome of subordinate evaluations ranging over a plurality of occasions of experience. Thus morality presupposes the endurance of aim through a society embracing a plurality of occasions. Sherburne asserts[104] that Whitehead's concept of personal identity has no relevance for his moral theory in countering the charge that Whitehead's concept of the atomicity of actual occasions within the career of an individual leaves no room for a theory of responsibility. As a result he introduces the notion of immediate

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[102] AI, p. 54. [103] Ibid., p. 293.

[104] Cf. the section on Sherburne, pp. 82-84.

responsibility to God in the individual occasion. However, the ultimate moral significance of an individual moment of experience is negligible in contrast to that of the larger series of occasions within which the sustenance of personal identity is exhibited. Contrary to Sherburne's claim, Whitehead's concept of personal identity is of the essence in his notion of moral responsibility. The order, which is the ground of unity from which the individual derives responsibility, is social and not divine.[105]

It is true that the atomicity of individual occasions leaves no room for "responsibility for" the past in the sense of "guilt." In this sense each individual occasion, taken individually, is innocent. However, there is responsibility <u>for</u> the present within the present and it is a responsibility <u>to</u> the future derived in part <u>from</u> the past. There can be no objective guilt in an actual occasion for the actual effects of antecedent occasions. However, the realization of a moral evaluation by its very nature requires a pattern of valuation embracing a plurality of occasions in its character. The achievement of a "moral decision" is itself the coordination of a plurality of minor evaluative movements. In this sense, guilt in a present occasion is the cumulative dissatisfaction with the anticipated issue of

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[105]At least so far as moral responsibility is concerned. Religious experience may be another matter, transforming the conscious sense of social identity into a consciousness of cosmic individuality.

accepted aim, based upon experience of the outcome of similar aim in the past. It is possible to have a meaningful concept of "responsibility for" the past when we are speaking of a series of events within which personal identity is exhibited. Indeed, moral "intuition" is largely the awareness of personal responsibility. Moral responsibility rests upon the fact that given the various elements of aims, it lies within our power to shift the emphasis placed upon each. This adjustment of the final intensity in subjective aim is:

> . . . the foundation of our experience of responsibility, of approbation or of disapprobation, of self-approval or of self-reproach, of freedom, of emphasis. This element in experience is too large to be put aside merely as misconstruction. It governs the whole tone of human life. . . .
> . . . however far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of components of a concrescence . . . . Each occasion exhibits . . . [a] measure of creative emphasis in proportion to its measure of subjective intensity.[106]

Thus to the extent to which a series of events exhibiting a process of personal identification exhibits consistent acceptance and development of a pattern of aim, the dominant occasions within that series may be responsible for its objective value as a whole. Relatively speaking, the effect of individual occasions is likely to be of little significance on the whole. We are more concerned with the massive effect of cumulative realizations. Thus the focal point of moral evaluation really rests upon the responsibility

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[106] PR, pp. 74-75.

of the sustained types of valuation given embodiment by the occasions, even though there is creative adjustment of that valuation in each symbolic re-enactment. The more extensive the set of occasions exhibiting community of aim, the more likely is it to be a primary focus of moral concern. Thus a society of persons, identified as a society in respect of this communal element, is as much a subject of moral interest and subject to moral responsibility as the component persons within it. Like citizens of a nation, individual occasions of experience bear the ultimate responsibility for reform but each can make only a partial contribution. There are exceptions. There are shattering moments in experience, just as there is Christ and there is Hitler. Yet each in part was a product of and dependent upon the social climate of his time.

Occasionally, moral philosophers seem not to take morality seriously enough. They act as if morality were a thing of the moment, to be done or not done. The outgrowth of this viewpoint has often been bitterly oppressive condemnation of behavior. However, an individual must acquire the capacity for morality before he can act morally. No one expects of a child what he expects of an adult. Yet adults are often less moral than children. The wisdom and morality of reserving judgment upon the behavior of others is a recognition of the dependence of motivation upon the circumstances of its development.

. . . moral authority is limited by competence

> to attain those ends whose immediate dominance is evident to enlightened wisdom.[107]

Moral responsibility is limited by the capacity of the moral ideal to serve as an effective guide to behavior. This effectiveness itself is a function of both the background of instinctive feeling which re-enforces the idea and the relevance of the idea which gives direction to the feeling. There is of course the further limitation imposed by external circumstance.

In Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead traces the moral evolution of Western society. Here he concludes:

> . . . The best service that ideas can render is gradually to lift into the mental poles the ideal of another type of perfection which becomes a program for reform. An illustration of this is the service of Christianity by its introduction of new ideals for the social life of mankind.[108]

But he stresses that:

> . . . the final introduction of a reform does not necessarily prove the moral superiority of the reforming generation. It certainly does require that that generation exhibits reforming energy. But conditions may have changed, so that what is possible now may not have been possible then. A great idea is not to be conceived as merely waiting for enough good men to carry it into practical effect. . . . The ideal in the background is promoting the gradual growth of the requisite communal customs, adequate to sustain the load of its exemplification.[109]

As indicated at the outset, I have been reconstructing the corollary of moral development in the individual to supplement the social ethics expressed in Adventures of Ideas. The

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[107] AI, p. 69. [108] Ibid., p. 258. [109] Ibid., p. 29.

XUM

organic conception of society is the view that the individual is in part a product of the society which he joins by its incorporation within himself while the society is also in part an expression of the individuals which sustain it. The point to be made here is that the process whereby an ethical ideal shapes the capability of a society for its ultimate exemplification is reflected in the moral development of every individual. Indeed, the realization of moral character by a civilization is largely dependent upon the development of moral character in its members. The differences lie in behavior that is relevant to such complex bodies as nations but not relevant to individual citizens.

Just as a child crudely approximates physiological evolution in foetal development, he approximates social evolution in moral development. The development of "communal custom" adequate to sustain the ideal finds its corollary in the development of routines of behavior in both physical and intellectual feeling. These routines are the subordinate developments which accomplish the transfer from highly concrete, particular, and short-sighted moral emotion to the defining of practicable ambitions and instincts relevant to achievement over a span of years. They may exhibit consideration for a variable plurality of subjects.

> Wisdom is proportional to the width of the evidence made effective in the final self-determination.[110]

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[110] Ibid., p. 54.

Where an idea has sufficient intrinsic interest, re-enforced by entrenched instinct, it may endure until there is adequate adaptation of individual feeling to render it practicable.

> . . . There has in every case to be a selection of ends dependent partly on intrinsic importance if attained, and partly upon practicability of attainment.[111]

These adaptive routines include the primitive instinctive behaviors derived from cultural and bodily inheritance, coordination of conscious and self-conscious discriminations, the acquisition of symbolic tools and their intellectual coordination with a widening base of experience and a growing history of re-enforcement in successful practical feeling. Freedom of moral practice is achieved by the coordination of conscious life into a self-sustaining mechanism habituated to accepting the direction of intellectual inclinations. Such an accomplishment involves the spread of an idea to dominate the components of individual feeling in the same manner that ideas come to dominate civilizations.

A child achieves concern for his own immediate future, while his remote future remains an object of idly imaginative activity. All too often in our own educational systems, he is oblivious to the ultimate relevance of much of his activity to this future. Yet his moral feeling

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[111] Ibid., p. 64.

shifts from inclination and comprehension of purely personal exigencies to achieve concern for other subjects around him. Children readily achieve fierce affections which fluctuate from jealous possessiveness to devoted concerns for another's enjoyment. A child may feel concern for a suffering bird and decide to cure birds by becoming a doctor. With the development of more selective identifications in his valuation of others, the affection for the bird may be replaced with a primary concern for human friends. But a remote idea re-enforced by its instrumentality to immediate affection achieves persistence and at last may so pervade the interests of the child that it sustains him through the years of acquiring method, subordinate purpose, and the requisite feelings to become a healer of men. Unfortunately, all too often the intensification of personal identity expressed in such ambition reduces the end sought to a means of lesser personal gratification. The idealism of the youngster who dedicates himself to becoming a doctor for the sake of service gives way to the cynicism of doctors who value their own services only in respect of payments received. Existence is filled with the demands for interest and affection, which shift in the terms of their definition and the feelings aroused in their support. Beyond personal identity,

> . . . there are other societies, and societies of societies. There is the animal body ministering to the soul: there are families, groups of families, nations, species, groups involving different species associated in the joint enterprise of keeping alive. These various societies, each in its measure, claim loyalties and loves. In human history the various

> responses to these claims disclose the essential transcendence of each individual actuality beyond itself.[112]

If human valuation proceeded to give each society of subjects its full recognition in conscious concern, there would be no problem of morality. However,

> . . . Among mankind these fundamental feelings reign with great strength within limited societies. But the range of human intelligence--its very foresight as to dangers and opportunities, the power of the imaginative entertaining of differences between group and group, of their divergencies of habit and sentiment--this range of intelligence has produced a ferocity of inversion of this very sentiment of interracial benevolence. Mankind is distinguished by its strength of tribal feeling, and conversely it is also distinguished by far-reaching malign exploitation and inter-tribal warfare. Also the tribal feeling is apt to be chequered by limitations of benevolence to special sections within the boundary of the same community.[113]

It is a gross oversimplification to identify moral feeling as mere benevolence to other subjects. The social instincts evolved at a pre-conscious level are submerged in consciousness. Their resurrection in conscious motivation transforms them into definite feelings relative to definite subjects. The capacity for moral concern in any given individual will range over a wide field of diversely identified subjects. It will embrace a varying degree of commitment in each case relative to contrasts with other subjects and specific circumstances. Moreover, since the aim of the moral subject itself becomes instrumental to other subjects, a determining factor will be the services required. In every instance the

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[112] AI, p. 290. [113] Ibid., p. 44.

issue of moral motivation and moral responsibility requires an answer in terms of "how much," to whom, in what regards, under what circumstances, in respect of what modes of enjoyment.

This final point raises another problem of moral consciousness. Intellectual evaluation passes from regard for the importance of individual subjects to regard for specific components in the valuation of the individual himself. Thus we proceed from the uncritical acceptance of those with whom we are familiar to the critical acceptance and rejection of the individual in respect of specific virtues and vices. It is a common feature of child behavior to reject a beloved parent when contrast with others reveals a specific flaw. The felt betrayal of unqualified affection is bitter. Fortunately for family life, wider experience may lead to a re-evaluation of the parent in terms of a more detailed and reconstituted complex image of his identity. The result may be the renewal of affection in the notion that, "as a whole, the old man is not such a bad guy." Again, situations will differ.

Ultimately, moral progress is progress in the achievement of moral capacity and moral responsibility themselves. I have suggested above that these are specifically structured in concrete instances. However, there is a general sense in which moral capacity can itself be increased in adaptability. Such occurs where there is slowly established a routine in moral consciousness of relying upon the

XUM

rational persuasiveness of creative intelligence.

> . . . In so far as the area of reasonable persuasion widens, an environment has been provided within which the higher mental activities and the subtler feelings can find their use and their enjoyment. But with the growth of intellect the range of necessity diminishes. Some command over nature has been attained. Thus a widespread reliance on persuasion produces its reward in the shape of an upward evolution. At least, it produces conditions favourable to such an upward trend.[114]

It is one more testimony to the continuity of processes in nature that the same evaluative function which gives birth to aggression based on intensified loyalty also reaches a height of operation which subdues the compulsive force of limited emotion to the persuasive influence of rational perspective. Just as growth in artistry is the gradual development of mastery over the environment by intelligent interests, growth in moral capacity is the gradual development of mastery over intelligent interests by themselves.

> . . . Thus Peace is self-control at its widest,--at the width where the 'self' has been lost, and interest has been transferred to coördinations wider than personality.[115]

Two popular dogmas of moral thought are repudiated by the preceding account. One is the conviction of absolutists that moral responsibilities apply without qualifications appropriate to individual subjects. The other is the view of relativists that there is no appropriateness of moral values subject to comparative evaluation in differing

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[114] AI, p. 76. [115] Ibid., p. 284.

circumstances. However, this explanation does account for two phenomena of primary current interest to anthropology. In its explanation of the submersion of habitual routine in conscious experience and its qualified resurrection in reinforcement of novel directive objects, it accounts for the observed datum that the instinctual behavior patterns of simpler organisms become increasingly less specific with increasing complexity of the organism. The result is a general ground of propensity with a high degree of variability in the specific objects with which responses can be associated.

On the other hand, it accounts for the aggressiveness of man to his own species, much touted of late by ethologists who offer it as man's most distinctive feature. While it accounts for this difference between man and most other species, the preceding account would direct the attention of ethology to a rather salient fact of human behavior. By this I refer to the fact that such infra-species aggressions are relative to a context of subordinate loyalties within which the more obvious phenomenon is co-operative inclination. Whether it is true that primitive human behavior, in progenitor primate or child, is aggressive is only of limited interest to morality. What is more interesting is where it can end. It would appear that it does occasionally end, and perhaps begins, in benevolence. At least the suggestion is offered here that aggression is the defensive expression of misguided affection. Political leaders in wartime have

XUM

always claimed this explicitly, though not acknowledging the mis-direction.

Moral Designs

There are three main topics which remain to be briefly discussed in developing Whitehead's moral philosophy: the general factors governing the formation of particular moral values; the general topic of Good and Evil; and the relationship between religion and morality. In the concluding chapter of Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead notes that moral codes reflect the special circumstances of the societies within which they originate. However, this does not preclude the search for generalities behind these codes.

> . . . Such generalities should reflect the very notions of the harmonizing of harmonies, and of particular individual actualities as the sole authentic reality. These are the principles of the generality of harmony, and of the importance of the individual. The first means 'order,' and the second means 'love.' Between the two there is a suggestion of opposition. For 'order' is impersonal; and love, above all things, is personal. The antithesis is solved by rating types of order in relative importance according to their success in magnifying the individual actualities, that is to say, in promoting strength of experience. Also in rating the individual on the double basis, partly on the intrinsic strength of its own experience, and partly on its influence in the promotion of a high-grade type of order. These two grounds in part coalesce. For a weak individual exerts a weak influence.[116]

The emergence of love as moral devotion was the primary topic of the preceding section. 'Order' refers to the complex

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[116] AI, pp. 290-291.

modes of definite valuation realized in the expression of moral benevolence. Morality is the expression of concern for other individuals as realized under vastly various modes of complex characterization. Any element in experience can be a component in the realization of a morally valuable order. While this topic has been touched upon in passing, it deserves attention in its own right. In some sense, the ultimate Importance of morality resides in love, but in another sense, its whole Interest resides in the systems of order which give it definition.

The primary impetus of morality rests upon recognition of the fact that the achievement of value experience for ourselves is itself a function of our capacity to give value to others. The phrase 'give value to' has the meanings of both 'appreciate' and 'serve.' The intensity of self-gratification achieved in mere possessive self-interest is purchased at a cost of simplicity and superficiality of depth. Even were it not for the conflict fostered by purely possessive interest, it would remain a fact that unreflective self-indulgence brings its own tedium. The experience of a child is marked by quick fascination and quick loss of interest. The achievement of a concern for others, for future personal well-being and the future well-being of various individuals, introduces a broader scope of values. However, since it requires suppression of the effort at immediate self-satisfaction, moral aim would only be felt as odious discipline were it not for the fact that

XUM

> . . . The function of being a means is not disjoined from the function of being an end. The sense of worth beyond itself is immediately enjoyed as an over-powering element in the individual self-attainment.[117]

There are two sides to this claim, one is the suggestion that morality is the shift toward anticipatory enjoyment, with the scope of moral interest being marked by the range of individuals for whom we harbor ambitions. At the same time this anticipation comprises an intrinsic satisfaction taken in the awareness of our own value to others. Moralists harping on the theme of humility seem oblivious to the fact that a man who has no sense of his own importance would of necessity be incapable of conceiving himself as a moral agent. A subtler form of the same error is made by moralists who fail to recognize that morality is either a joyful and self-rewarding enterprise or else it is a hollow compulsive ritual, exhibiting the appearance without the reality of moral feeling. There is no denying the frequent conflict of duty and desire stressed by Kant, however it is a conflict of interests and not interest in conflict with that which is devoid of interest. In moral education, a child may submit to compulsion in following specific patterns of behavior, however he only willingly "internalizes" those which are recognizable as giving valuable new direction to accepted aims.

There is one more general point which must be made

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[117] PR, p. 531.

XUM

about moral motivation. Specifically moral ideals are ideals of service, the characterization of which necessarily involves reference to those to whom service is to be rendered. As developed above, they are realized as individual feelings organizing a broad basis of ill-defined feeling under the clarifying form of an idea. The idea is itself an individual intellectual feeling. Since "given" feelings are immutable, being facts, the ideal is a new feeling creatively realized. Of course, given the complexity of human experience and the fertility of intellectual imagination, consciousness is filled with a vast variety of ideals. In fact, every moral ideal will involve cognitive and aesthetic ideals, namely cognitive idealizations (or identifications) of the subject to be served and aesthetic idealizations of the satisfactions to be given. Thus each moral ideal will involve notions of that for whom a thing is to be done, that which is to be done for him, and the manner of its doing--as expressed in the moral ideal itself. (I.e., the child's "Becoming a doctor in order to give birds the pleasure of health.") Each of these ideals and each of their constituents will vary in strength and influence. The most effective, i.e., the most concrete, are also the most immediately relevant. This "relevance" is an index of the consonance between the moral and non-moral values involved.

When the moral ideal also affords aesthetic value and cognitive value to the subject, it is most influential. Thus, for example, a child will readily acquire the moral

XUM

concern with physical self-improvement where moral aim is itself re-enforced by the organic pleasures of play. Similarly, intellectual self-development can be re-enforced by the presentation of learning as a game of imagination. Where both can be combined, children become avid and ambitious students. Existentialists have rightfully stressed the dangers of excess emphasis upon the anticipatory character of moral feeling, the loss of today in deferment to a tomorrow which may never come. However, if anticipation is recognized as present enjoyment this objection can in part be answered. Yet one cannot deny that moral concern opens one to anxiety for that which is valued. But so far as the purely personal sense of loss is concerned, this anxiety can be allayed by patterns of moral valuation which also afford immediate non-moral satisfactions. In this manner, the losses involved in high hopes can be minimized. "Angst" itself derives from a moral fallacy of misplaced concreteness, it replaces the reality of the anticipation with the reality of that which is anticipated. It then emphasizes the fear for loss of that which is not yet to the point of destroying the joy that is now. As a result, some men fear death too much to enjoy life and fear failure too much to try. Such conditions arise when the ideal object of moral dedication is perverted to an object of mere aesthetic possessiveness, dwelt upon in present imagination.[118]

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[118]Rarely is it the fault of the subject himself. The

Thus in suggesting that we must search for patterns of moral valuation or 'order' which "magnify the individuals" involved, Whitehead is stressing the search for concepts of service that enrich not only the experience of those who are served but also those who serve. As Mill saw, self-abnegation and asceticism for their own sake have no place in morality. However, the point here is not merely that the value experience of the present subject is to be counted in the total. It is that "weak individuals have a weak influence." As moralists and psychologists have occassionally noted, self-respect is a pre-requisite of respect for others. This is a moral form of the principle developed earlier, that extrinsic value is derivative from intrinsic value.

Schilpp has charged that Whitehead offers no criterion for the choice of "pattern" in moral feeling. Goheen has identified Whitehead's emphasis upon pattern as a mere Platonic pre-occupation with "unity."[119] However, diversity is just as essential. "Importance" is the achievement of value through the continual individual derivation of novel organic unities from a plurality and plurality is an essential in the process. The aim of existence for Whitehead is

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dreams of people in destitute situations are rapidly transformed into the very substance upon which they must live.

[119] John Goheen, "Whitehead's Theory of Value," The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (N.Y.: Tudor Publishing Co., 1951), pp. 435-459; also supra, pp. 77-81 on Schilpp.

not "uniform" activity but rather "organic activity."

> . . . The Universe achieves its values by reason of its coördination into societies of societies . . . . [120]

> . . . Each society has its own type of perfection, and puts up with certain blots, at that stage inevitable. . . . All realization of the Good is finite, and necessarily excludes certain other types.[121]

It is the social organization internal to the individual which determines his contribution in subsequent occasions. For the moment it may suffice to point out that the aim at social perfection, at least in respect of its moral dimension, is context bound. Morality is the inculcation into aim of elements perfecting the achievement of organic order by perfecting the conditions for realization of satisfaction by the subjects involved. There may be a high degree of plasticity but each society achieves a type of value for itself. Thus the specification of detailed valuations can be carried out only in relation to specified circumstances. This does not mean that there are no general features in terms of which prospects of valuation can themselves be judged. Indeed these have been implicit throughout the discussion thus far. However, they require a final summary.

Morality is an aim at a "union of harmony, intensity, and vividness." Thus far my discussion has largely been limited to the process of "harmonization." It is the factors of "intensity" and "vividness" which work to preserve

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[120] AI, p. 207. [121] Ibid., p. 289.

the differences within "harmony" which are required for importance. For Whitehead, intensity and vividness are really inseparable elements in the determination of selective emphasis. Intensity is the force with which elements of distinct value are felt in experience. In respect of morality, it is the origin of the effectiveness of moral aim. In this sense, the attainment of intensity takes precedence over the attainment of individual social structure itself, since intensity gauges the height of value experience and strength of objective import ultimately expressed:

> . . . patterned intensiveness regulates the distinctive relative importance of each element of the datum as felt in that feeling.[122]

The selectiveness of evaluation operates for the sake of intensity. Indiscriminate intensity in regard to the overwhelming mass of contingent data given in the antecedent world would result in the deterioration of value experience into overwhelming confusion. There is here an element in the operation of "interest" that is reminiscent of Nietzsche: "Intensity is the reward of narrowness."[123]

Morality is as much dependent upon real as ideal potential insofar as moral aim is relative to immediate social context and moral relevance itself is a function of the congruence of ideal and real potential in the immediate occasion. "Real potential" is the capacity of attained value to secure diverse novel appreciations under interpretive

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[122] PR, p. 368. [123] Ibid., p. 172.

presentations which are more limited than the given original:

> . . . All characteristics peculiar to actualities are modes of emphasis whereby finitude vivifies the infinite. In this way Creativity involves the production of value-experience, by the inflow from the infinite into the finite, deriving special character from the details and the totality of the finite pattern. . . .
> . . . consciousness proceeds to a second order of abstraction whereby finite constituents of the actual thing are abstracted from that thing.[124]

'Vividness' expresses the degree of distinctness between cognitively isolated characters. It thus furnishes the focus requisite for intensive magnification and preserves the details from fading into vague anonymity. Vividness in the final appearance determines the degree of distinctive originality in the emergent occasion and its subsequent claim to attention. With respect to objective elements in experience, intensity and vividness roughly correspond to Hume's "force" and "liveliness" of ideas.

However, morality is the perfection of "aim" leading to greatness of experience and requiring a diversity of vivid detail.

> . . . the perfection of Subjective Form is defined in terms of 'Strength.' . . . Strength has two factors, namely, variety of detail with effective contrast, which is Massiveness, and Intensity Proper which is comparative magnitude . . . . [however] the maximum of intensity proper is finally dependent upon massiveness.[125]

> A subjective . . . [aim] has two factors, its qualitative pattern and its pattern of intensive

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[124] "MG," p. 681. [125] AI, p. 252.

quantity.[126]

Intensity alone can not account for definite character or contrasting diversity in organism. First of all, the emergence of intensity requires given character. Secondly, a single vivid interest of sufficient intensity might take the form of generating harmony through sheer subordinating domination of alternative expression. As a component in primitive moral valuation, this would be the aesthetic basis of aggressive behavior. That is to say, motivation characterized by intensity lacking qualitative diversity achieves social realization as an achievement of brute suppression. However, 'intensity' and 'vividness' express the capacity of the individual to become a moving factor in the world. The force of sheer suppression is self-expending. Its singularity generates opposition to itself by virtue of its very exclusions. Like Plato's tyrant, an atomic explosion, or a natural holocaust, the more ferocious the intensity of its momentary expression, the more assiduously do the constituents of its immediate vicinity seek dissipation of its further influences. Perfection of vividness requires the incorporation of concern for a plurality of vivid factors.

The ultimate endurance of express intensity rests upon circumspection in the incorporation of elements emphasized. However, the incorporation of diversity in emphasis, with equality of intensity given to the diverse factors,

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[126] PR, p. 356.

would itself dissipate all emphasis in sheer discord. While the absence of intensity in any elements produces the evil of boredom in utter stagnation, equality of emphasis would produce the opposite and equally debilitating evil of indecision and inconsistency. Thus although,

> . . . the discrimination of quality immensely increases the intensity of experience,[127]

and

> . . . the rise in vivid experience of the Good and of the Bad depends upon the intuition of exact forms of limitation,[128]

there remains the need for reconciliation of diverse interests in emphasis so as to avoid conflict. The avoidance of conflict is itself achieved through the gradation of intensity in a qualitative pattern of relative emphasis. This is to say that strength rests upon the evaluative adjustment of diverse interests beneath a single dominant pattern of concern. Preservation of vivid diverse interests through expression in a pattern of intensive subordination is the meaning of "contrast":

> It follows that balanced complexity is the outcome of this final category of subjective aim. Here 'complexity' means the realization of contrasts, of contrasts of contrasts, and so on; and 'balance' means the absence of attenuations due to the elimination of contrasts which some elements in the pattern would introduce and other elements inhibit. . . .
> . . . But this limitation to 'conditions of contrast' is the demand for 'balance.'
> . . . and 'balance' is the adjustment of identities and diversities for the introduction of contrast with the avoidance of inhibitions by

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[127] MT, pp. 161-162. [128] Ibid., p. 107.

incompatibilities.[129]

The insistence upon vividness is an insistence upon the pursuit of value experience that is not superficially weak in its simplification to a single mode of expression, i.e., "brutalizing" in the original sense of "reduction to primitive modes of enjoyment." Vividness is a demand for the explicit preservation of complex diversity of tolerance within the express valuation of the emergent subject. Thereby is to be achieved the massiveness of potential which expresses itself morally as mutual tolerance and greatness of foresight arising out of depth of insight.

> . . . The selectiveness of individual experience is moral so far as it conforms to the balance of importance disclosed in the rational vision; and conversely the conversion of the intellectual insight into an emotional force corrects the sensitive experience in the direction of morality.[130]

The moral prospect is a " . . . prophecy which procures its own fulfillment"[131] and which channels the force of expression. The demand for vividness, in conjunction with the demand for harmony and intensity, requires that moral values exhibit contrast in the achievement of organic activity within which there is preserved the greatest possible effectiveness of constituent elements limited only by "mutual respect." (These elements may be components of aesthetic experience to be enjoyed by other subjects or the subjects which are themselves united in a moral prospect.) Morality

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[129] PR, pp. 424-425. [130] Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[131] AI, p. 49.

is the aim at patterns of valuation which, relative to a given context, foster the fullest possible satisfaction of potentials for individual enjoyment. However, this need be no more than the service of morality to non-moral value. In its focus upon the transformation of subjective interests themselves, morality passes beyond the satisfaction of real potential: to the creation of novel potential itself. The final aim of moralization is the aim at moralization.

Good and Evil

If it be kept in mind that 'morality' denotes an abstraction that has significance only with respect to individuals, then the idea of "morality for morality's sake" becomes the notion that the specific aim of morality is the indefinite improvement of subjects for the sake of future subjects. A better subject is one who has enhanced ability to appreciate others as well as enhanced ability to serve others. As a direct corollary it includes the broadening of enjoyment for the subject himself as well as the enhancement of his own capacity to be appreciated by others, for he has more to enjoy and more to be enjoyed for. Such would be the status of moral process in the best of all possible worlds. As matters would have it, we live in the actual world. In the actual world we are forced to be selective. The ideal is not self-sacrifice and I am bound to loyalties and discriminations.

> . . . The nature of evil is that the characters of things are mutually obstructive. Thus the depths

> of life require a process of selection. . . . Selection is at once the measure of evil, and the process of its evasion. It means the discarding the element of obstructiveness in fact. No element in fact is ineffectual: thus the struggle with evil is a process of building up a mode of utilization . . . .
>
> The evil of the world is that those elements which are translucent so far as transmission is concerned, [i.e., submit themselves almost totally to replication of conformal demands] in themselves are of slight weight; and that those elements with individual weight, by their discord, impose upon vivid immediacy the obligation that it fade into night.[132]

> . . . Evil is the half-way house between perfection and triviality. It is the violence of strength against strength.[133]

Evil is also describable metaphysically as the "perpetual perishing" of the universe which occurs insofar as: (1) objectified actual entities can only exist as encompassed in the unity of an emerging actual entity; (2) all realizations are finite and unique, and thus mutually exclusive; (3) joint realization requires either suppression of elements, realization under the guise of conflict, or mutual submersion in symbolic contrast. Thus the stability of the present achievement will be limited by its capacity for reconciliation. Where this capacity is lessened there will be decrease in importance.

However, Whitehead has reservations here:

> . . . The doctrine has been stated that the experience of destruction is in itself evil; in fact that it constitutes the meaning of evil. We find now that this enunciation is much too simple-minded. Qualifications have to be introduced . . . .[134]

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[132] *PR*, pp. 517-518. [133] *AI*, p. 275.

[134] *Ibid.*, p. 258.

The qualifications introduced by Whitehead refer to the positive role served by disorder in achieving the realization of a "noble discontent" leading to more strength in experience. Disorder may be positively realized in experience with a feeling of constructive purpose:

> . . . The common character of all evil is that its realization in fact involves that there is some concurrent realization of a purpose towards elimination. The purpose is to secure the avoidance of evil. The fact of the instability of evil is the moral order in the world.
>
> Evil, triumphant in its enjoyment, is so far good in itself; but beyond itself it is evil in its character of a destructive agent among things greater than itself.[135]

Evil contains within itself the seeds of its own elimination. The experience of evil serves as a spur upward beyond the scope of present expression.

However, evil lies "in depths and distances below and beyond appearance." Disorder, occuring between the simpler and antecedent constituents of a complex organic experience, achieves synthesis in a higher order "propositional feeling" contrasting the datum with a new character to be realized in the present feeling but frustrated by the conflict. This is:

> . . . the true active presence of both component feelings. In this case there is a third feeling of mutual destructiveness, so that one or other--or both--of the component feelings fails to attain the strength properly belonging to the prehension of the datum from which it arises. This is the feeling of evil in the most general sense, namely physical pain or mental evil, such as sorrow, horror, dislike. This type of inhibition will be termed 'aesthetic

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[135] RM, pp. 92-93.

> destruction.' Aesthetic destruction is a positive component in subjective form, and is inconsistent with perfection.[136]

Here the mutual destructiveness of their common presence as primitive data constitutes the evil which is the object of feeling at a higher level. But at the higher level, the feeling realized already involves appearance under the guise of "pain" or "sorrow." Thus evil is the painful experience of destruction. In their individuality, the conflicting elements constitute positive objects of enjoyment but are mutually incompatible in the given relation.

The conscious "recognition" of evil requires a conscious awareness of what "could have been":

> Thus evil promotes its own elimination by destruction, or degradation, or by elevation. . . . It must be noted that the state of degradation to which evil leads, when accomplished, is not in itself evil, except by comparison with what might have been. A hog is not an evil beast, but when a man is degraded to the level of a hog, with the accompanying atrophy of finer elements, he is no more evil than a hog. The evil of the final degradation lies in the comparison of what is with what might have been. During the process of degradation the comparison is an evil for the man himself, and at its final stage it remains an evil for others.[137]

Moreover, the evil realized is itself dependent on indeterminate factors.

> . . . it becomes plain that, with a sufficiently comprehensive view, a stable state of final degradation is not reached. For the relationships with society and the indirect effects have to be taken into account. Also destruction when accomplished is not an evil for the thing destroyed. For there is no such thing. Again the evil lies in the loss to the social environment. There is evil when

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[136] AI, pp. 255-256. [137] RM, p. 94.

things are at cross purposes.[138]

> . . . Evil is positive and destructive; what is good is positive and creative.[139]

Evil can derive from conflict of concept with concept, concept with reality, or reality with reality. The evil lies either below the appearance in frustration of given real potentials or beyond, within the future potentials of present realization including novel conceptual additions. Purely aesthetic evil is realized in a relationship between objects relative to a given subjectivity. The same applies to cognitive evil, though now the objects in question will be symbolic. However, moral evil is always concerned with the relationship between subjects, recognized as subjects.

These potentials are always for newly emergent subjects. "Degradation" is literally de-gradation. Where the response to conflict takes the form of decline, conformation is achieved through reduction of one or more of the conflicting factors to a level of existence characterized by compatibility within the environment at a lower level of realization. The range of this process may be from lowering our opinion of someone who disagrees with us to killing or enslaving him. Contemporary America offers an example of a society that may be tending toward a more primitive form of order due to a sterile response to conflict. An alcoholic's drinking will be an evil to him only so long as he retains

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[138] Ibid. [139] Ibid., p. 93.

XUM

an awareness of contrast with the values formerly comprising his ego-object. He is thus afforded a comparison between the subject that was and the subject that is--perhaps with a sense of responsibility for the decline. Once he has fully anaesthetized (or killed) himself there is no longer any evil for him, it is only evil for others. Further, there is evil for others only insofar as there is novel conflict, involving awareness of what might have been for them and for him. The opening of a fatal wound is a painful organic adaptation to the brutal conformal demand of the weapon. But after the moment of death, the active harm is only to those left behind to suffer the loss.

Evil is not merely the absence of good or even the simple loss of good. It is the realization of a lesser good at the cost of a greater, a minimization of value that might otherwise have been realized--yet proceeding from a realization of value. An individual actuality may be said to be evil only relative to the context of some broader system of order, previously sustained within inheritance or yet to be achieved. Such a contrast can be realized within the reflection and the anticipation of a particular moral subject. It is only an ideal realization. Yet without it there would be no locus for moral choice. Within this context of alternatives, the moral dilemma is not one of simple good versus simple evil. It is a comparison of relative goods. Moreover, it is highly complex, since the question must be: given these subjects as opposed to those, related in this

XUM

manner as opposed to another, and these objects as opposed to others in each case. The spouse who decides to murder an unfaithful partner decides for a system of life and not an isolated issue. Indeed, the demand for recognition of this organic relativity in moral choice is the most striking feature of modern reform movements.

Of course, the same may be said of the good. Strictly speaking, "The Good," for Whitehead, can not be defined:

> . . . since 'The Good' is an ultimate qualification not to be analysed in terms of any things more final than itself. But an analogous question can be asked, . . . To what sort of things does the concept apply, and in particular what sort of conditions are requisite for its evocation?[140]

Whitehead's answer to this latter question provoked Schilpp's charge that Whitehead defines the Good as "pattern" and then gives no criterion of "pattern."

> . . . the infusion of pattern into natural occurrences, and the stability of such patterns, and the modification of such patterns, is the necessary condition for the realization of the Good.[141]

Whitehead's view is summed up in this citation:

> . . . All value is the gift of finitude which is the necessary condition for activity. Also activity means the origination of patterns of assemblage, and mathematics is the study of pattern. Here we find the essential clue which relates mathematics to the study of the good, and the study of the bad.[142]

Repeatedly in his later work, Whitehead suggests that

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[140] AI, p. 152. [141] "MG," pp. 677-678.

[142] Ibid., p. 674.

> . . . mathematical understanding . . . [is] the primary example of insight into the nature of The Good.[143]

But, his emphasis is always upon the relationship of "order" to the good and the function of mathematics in interpreting order. He does not identify the good with order. The important point is rather:

> . . . the function of pattern in the production of Good or Evil in the finite unit of feeling which embraces the enjoyment of that pattern.[144]

A pattern is "in itself neither good nor bad." Apart from the concrete individuals involved in exemplification, mere patterns exhibit no basis for preference.

"Order" is "Harmony," deprived of its quality of value felt in immediate enjoyment. The conditions of the Good are the conditions prerequisite to originative activity; for

> . . . Evil is positive and destructive; what is good is positive and creative.[145]

It is essential to note that Whitehead identifies the necessary condition of realizing the Good as the "infusion," "stability," and "modification" of pattern and not merely "pattern" itself.

> The notions of Harmony and of Mathematical Relations are only special exemplifications of a yet more general philosophic concept, namely, that of the general interconnectedness of things, which transforms the manifoldness of the many into the unity of the one.[146]

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[143] MT, p. 104. [144] "MG," p. 680. [145] RM, p. 93.

[146] AI, p. 153.

'Goodness' refers to the capacity for mutual re-enforcement of real potential in complete actualities, given prior to present appearance or through the mediation of some more proximate past appearance. It also refers to the same aspect of future realities, including the completed present actuality, conceptually entertained within anticipation. However, both refer to the objective potential for the derivation of novel value.

The moral dimension of the good is concerned with the role to be played by present subjectivity in its dealings with the world. Morality either grows or declines. Experience of the goodness of reality here becomes the re-inforcing satisfaction with antecedent personal valuations recognized as a dominant element in achieving present value experience. If morality is left at this point, the moral process will wither as potentials are exhausted. I.e., people who direct morality toward the preservation only of the goodness they have attained tend to confuse the activity of morality with a passive appreciation of its aesthetic attainments. The continued repetition of patterns of achievement which initially provide the ground for creative variation and intensity of interest, and thus achievement of good, can eventually so homogenize the environment that the same pattern becomes a condition of evil.[147] Tedium is the first symptom of

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[147] As exemplified in the homogenization of the environment by certain forms of human activity, resulting in the instability of simplified eco-systems.

approaching revolution. The revolution is apt to be violent and filled with evil if the environment is well stocked with defensive moralists who are:

> . . . unprogressive, enjoying their egotistical goodness. . . . They have reached a state of stable goodness, so far as their own interior life is concerned. This type of moral correctitude is, on a larger view, so like evil that the distinction is trivial.[148]

The moral intuition finds its proper object in replacing the concern with how good the world is as expressed in me now to the concern with how it can improve and how I can improve it. The experience of goodness always presupposes a standard of value and the experience of moral goodness requires an awareness of self and others in relation to this standard. It starts out as an appreciation of the service rendered by novelty in subordinate purpose to an accepted context of social purpose. In its most creative form it passes over into the appreciation of established purpose in respect of the service which it can offer in relation to a novel ideal prospect, involving a broader community. But again, this ideal will only achieve such eminence if possessed of strength drawn from its relevance to the given context. To avoid the evil of conflict and indifference, innovations in ethical concepts of the good must be sufficiently broad to include the best of the past. Thus to achieve the moral good, one must always insure that the sacrifice which is the price of reformation includes the

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[148] RM, p. 95.

promise of an adequately compensating salvation.

The idea of Goodness is not so much elicited by the notion of form as it is by that of formation. The predication of 'good' reflects the recognition of elements in experience as exhibiting a function which in their context, as seen from a broader perspective, are essentially creative. The Creativity of the universe is oriented toward the production of beauty, but it is in its Creativity itself that its goodness resides. Goodness is that quality in respect of which there is origination of assemblage, integration of value for the derivation of higher value, and reconciliation of aim and achievement. It is "success" where 'success' means achieving the ongoing function of fostering fulfillment. Morality is not merely a matter of transforming the actual world to make its subjects happier. It is a matter of transforming the real world through creating novel potentials for valuation and evaluation. It is the creation of more creative subjects.

Religion and Morality

In the final chapter, I offer a summary of Whitehead's position and a more concrete discussion of its detached implications for individual moral decisions. Thus I have omitted such a summary here and instead have commented briefly on Belaief's confusion of Whitehead's concepts of religion and morality.

As noted in Chapter Two,[149] Belaief credits Whitehead with grounding morality in a religious insight into the unity of the universe in God. Tragedy and ultimately irrationality result from the attempt to achieve this unattainable ideal. The moral agent is ultimately plunged into "despair" from which he is rescued by the "divine gift of peace." The final tragedy arises from the sacrifice of desire to duty without guarantee of reward. As a result, Belaief goes on to develop a postulate of subjective immortality.

All of this sounds alien to Whitehead's discussions of duty.

> . . . The vigour of civilized societies is preserved by the wide-spread sense that high aims are worthwhile. . . . men wander beyond the safe provision of personal gratifications. All strong interests easily become impersonal, the love of a good job well done.[150]

Indeed, he explicitly states that the "Peace" which comes in moral effort is a self-rewarding moral "satisfaction."

> . . . Certainly Regulus did not return to Carthage, with the certainty of torture and death, cherishing any mystic notions of another life . . . . He was a practical man . . . .
> . . . . . .
>
> . . . Devotion to the Republic magnified the type of personal satisfactions for those who conformed their purposes to its maintenance. Such conformation of purpose to ideal beyond personal limitations is the conception of that Peace with which the wise man can face his fate, master of his soul.[151]

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[149] Supra, p. 88. [150] AI, pp. 286-287.

[151] Ibid., pp. 288-290.

"Peace," in this sense, might well be the emotion felt by a father, fond of his family, who feels that he is doing the best he can to give them a happy home. No doubt for most people, it is a deeper satisfaction than merely earning a personal living. No doubt its origins are mixed, partly the love of individual family members, partly enjoyment of participating in the family structure together with an aesthetic satisfaction with the "family" itself as an element of order realized within the members, perhaps partly from the organic re-enforcement afforded by primitive biological routines of feeling connected with the mutual dependencies of sexual relation and child rearing. To add to these a divine "gift" seems superfluous.

Indeed, it is the fact that an element of "anxiety" remains in moral satisfaction that causes it to remain only a "halfway house" on the route to religious satisfaction as "the extreme ecstasy of Peace." Morality

> . . . is the love of particular individual things. . . . Personal life has here evidently passed beyond itself, but with explicit, definite limitation . . . . Such love is really an intense feeling as to how the harmony of the world should be realized in particular objects. It is the feeling as to what would happen if right could triumph in a beautiful world, with discord routed. . . . Such love is distracting . . . . it involves deep feeling of an aim in the Universe, winning such triumph as is possible to it. It is the sense of Eros, hovering between Peace as the crown of Youth and Peace as the issue of Tragedy.[152]

It should be noted here that this feeling of an "aim in the

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[152] Ibid., pp. 287-288.

Universe" need indicate only the acknowledgement of another subject. Indeed this is the central difference between morality and religion for Whitehead. Morality starts out with the love of individual subjects and perhaps ideally it could expand to embrace all subjects.

> . . . One of its fruits is that passion whose existence Hume denied, the love of mankind as such.[153]

At this point, valuation of the system of order is in respect of its service to the subjects, as "realized in" them. If a concept of the divine enters, it is only as another individual. In contrast, a religious perspective stresses valuation of the order in the universe itself and values individuals for their role in exemplifying it. Such a view treats the order of the universe as an expression of one subjective valuation. Thus the two poles of religion result, an intellectual obsession with a theological account of the natural order and a concrete obsession with the mystic experience of cosmic individuality.

Belaief confuses a moral or "social" consciousness with a religious "world consciousness." Moral consciousness is social consciousness within which self-interest has been expanded to identification with the good as sought by some group of subjects joined in progressive development--whether it be mankind, Americans, blacks, or one beloved.[154] Yet

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[153] Ibid., p. 284.

[154] Of course, it must be kept in mind that "the beloved" is a society of occasions as much as "the lover."

the agent sees himself as participant in a social context in opposition to conflicting factors. Loyalty will entail exclusions. If morality originates with the recognition of other subjects, it will not extend to recognition of all individuals. This follows if only for the reason that some individuals, like sub-atomic particles, do not exhibit anything that might be called subjective continuity. Also, at some point there must be conflict. Thus another distinction is that morality terminates its loyalties in service to sentient individuals. The acceptance of loyalty to the order of non-sentient nature follows only within a religious perspective which sees it as expressive of a cosmic subject.

Morality is positive anticipation. It involves an

> . . . ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action--that it should embody the adventure of hope.[155]

There must remain the possibility of anxiety. Without it "hope" would be "certainty" and not "hope." Yet the ultimate religious consciousness (in contrast to Kierkegaard) is the experience of "Peace" in its fullness. It is:

> . . . not a hope for the future, nor is it an interest in present details. It is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet momentous in its coördination of values.[156]

Thus while there is a resemblance to morality in that religion

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[155] PR, p. 67.

[156] AI, p. 283; italics not in the original.

> . . . is directed to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating particularity,[157]

religious intuition at its greatest height carries this to its ultimate termination. " . . . Religion is world loyalty"[158] where 'world' refers to the universe itself.

Morality is the aim at self-transcending aims. Its ideals may be unattainable in the sense that all ideals undergo adaptation to concrete circumstance in modifying the circumstances themselves. However, they are not finite only in the sense that purely moral aim is an aim at indefinite improvement. In contrast, religion is fundamentally concerned with the enjoyment of self-transcendence in its aesthetic achievement. While the moral agent conceives of his own agency as that of one among a many with a role to play, religious experience finds its fulfillment at that point wherein the distinction between ego-objects and the other have become meaningless:

> . . . Religion is founded on the concurrence of three allied concepts in one moment of self-consciousness, . . . whose mutual relations to each other are only to be settled jointly by some direct intuition into the ultimate character of the universe.
>
> These concepts are:
>
> 1. That of the value of an individual for itself.
> 2. That of the value of the diverse individuals of the world for each other.
> 3. That of the value of the objective world which is a community derivative from the interrelations of its component individuals, and also necessary for the existence of each of these individuals.[159]

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[157] PR, p. 23. [158] RM, p. 59. [159] Ibid., p. 58.

Aesthetic concern is limited to the first. The scientific study of relations limits itself to the second. Morality embraces the third in recognition of the organic conception of social existence. However:

> The moment of religious consciousness starts from self-valuation, but it broadens into the concept of the world . . . .
> In its solitariness the spirit asks, What, in the way of value, is the attainment of life? And it can find no such value till it has merged its individual claim with that of the objective universe. . . .
> The spirit at once surrenders itself to this universal claim and appropriates it for itself.[160]

> . . . the distinction of a world-consciousness as contrasted with a social consciousness is the change of emphasis in the concept of rightness. A social consciousness concerns people whom you know and love . . . . But a world-consciousness is more disengaged. It rises to the conception of an essential rightness of things. . . . [161]

From a moral viewpoint, the agent wishes to change the world; he creatively introduces preference. From a religious viewpoint the agent accepts the world and wishes only to fulfill its given promises. At the same time, religious consciousness interpreted as "passive submission" without active appreciative participation reduces religion to self-abnegation from an opposite extreme. Contemplative Buddhism may be a world morality calling itself a religion, while certain forms of absolute idealism may be religions calling themselves ethical theories.

> . . . Life is an internal fact for its own sake, before it is an external fact relating itself to others. . . . it receives its final quality, on

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[160] Ibid., pp. 58-59. [161] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

XUM

> which its worth depends, from the internal life which is the self-realization of existence. Religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of man so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things.
>
> This doctrine is the direct negation of the theory that religion is primarily a social fact. . . .
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> . . . . . .
>
> . . . Religion is by no means necessarily good. . . .
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> . . . This is a dangerous delusion.[162]

Morality is concerned with the external life of man as derivative from the internal. Religion transcends the moral in a return to internal fulfillment. It replaces the moral sense of objective organic unity with the sense of subjective unity--sheer cosmic individuality.

Religious perspective sees the future as subject to an adequate guardianship, but for fullness must recognize the individuals' own immediate participation in the process. Religious peace comes when

> . . . Theology . . . expresses] that element in perishing lives which is undying by reason of its expression of perfections proper to our finite natures. In this way we shall understand how life includes a mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow.[163]

Theology is the science which seeks to express the principles of the subjective unity of the universe and its inherent aims. Religious morality at its best is morality wherein individual intuition identifies with the progress of divine purpose. The subject it seeks to serve is God. The critical question

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[162] Ibid., pp. 15-17. [163] AI, p. 176.

is the accuracy of identification. Secular morality is a less ambitious enterprise, the aims of finite individuals are more readily accessible and often can be solicited by direct interrogation. Also morality tends often to be an enemy of religion where the apparent theological rationalizations of the grounds for religious contentment seem inadequate. Morality is the zest for self-transcendent reform. History offers a spectacle of religious rationalizations being justly denounced by reformers who find the City of Man arrayed against the City of God.

Chapter 4

DERIVATIONS

. . . enthusiasm is an emotion of the ethical part of the soul.[1]

. . . Real generosity toward the future lies in giving all to the present.[2]

The price of hating other human beings is loving oneself less.[3]

It was necessary to destroy the village in order to save it.[4]

MORAL INTENTIONS

In Conclusion

In the opening section of this concluding chapter, I offer a summary of Whitehead's moral philosophy by way of examining some of its practical implications. The remaining sections of the chapter are primarily concerned with evaluating the theory in terms of the criteria developed at the

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[1]Aristotle, Politics, trans. Benjamin Jowett, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (N.Y.: Random House, 1941), p. 1311.

[2]Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1956), p. 304.

[3]Eldridge Cleaver, Soul On Ice (N.Y.: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1970), p. 29.

[4]An American officer in Viet Nam.

outset,[5] and in comparison with several classical alternatives. In effect, the opening discussion is part of this evaluation since it is essential to any moral theory that it be applicable to immediate practice. The issue is particularly acute here. As I have noted repeatedly, Whitehead's presentation of his views is deficient in drawing out their implications for the individual. In order to avoid tedious redundancy, I have attempted to avoid the technical details of the preceding chapter though it is presupposed as the basis of the present discussion.

Moral Values

It is impossible to overstress the importance of the notion that the ultimate moral values are individual subjects, valued for the sake of their own creative self-enjoyment. Without this terminal intrinsic valuation, the whole concept of social service--of the extrinsic value of the individual to others--is rendered meaningless. Yet it is equally important to emphasize that the self-enjoyment of the individual is derived from, and enters into, the self-enjoyment of others. For without this recognition moral valuation is converted into its antithesis--the conception of a sheer plurality of unrelated and momentary self-gratifications. Thus to stress the importance of individual subjects is simultaneously to stress the importance of their

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[5] Supra, pp. 32-38.

mutual value as realizing a social order. Yet the sole significance of the latter is in respect of the former.

The inversion of this valuation is part of the most basic moral problem facing civilization. I am referring to what is commonly identified as the "dehumanization" of contemporary life. So much has been written about it that a detailed discussion would only be tedious. However, it may be that I include some things under this rubric which are often omitted. At one extreme we find the emphasis of the state system and ideological system in isolation from the citizenry. It appears: in Hitler's conviction that every German should die in defense of Germany, in the notion that everyone would be "better dead than red," in the willingness to destroy the inhabitants of a country to preserve it for "Democracy"--or for nationalistic Marxism, in the ability of politicians to contemplate the nuclear sacrifice and destruction of billions in the defense of "society," or "freedom," or even "mankind." It appears in the facile use of such terms as "body count," "overkill capacity," "population surplus," "labor units," "student hours," "consumer," etc. It appears in the vastly complex systematization and standardization of labor and civil administration with a concomitant characterization of the individual in terms of his use-function and appropriate "role." It appears in the simplistic categorization of individuals and the expectancy of conformity (with approbation or disapprobation) to the category. Thus we have "radicals," "pigs," "welfare leeches,"

XUM

"imperialists," "commies," "honkies," "niggers," "ivory tower academicians," and their "systems": the "establishment," the "new left," and the "silent majority."

In connection with each of these, to a greater or lesser extent, there has been a growth of fear and animosity approaching paranoia. The final and most bitter of dehumanizing categories is that of "the enemy." Again the "enemies" range from the "devil theories" of systematic conspiracies down to the individual alienation of urban dwellers behind veils of suspicion and personal anxiety. It is the concept of "the enemy" which most intensifies the collapse of social life. It replaces the resolution of differences through social intercourse and persuasion with the appeal to force in its worst form, inter-personal violence. Force does not require any simple overt expression. To see the individual as a moral value is to recognize him as a creative center of value, capable of self-adaptation to novel self-enjoyment and enjoyment of his contribution to the enjoyment of others. Force is employed the moment that the individual is regarded only as an object for immediate use, to enjoy or eliminate as an impediment to enjoyment.

Indifference of attitude is perhaps the most common manifestation of force toward other subjects. But it is not the worst. To view an individual as an "enemy" is not merely to treat him as an object, impeding or aiding satisfaction. It is to view him as a subject <u>intending the production of disvalue instead of value</u>. Such a notion is a

XUM

complete inversion of the nature of the individual. We do not usually feel hostility toward a man whom we genuinely believe to mean well though doing wrong. At worst we feel pity. Similarly, we do not feel hostility toward a stone unless we are anthropomorphizing. Hostility replaces the impersonality of mere force with the personal antipathy of violence. It is the worst form of moral evil, the intentional opposition of subject to subject for the purpose of destroying the other.

Many of the issues here are more directly pertinent to Whitehead's social ethics, which I have not tried to reconstruct. However, with respect to our contemporary situation, the most critical implication of his moral philosophy is equally relevant to the individual as to society at large. It is the fundamental importance of eliminating this conception of "the enemy." Indeed, it is the problem of achieving moral perspective, which for Whitehead is the basic problem of morality. 'Communication' refers to the intersubjective recognition and cooperation which underlies all moral valuation. It begins with the discovery of shared valuation and collapses where that acknowledgment flags. Morality collapses with it, since communication is the sole medium of persuasion. So long as another subject is regarded only as an "enemy," the very possibility of communication is eliminated. We see ourselves as intending that which has value while the "enemy" intends disvalue and is fundamentally alien and incomprehensible.

XUM

What is at issue here is Manicheanism as applied to individual behavior. In the true Platonic tradition, Whitehead regards the individual as always doing that which seems to him to be worthwhile. His emphasis of alternative valuations may be misplaced, fragmentary, or short-sighted; but it is inevitably positive. We do what we feel to be important. The moral evil of intersubjective conflict arises where positive interests are at cross purposes.[6] Manicheanism is abetted by two factors here. Initially, in the condition of alienation produced by abstract consciousness, we feel the intersubjective valuation of past moments within the society of our own person strongly and fairly immediately. The projection of our future personality is an inferential act, but it is grounded on a strong basis of organic re-enforcement. However in the case of more remotely related subjects, their recognition is by a highly mediate path of experience and our grasp and projection of their own subjective valuation is by a more tenuous route of inference. As discussed in Chapter Three, this tenuous relation may be strengthened if re-enforced by non-moral valuation and such instinctual grounds of cooperative relation as sexual attraction or parental relation. An early history of fortunate circumstances, relatively free from serious intersubjective conflict, can do much to promote the

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[6]This may be as much the case within the person as between persons. Thus we may come to "mistrust our own motives."

generalization and strength of these nascent "fellow feelings." It is for this reason that it is morally important to create an environment of love for a child.[7]

Added to this tenuousness there is the problem that, while moral evil is a conflict of positive interests, we experience it under the unifying contrast of a singular feeling with an affective tone such as pain or frustration. Rather than seeing the social interaction as destructive, grounded in the interests of each subject, we are apt to identify the destructiveness as merely the effect of the other individual. It is true that the means whereby we know of him is painful. But in the most common act of misplaced abstraction, we may identify the concrete individual whom we know with the means whereby we know of him. The result is to conceive him as intending the destruction itself, an evil intentioned person. We do not see him as intending to accomplish a value, like ourselves, but as intending only a disvaluation. Perhaps it is not by chance that Manichean moralists use so many examples involving judgment passed upon the behavior and motives of others.[8]

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[7] As opposed, for example, to its aesthetic importance which resides in simply making the child happy.

[8] Obviously, a person's intentions may be destructive without his intending destruction. The point here is simply that even where the latter is the case, the destruction intended is always viewed as instrumental to values sought or defended which are valued more highly by the subject than that which is destroyed.

XUM

Moral Decisions

A third factor contributing to the intensity of Manicheanism is the emphasis placed in our culture upon the "faculty" concept of rational will, involving both a misconception of the nature of choice and of the importance of rationality in human evaluations. Far too often, moralists have assumed that the giving of intellectually satisfying "reasons" is adequate to morally motivate behavior. If a man then fails to be moral, it is either because he has chosen to be immoral (or amoral) or because he is not yet "really convinced" of the morality of the actions endorsed. (The latter strategy is most often that of Platonic rationalists who are perplexed with the incompatibility of the notion that a man only does "what he believes to be good" and the fact that many miscreants will admit--and believe--that they really "knew better.")

The concept of rational will, while promoting interpersonal antipathy by supporting the notion that a man chooses between doing what is positive or doing what is negative, also supports simplistic models of moral value, moral behavior, and moral motivation. One result is the tendency to lose sight of the ultimacy of "subjects" as moral values. Moral values come to be conceived as formal principles enjoining or prohibiting "types" of action, independent of the concrete conditions obtaining in the community of subjects (the service of whom constitutes the

sole justification for such principles).[9] The drift into abstract formalism is also one component of the condition of dehumanization discussed above. In Whitehead's terms, the antipathy toward peoples in the name of social principles--whether of specific moral codes, value systems, or social systems--is an isolation of the element of "order" in moral valuation and another inversion of value. It wholly supplants the dimension of "love" or concern for individual subjects with this concern for some system of "order." Such an attitude suggests that the defense of "types" of value is more important than the preservation of those individuals without whom no value can be realized.

Of course Whitehead himself stresses the importance of "order" to moral evaluation and even of rating the individual for his contribution to a "high-grade type of order." But he defines a "high-grade type of order" as one which "magnifies the individual actualities." Thus the focal point of morality always comes back to maximizing the value of the

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[9]Some ordinary language philosophers argue that we have terms identifying actions that are always wrong, regardless of circumstance, i.e., "murder." Were such the case, it might be only a commentary upon the embodiment of unfortunate moral ideas in our language. To the contrary, however, what could be more obviously the case than the fact that 'murder' is a term reserved for application only in those cases where the act of killing has in fact been shown to be not justified by the circumstances. It is this issue precisely which is at stake in every murder trial. To then claim that we recognize the universal immorality of "murder" as "killing unjustified by circumstance" as immoral independent of circumstance would surely be the most absurd circularity.

individual--both in respect of his own capacity for enjoyment and in respect of his ability to contribute to that of others.

One implication of Whitehead's ethics is that the answer to the question "What should I do?" is only one part of the complete answer to the question "Who should I value?" Similarly, the question "What is to be valued?" is only another part of this latter question, one which can not be answered independent of it. A complete conception of the community of subjects to be served must also embrace a system of practical relations expressed in behavior and conceptions of non-moral values to be achieved. The obvious general answer to the moral question of who to value is: "those who are most valuable."

When concerned with this notion, Manichean moralists[10] have tended to identify those who are most valuable in terms of a "what" which is valued. For example, man has occasionally been held to be intrinsically valuable in respect of his similarity to God, grounded in man's "knowledge of good and evil." More often, philosophers have held the value of the individual to be grounded in his rationality. Even humanists have tended to value the individual on behalf of his being human. Each such judgment involves taking a factor of structure from the objective order in our own aesthetic appreciation and projecting it onto the individual

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[10]Together with quite a few non-Manicheans.

subject as the terminal ground of moral valuation. "Rationality" itself is merely a mode of order realized in individual consciousness. Its value can be no greater than the contribution which it does, in fact, make to individual satisfaction. Such property variables identify modes of functioning explicable only relative to other factors in our system of conscious understanding. Thus to value the individual in respect of such a "property" is only to value him as exemplifying some system of relationships. This misplacement of concrete value leaves us living an abstraction, since "system" of itself can generate no value and is realized only within the individual.

Apart from misrepresentation, evaluative typification pits individuals as "types" against each other. If we recognize that each such "type" is meaningful only as expressing a "role" relative to other factors in consciousness, it becomes apparent that the alienation of moral values (of subjects) through the emphasis of abstract categories is of one fabric with such massive systematic abstractions as Hitler's. Moreover, it is fairly clear that such an attitude derives largely from excess emphasis, morally, upon our intellectual feelings and too little upon our concrete apprehensions. A hollowness in life is to be expected if we dwell only on the thin air of our intellectual expectancies. If nothing else it directs our attention away from the moral beauty which is the uniqueness of each individual, approached on his own terms.

XUM

Systematic abstractions are valuable, so long as they are inhibited from reductionism by a concern for the concrete. The humanism espoused by Whitehead reflects neither species loyalty nor evaluative emphasis of one characteristic of the individual. The conclusion that individual humans are to be regarded as the most valuable subjects is an inference from the general theory of value which does not deny possible exceptions.

To be morally valued is to be valued for the sake of one's intrinsic capacity to realize value. Thus to be morally valuable is to be capable of valuing, of realizing value. Humans are valuable, not because they are human, but because to be human is to possess a high order of consciousness; and in terms of the value theory, the principle function of consciousness is the intensification of value experience. But again, conscious individuals are not to be valued for the sake of their consciousness but for their value experience which it serves, and the latter exhausts all dimensions of feeling.

Merely conscious interest and rationality are to a degree opposed, though both contribute to maximizing the individual. The former contributes intensity. The moral importance of the latter lies in its role in increasing the strength of valuation by broadening the perspective of recognized values--thereby diversifying the content of conscious appreciation. This function of reason subsumes the classical conceptions of both cognitive and practical

intellect. Before examining the application of the notion to real moral choice, it is worth restating the dilemma of both Platonic and Aristotelian moral rationalism. The basic problem here is that of determining the role of reason in practical moral considerations.

Initially, one must concede, as a basic datum, that most of the time we do "know better" than we act in practice. Whether we conceive of this like Kant, as a conflict of duty with desire, or "weakness of will," or as a Platonic "forgetting," it remains that in ten thousand details of behavior, we act against our own theoretic apprehension of what is appropriate. Contemporary ecological science has given us the broadest of rational perspectives with immediate personal implications. Few people deny them, yet few act upon them. Few individuals would deny the harm of smoking as they light a cigarette. For that matter, few would deny the value of human beings as they misuse a fellow. If we take the approach of the Aristotelian tradition, then we are left in the somewhat arrogant position of saying that behavior is rationally determinable but that most men choose to be irrational or worse. Even were we not led into Manichean antipathy we would still be inhibited from acknowledging subjects as the ultimate moral ends by the acknowledgment of evil subjects--perhaps in the majority. If on the other hand, we pursue the Platonic alternative, we seem to fly in the face of the facts. From the standpoint of a Platonic humanism, once we theoretically accept the value of "persons,"

XUM

morality ought to resolve itself into the largely aesthetic and cognitive problem of determining what modes of activity are in fact most satisfying and involve the minimum of conflicts between subjects. (This path is indeed taken by Plato and by Mill.) But surely, if even a fraction of those who theoretically accept the moral importance of subjects acted upon that acceptance, the vast majority of personal and factional disputes arising from specific moral loyalties would be settled with the tools of reason. Communication, cooperation, and intelligent self-direction would prevail over the use of force and the submission to basic compulsions.

The Platonic solution to this dilemma, corresponding to the notion of rational will, is to assert that miscreant individuals do not "really" believe what they seem to believe. But this is a vague notion. Does it imply that the belief, admitted by the individual, is only an illusion? Or does it mean that the belief is not strongly held? If the latter, then it acknowledges that an individual may in fact act contrary to his belief. At the least we require an analysis of this concept of "strength" of belief and perhaps of action as derived from a plurality of incompatible beliefs differing in strength.

This is indeed part of Whitehead's resolution of the dilemma. Rational ideals, general or specific, are abstract ideas found relevant to concrete feeling. The practical import of such notions as motives to behavior must always

XUM

rest upon their effectiveness in achieving a coordination of feelings. Moral rationality of perspective is the effective identification of interdependent modes of valuation relative to a recognized interdependence of the subjective community enjoying these values. But the critical term is 'effective.' Real moral decisions are not instantaneous options for simple alternatives. Also they are not simple expressions of understanding directing emotion. At critical moments, the complex of experience expressed in behavior will be largely determined. Morality begins with the gradual adjustment of emphasis within this complex to prepare ourselves for moral response in such situations. This self-adaptation to moral perspective requires coordinate modification of general cognitive abstractions and modification of individual appreciations. The problem is one of achieving strength in the former while rendering them specific and generalizing the focus of the latter while preserving their intensity.

On the one hand, we entertain a great plurality of mutually incompatible beliefs. The mere fact that we do not experience this as a chaos of contradiction implies that cognitive acceptance can not be treated as a matter of knowing what to do while practical action is doing what we know. The average person learns as a child that there is nothing to be feared in the dark. However, this does not mean that he wholly puts aside his belief to the contrary. The entertainment of these incompatibles is achieved through

XUM

differing degrees of intensity of emphasis relative to other conditions, both abstract and concrete. The predominance of emphasis in the former belief may well depend on whether the lights are shining. If bogeymen do not fit in with our general view of things, this fear may be gradually eliminated. But one good "bump in the night" can knock the most rational of attitudes into a cocked hat.

It is so much the worse for isolated generalizations and isolated moral principles. They are pale influences at best. However, it is the very weakness and abstract detachment of our intellectual generalities which enables us to eliminate inconsistency in theory. It is our fragmentary attitudes toward specifics which are apt to possess the intensity which enables them to persist incompatibly with other factors in experience. When we construct the bridges of inference which enable us to apply the general to the specific, they often are of no avail against these concrete beliefs, established in long habits of practice. However, the detachment of a purely "theoretic" attitude, and the immediate irrelevance of general conceptions, enables us to accept, reject, adjust, and systematize "ideas." Gradually, as we achieve "system," we achieve "strength" in the parts and in the whole derived from the co-ordination of consciousness. Proportionally this "strength" will increase in direct relationship to the extent of diverse factors included within the system until it reaches a point capable of overriding the intensity of short-sighted but well-entrenched

XUM

convictions. In the conflict of rational inclinations with irrational attitudes, the weapon of reason is systematic thought. In this resides the whole practical importance of grounding moral theory upon a metaphysics. When specific inferences conflict with immediate inclination they must draw strength from above to prevail over what is at hand. If, however, the theory is well-founded, a secondary re-inforcement will come from below.

A truly "rational" system will overcome the abstraction of conflicting subordinate purposes by accommodating them under a new perspective, one capable of "displacing" the dissident attitudes by recovering a broader range of values suppressed in previous conscious emphasis. Thus, as a limited moral system, the concepts of trade unionism and collective bargaining not only afforded workers heightened effectiveness in improving individual living conditions but did so under a perspective which enabled the individual worker to recover an enjoyment of fellow-feelings suppressed in competitive free-labor market attitudes. Of course, the implicit notion here is that the morally rational system will comprise the conception of a social system embracing the non-moral world which is the environment it uses.[11] The complete perspective would be realized as a

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[11]Again we may entertain individually incompatible systematic beliefs to be reconciled. Thus the same man may be a trade-unionist, a black nationalist, and a humanist.

XUM

representation of actual conditions in contrast with ideally preferred alternatives. The system will be more rational in direct proportion to the degree to which it encompasses the insights of more limited systems while embracing their omissions. As a result, the more rational system will be both more general and more concrete than the less rational system.

Thus the suggestion here is that in his approach to moral decision and moral self-conditioning, the individual must seek--to be best of his ability--to achieve systematic comprehension of social reality. One half of moral choice is the continuing effort to "take stock" of our lives and realize unity of vision in directing them. The moral importance of systematic general conceptions does not lie only in the "craft" of intelligent behavior. It lies in the fact that when the subordinate purposes which constitute prescriptions of immediate behavior are derived from coherent purpose massively coordinating experience, they are more likely to be fulfilled. At the same time, they will afford a greater fulfillment of the individual himself, magnifying his satisfaction in accord with the magnitude of his outlook. Historically, the most effective moral systems have been those which brought with them a world-view.

Unfortunately, such systems have also been the most destructive. They become destructive when the strength of limited abstractions operates to sustain persistent omissions while shifting from the emphasis of positive effort on behalf

XUM

of the subjects valued to a defensive posture toward negative conceptions of those subjects, the valuation of whom is omitted. In the height of its positive fervor, trade unionism was characterized by the ready sympathy of its members for all aspiring peoples. Today trade unionists are characterized by their defensive animosity toward these same aspirations where they are seen as threatening that which has been achieved by union members. The aim of Marxist humanism to liberate both worker and capitalist as equally victims of alienation, gives way to the class war of workers to eliminate capitalists--conceived only as the victimizers of the workers. Examples can be multiplied indefinitely. It is at this point that one encounters the importance of emphasizing the opposite pole of emphasis in moral perspective--the direct adjustment of feeling toward that which is individual. It is the counterbalance to abstract systematization and is essential in several respects.

Initially, even if I have intellectually transcended moral factionalism and systematically entertain the ultimate conception of the moral importance of each subject, there remains a massive problem. In the real world I am forced to choose between individuals, to judge their mutual relations and their modes of satisfaction. Such choice requires that I descend from the general conception of the value of the individual to employment of the typifications which are the tools of all such comparative evaluations. Thus there remains a need for a safeguard against reductionistic

XUM

abstraction and loss of the sense of the creative uniqueness of each individual. Moreover, under concrete conditions of evaluation, the importance with which these different typifications are felt--defining subordinate communal loyalties--will depend upon complex antecedent habits of feeling. My discussion thus far has suggested a model of choice which still involves the simple resolution of opposition between these systematic factors. However, in the creative unity of feeling which is the outcome of evaluation, the issue is not "either-or." It is "how much influence" is exerted by the rational perspective (including the evaluative emphasis of subordinate perspectives of more limited scope) in determining the character of my final feelings as to who is most valuable.

The concrete situation is not reason "guiding" while emotion motivates, or reason determining rational will, etc. Morality is rather a matter of expressing the creative realization of feeling within which intellectual experiences are <u>one</u> formative and directive factor. For this reason a sounding board in immediate feeling is needed, one which can operate to correct excessive subjective valuation of "types" in favor of differing individuals. It is to be found in habituating my immediate feelings to initial appreciation of each individual for his own sake and to embodiment of the moral affective qualities of hope and love. In essence, these are one feeling. Their separation is an artificial isolation of aspiration, the valuation of him for whom we

XUM

aspire, and the valuation of that to which we aspire for him. Another destructive influence of Manichean thought has been the presentation of morality as a dour and gloomy business. Until morality is recognized as the endeavor to celebrate the potential for joy in individual lives, we will have little of either morality or joy.

The beginning of moral habituation must lie in the appreciation of some one. Thus achieving an ultimate moral perspective involves building a bridge between these extreme points: the idea of the creative love of all individuals and the fact of creatively loving one individual. I will not recount the discussion in Chapter Three of the growth in conscious recognition of other subjects beginning with appreciation of our own past and future subjectivity. The general point is the notion that an organically based propensity for cooperative feeling is recovered and given conscious re-definition with respect to specific individuals. As children we have little control over the creation of our environment. As adults, we find ourselves with a limited capability for moral feeling. Unless we have an exceptional background, we must habituate ourselves in the appreciation of other individuals, as individuals.

Part of this process requires the rational shaping of our own valuations so as to provide the sound basis of regard for our own persons which is requisite to regard for other persons. This is to say that in our own aesthetic and cognitive aims we must seek such breadth and depth of

personal purpose as are commensurate with the real conditions of our personal situation, emphasizing those which do not provoke conflict within the environment. It is essential in our intellectual conception of social alternatives to eliminate modes of activity fostering competitive attitudes between individuals. Similarly, it is essential in the direct adjustment of feeling to modify such feelings when they occur. Competitiveness can be tolerated only if it is seen as a tool of cooperating persons against intolerable and impersonal conditions. Indeed this is the point of stressing that the moral response to conflict should be the search for modes of use rather than modes of elimination. Use is accomplished by mutual accommodation of formerly conflicting factions in a higher mode of cooperation. At the same time it is essential to avoid converting the concern for my own future well-being into the aesthetic possessiveness which makes it an object of idle enjoyment. The man who dreams of his own future only for the sake of the immediate satisfaction afforded by such activity is unlikely to accomplish anything. Moreover, this use of his own person is a primary basis of the use of others as aesthetic objects, impeding the appreciation of them for their own sake. However, these are merely elements of background. At any given moment we do in fact appreciate a more or less great plurality of individuals with a variable degree of intensity.

The essential point here is far simpler. It is only that at the level of immediate feeling, the concern of moral

XUM

effort must be to acquire the habit of always keeping the paths of communication open to each new individual encountered. The commitment is to refrain from passing judgment until we have sought understanding of what is truly valued by this individual. Indeed, it is to see him as a person before typifying him in the rational perspective. Then we must ask ourselves, where we feel discrepancy, whether it is the systematic judgment which requires adjustment in its emphasis or the individual valuation. Such an attitude is essential if we are to take seriously the notion that each subject is creative. From the creativity of the individual, it follows that our typifications must always remain abstract approximations--more or less applicable. For purposes of moral feeling, the Platonic notion that each thing "is what it is" becomes the notion that each man "is who he is." Thus before we evaluatively typify the individual, we must seek to accept him as he is and then observe whether the typifications are significantly approximated in his own expressions.

It may be that my perspectives need broadening to accommodate this individual or that potentially greater losses require modification of the individual himself. In the end, the finitude of values forces choice. We, ourselves, are the individuals we first confront in this manner and whose nature we determine; and whether we will or not, we determine the natures of those around us as they determine ours. If it is the individual who must change, we shall have

XUM

recourse to moral modification of the self--on a basis of recognized sympathies. But this is the paradigm of moral decision itself--the communication with self wherein we gradually adjust the stress and balance of interests in the realization of a personal unity of feeling.

We do not simply decide to do the moral. We must persuade ourselves to acquire the capability. Our best guides are the systematic idealizations achieved in practical detachment and the generous feelings felt toward individuals in good times. These are the only tools of persuasion--the appeal to the desirable possibility and the appeal to the actual satisfaction. Morality is not a matter of momentary decision. It is a way of life which can best be brought to fruition during those periods of freedom from practical necessity wherein we can gather ourselves together. Only then are we likely to be able to start the process of adjustment and self encouragement, of "opening" ourselves, which creates the requisite background to moral action in moments of moral crisis.

Morality is the decision of who is to be valued, determining what we are to do as our role relative to this valuation. The determination of this role is the decision who to be.

The achievement of moral identity, of moral beauty in the Platonic sense, is far more important than any set of principles or formal inhibitions, for it inhibits, at the outset, the Manichean view of our fellows as enemies. It

XUM

prepares us to see them as friends and to determine to the best of our abilities that which will bring them joy.

MORAL SITUATIONS AND MORAL ORDER

In this section, I offer an evaluative comparison of several aspects of Whitehead's moral theory with that of other ethicists. Because of their apparent similarities, I stress the relations of Whitehead's view to classical utilitarianism and Dewey's pragmatism. Apart from these, some mention is made of the Kantian and Aristotelian traditions of thought--though more of the preceding section is devoted to these latter.

Although Whitehead's moral philosophy has certain obvious similarities to Utilitarianism, they should not be overrated. The most critical differences may be traced to Whitehead's own objection to the failure of Utilitarianism to adequately account for fellow-feeling and to provide adequate conceptual tools for resolving the relationships between distribution and types of satisfaction. As opposed to the classical Utilitarian, Whitehead refuses to discriminate between the morality of a man and the morality of his actions. A man is what he does and his overt actions are public expressions of his valuational feelings. Indeed, he is his valuational activity, the publicity of which is an index of its effectiveness. Where the dominate focus of this activity is "donative" valuation of individual subjects (as opposed to the "appropriative" or "symbolic" valuation

XUM

of mere objects), his values are moral.

Indeed, the ultimate effectiveness of his actions may be as much dependent upon subsequent individuals as upon the accuracy of the rational insights and intensity of feeling guiding his own behavior. Even apart from the uncertainty of understanding, there intervenes the creative ability of subsequent subjects to use or misuse his contributions. Moreover, as opposed to classical Utilitarianism, if the consequences of his actions are realized only as immediate satisfactions, their value in itself is non-moral.

Aesthetic value is concerned with the "closed fact" of immediate fulfillment while moral value is always focused upon the transcendent valuation which opens the individual to embrace the valuation of interests beyond those of his own immediate subjectivity. Morality is "the maximization of importance" and not its mere achievement in a given instance or number of instances.

If by distinguishing a man's actions from his intentions, one means to distinguish the consequences of these latter from the same, then such consequences could indeed be on the same footing as natural events in respect of their moral value. Each can have moral value only to the extent to which it contributes to the moralization of valuation in subsequent individuals. Assuredly the consequences of moral actions are far more often morally valuable than those of non-moral events for the simple reason that satisfaction accompanied by a recognition of its origins in the moral

XUM

beauty or "concern" of another is a primary origin of that gratitude which underlies the growth of conscious fellow-feeling. It is, in fact, an act of moral valuing.

For purposes of practical morality the intention is far more important than the result, since to the extent to which the latter is the outcome of intelligently directed behavior it will depend upon the former. Here Whitehead is closer to the rule Utilitarian in his recognition that our rationally defined intentions are "generalized" both in the sense that their defining objects will be abstractions never precisely fulfilled in actual achievements and in the sense that they incorporate into our own interest a concern for broader interests. However, unlike the rule Utilitarian, Whitehead does not regard these directive ideas as obligatory principles imposed upon inclination. They are themselves teleological aspirations.

In his conception of the processive and non-terminal character of moral intention Whitehead resembles Dewey, for whom ". . . Growth itself is the only moral 'end.'"[12] Like Whitehead's, Dewey's value theory stresses the importance of organic experience, fulfilling the whole individual, and involving:

> . . . multiplication of sensed distinctions as well as harmony, unification. . . . If we wished to transmute this generalization into a categorical imperative we should say: "So act as to increase

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[12]John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1960), p. 177.

the meaning of present experience."[13]

Yet, ironically enough, given Whitehead's stress of process and Dewey's stress upon the importance of the social environment in shaping the individual, Whitehead deviates from Dewey precisely with respect to the extent to which Dewey emphasizes process yet fails to provide an account of moral feeling adequate to resolve the egoism-altruism dichotomy.

In his discussion of the "authority of Right" as grounded in social pressure,[14] Dewey offers an account of social feelings which sounds very similar to Whitehead's. It acknowledges the origin of morality in the actuality of social relations and interests as opposed to any external formal imposition. However, there is a difference which stems precisely from the handling of the "formal" dimension of morality. Dewey asserts:

> . . . If a man lived alone in the world there might be some sense in the question "Why be moral?" were it not for one thing: No such question would then arise. As it is, we live in a world where other persons live too. Our acts affect them. They perceive these effects, and react upon us in consequence. Because they are living beings they make demands upon us for certain things from us. They approve and condemn--not in abstract theory but in what they do to us. . . . Right is only an abstract name for the multitude of concrete demands in action which others impress upon us, and of which we are obliged, if we would live, to take some account.[15]

Thus while Dewey argues that considerations of right originate

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[13] John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (N.Y.: Random House, 1930), p. 283.

[14] Ibid., pp. 326-327. [15] Ibid., p. 326.

"within" life and not "outside of it," his account of "social pressure" treats moral awareness as an imposition externally imposed upon the individual rather than a positive realization of interests within his internalized environment. Thus as Hume's "sense of approval" confuses the reflective awareness of moral feeling with moral feeling itself, Dewey confuses it with the awareness of that which is externally approved. By failing to recognize that moral sensitivity is the approving awareness of the morally valuable, Dewey's theory loses the recognition of intrinsic value beyond our own immediate experience. Fellow-feeling becomes only a feeling <u>of</u> our fellows and not a feeling <u>for</u> them.

The result is to leave Dewey appealing to a rational egoism which treats moral relations as purely inter-personal. As I have argued, such an appeal ignores the fact that the achievement of what has been called "rational self-interest" itself requires the realization of an infra-personal concern for subsequent episodes within the life of the person. Such episodes are in fact not less external to the present moment than episodes in the life of another. While Dewey recognizes that the consequences of moral valuation are always pertinent to the future, he rejects the valuation of these consequences as ends in favor of the notion of moral rationality as the merely instrumental response of intelligence to actual difficulties.

> . . . Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Sufficient it is to stimulate us to remedial action, to endeavor in order to convert

> strife into harmony, monotony into a variegated scence, and limitation into expansion.[16]

Like most situational ethicists, Dewey stresses the importance of meaning in present activity and decries those who ". . . scamp present action in behalf of future 'ends' . . . ."[17]

> . . . Dominating intellectual pre-occupation with the future is the way by which efficiency in dealing with the present is attained. . . . What sense is there in increased external control except to increase the intrinsic significance of living?
> . . .
> . . . . . .
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> . . . Control of future living, such as it may turn out to be, is wholly dependent upon taking his present activity, seriously and devotedly, as an end, not a means.[18]

Here Dewey's whole discussion focuses upon the control of the future relative to present interests. He insists that future improvement be only a "result" and not an "aim."

Dewey wishes to reject both the eschatological fervor of idealism with its remote abstractions and the puritanical self-denial of the present. Thus he insists that the awareness of the importance of the present to the future has as its sole moral value the increased sense of significance in the present. He claims this use of the future for "judging" the present is the greatest spur to efficient activity. However, there are two flaws apparent. First of all, the present could gain importance in our eyes because of its

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[16] Ibid., p. 282. [17] Ibid., p. 269.

[18] Ibid., pp. 267-269.

significance for the future only if the future itself has a prior importance for us. Secondly, any increase in the present meaning of experience is to be realized only in a subsequent present, otherwise no change has transpired.

Without valuation of the future for its own sake we have no standard for judging the importance of the present beyond the immediate satisfaction which it already affords. Further, without some positive conception of alternatives preferable to the given, we would have no basis for judging moral evil. It is here that Dewey and Whitehead part company in pragmatic and Platonic directions respectively. Dewey's moral values are not ends identifying consummatory satisfactions. They are instruments, identifying "directions" of positive change in reaction to immediate inadequacies--even when they take the form of long range projects of social engineering. But they are remedial responses to prior problems giving definition to present experience as an end in itself. Dewey and Whitehead publicly disagreed over the latter's refusal to distinguish the mathematical-formal and genetic-functional modes of analysis.[19] It is relevant here that Whitehead stresses the importance of positive conceptions of what "could have been" or "could be," valued in preference to what is and has been, as essential formative components in the feeling of moral evil.

Dewey rejects morality as the external imposition of

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[19]See "Analysis of Meaning."

formal ideals. But for Whitehead, such ideal elements are factors internal to that which is becoming actual. While these complex conceptions identify a direction of creative change, as they do for Dewey, they also must involve a valuation of the ends to be served as constituting the sole ultimate ground of valuation in the process. Once again, these ends are those individual experiences, as yet unborn, whose fulfillment is to be derived from the pattern of behavior in question. The "sense" which is to be found in "increased external control" beyond increasing "the intrinsic significance of living" lies in the value which such control has for "the intrinsic significance" of those yet to live.

Morality is indeed spurred by a "noble discontent," but such discontent presupposes the envisagement of a better alternative. It requires a valuation of the possible in transformation of the real. One of the obvious facts of social history is the use made by dictators of the ignorance of a "better life" in preserving a degree of contentment among the repressed masses. By Dewey's account the discontent must come first. Further, in terms of his insistence upon the actual in determining our conceptions of the possible and desirable, it should follow that our immediate social reality must <u>wholly</u> dominate our moral ambitions. With such a theory of moral intelligence, there is no reason why broad humanistic ideals should ever emerge until they become requisite elements of foresight in preserving the society to which we are immediately loyal--i.e., rational-

XUM

egoism on a larger scale. Secondly, one would expect that a successful society--regardless of its external effects--would engender a satisfied membership. The awareness of deficiencies abroad should not even be felt as a defect by those at home. Yet the intense valuation of all men, indeed of all sentience, is one of the oldest of moral expressions.

It is true that this notion is fleeting among factional loyalties but its concrete importance to any society was not realized until the modern age of communication. Moreover, the idea has persistently recurred amid the most chauvinistic of social contexts. The emergence of this moral notion itself, and its effective role in individual feeling, cannot adequately be explained by Dewey's genetic account of the social dimension of moral experience. Yet it is only a larger instance of the speculative valuation that is essential to explain the slightest moral anticipation of novelty.

It is not the absence of ends which makes moral intention non-terminal, it is the indeterminate importance of present experience to subsequent realizations. Dewey's position depends upon his emphasis of the continuity of experience while Whitehead's account is episodic. Thus Dewey holds that there are no "arrivals" but instead a process of "arriving." However, it is not experience which is continuous. Experience perpetually perishes. Whitehead objected to Mill's failure to indicate whether the "greatest number" refers to persons or something else, underscoring

XUM

the need for an account of things that endure, recur, and occur. Moments of experience are the final individualities which neither recur nor endure. What recurs in continuity is the more or less consistent order of valuation which determines, in part, these moments. The individualization of a continuous personality or larger society is realized only within the moments of actual experience which embody it. Morality is the concern that each moment of experience, present and future, realize its greatest possible importance--balancing self-importance and transcendent importance where they conflict.

The situational ethicists who reject the concern for the future for its own sake go to an extreme no more desirable than that of puritan self-denial or romantic utopianism. Certainly, if one tries to give cosmic significance to every moment by ignoring immediate issues, he is quite likely to rob life of real meaning. But the gap is bridged where we recognize the attention to even the slightest detail as a component in the broader concern. The social activist who cannot take time to listen to a neighbor's troubles has probably misplaced his values. Nations, species, families, and even personalities are not the ultimate moral ends. They are systems of order, deriving value from their valuation by the occasions of experience within which their realization is carried forward.

Whitehead is closer to Kant than to either Mill or Dewey in his notion of the intrinsic valuation of others and

the priority of emphasis upon the intention underlying morality. Beyond this the differences are so obvious as to bear little mention. For Whitehead, the formative influence of moral rationality is teleologically entertained as a component of inclination. Moreover, he recognizes the importance of the immediate satisfaction which it affords and the re-enforcement of aesthetic and cognitive satisfactions. Realistic moral judgment will place emphasis upon systems of order, the moral valuation of which carries non-moral intrinsic satisfactions for the present moment. This should perhaps be the fundamental principle of moral education.[20]

Consequences, as achieved good, are indeed relevant as the empirical ground of moral intelligence. But our conceptions of the subjects valued will determine where we look in experience for satisfactions afforded and to be afforded. In experience we realize an appreciative awareness of particular subjects. Our efforts at conceptual identification leave us with a composite of characteristics which themselves identify potentialities for fulfillment, each "property" representing a mode of relation distinguishable relative to my present perspective. If my perspective is too narrow my conception will be fragmentary and the outcome of action may

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[20]At the same time, it is important that the latter not be depicted as the reward and justification for the former. Moral action without the joy of love and moral action for the sake only of immediate non-moral satisfaction both have the form without the content of morality.

be more destructive than constructive. One such form of narrowness is the overemphasis placed by Kant upon appreciation of the intellectual dimension of human experience.

In essence, Kant's ethics is a rationalistic humanism and like most humanisms spawned in the age of reason, its sense of justice is egalitarian. For Kant, egalitarianism takes the form of the universal determining ground of the will in moral law. Each man is an end in himself insofar as his rationality makes him a giver of practical law. However, this notion is purely formal, identifying the rational with the universal and the universal with that which is appropriate as a maxim to action--almost in defiance of the concrete qualifications relevant to each situation. The good will is ultimate but it follows from a sense of duty to universal law rather than benevolence to particular subjects. Deontologists since Kant have repeatedly stressed the importance of the notion that morality rests in acting in a manner that we would willingly approve for anyone. Indeed this is often held to be the essence of justice, that no special allowance be made for one individual as opposed to another. Frankena, for example, holds that we must have both a rule of benevolence and a rule of distributive justice to complement each other.

But the moral importance of this notion was better expressed in the two Biblical injunctions: "Do unto others as you would be done unto" and "Judge not that ye be not judged." The former is neither a rule of universalization

XUM

nor an appeal to rational egoism. It is a straight-forward call to recognize that others are as we, subjects. It enjoins the sympathetic recognition of others while the latter inhibits the prejudice that impedes understanding. The moral importance of asking ourselves whether we would "want others to act in a given manner in our own place" is that it takes us out of our place and puts us in theirs.

Benevolence is the inclination to serve and the sense of duty is the awareness of that service which is due. Morality does not lie in universality of specific responses nor justice in the equal distribution of goods. As Plato and Aristotle recognized, what is good for one man may be evil for another. Justice is to be found in the appropriate response, rendering each his due as guided by our best judgments of the real potentials for the individual, his own ideal anticipations of self-improvement, and the role of his valuations relative to wider systems of subjects. Again, as Plato and Aristotle saw, what must be valued is the "whole man." The importance of the rational part of the soul lies in its coordination into efficiency and enhancement of fulfillment of the diverse interests given in experience. Unfortunately, in the end, Aristotle's substantial conception of the self and his doctrine of external relations leave him no recourse but to treat the social concern for the self-realization of others as purely an internal element--incidental to the self-realization of the individual. Thus for Aristotle, the highest good is that which is self-sufficient,

XUM

while for Plato it is that which is good "both in itself and for its effects." The function of being a means is perfectly compatible with that of being an end.

What is universal is the equanimity of recognition that must be accorded to each individual as a subject to be judged according to merit. The inhibition against the particularity of affection comes not from disinterest but from the positive interest in others and the recognition that each is a means as well as an end, thus to be considered also for his contribution to a "high grade of order" for other ends.

Justice and Benevolence, Duty and Inclination, Reason and Sentiment, moral intention and effective behavior will all coincide where we approach life with the conscientious and continuous effort to discriminate the relative importance of each factor to each individual and each individual to each other, rendering that appreciation which is relevant to given situations. For these judgments we require general and particular conceptions of the value potentials of social orders--whether comprising sets of personal characteristics or civic systems. In the practical sphere of morality the effort for application of coordinate vision must always be qualified by that sensitivity to nuances of the immediate which guarantees relevance. The effort to maximize each moment of experience for its own sake is the most general of moral conceptions and yet relevant to every situation. Between that concrete yet general

XUM

notion and my immediate feelings lies the loop of conceptual abstractions with which I attempt to conceive the positive directions of life and my contributions to it.

Relative to the given moment, that which I value morally is morally valuable, incorrigibly. Here the absolute and the relative, the "subjective" and the "objective" co-incide. Whether it is more or less valuable from a broader moral perspective is a question only to be resolved by feelings realized from that perspective and by the ultimate test of facts in subsequent experience. What is morally valued by one man may not be morally valued by another. This is a commonplace of actual valuation. However, the question of whether the systems of interest defining the order out of which these valuations derive could have afforded a reconciliation (and are susceptible to modification for this end) is a matter of both theoretic possibility and real potentiality.

Strictly speaking, morality never involves the transformation of <u>actual</u> individuals for the sake of a system. Such individuals are who they are. Morality is always the attempt to transform the system, the conditions of life, on behalf of the individuals which it engenders. Morality is the benevolent search for justice and our practical problem is one of making judgments of relative importance in theory that will be sustained in the facts of creative enjoyment achieved. It is at this point that the generalizations of moral philosophy cease and that we must turn to science for

XUM

detailed study of the order of interests in sentient nature and in sentient society and for the evaluation of ideal orders as affording potential reconciliations beyond accepted practices.

MORAL SCIENCE

There are weaknesses in Whitehead's metaphysics which derivatively become weaknesses in the moral theory. The doctrine of eternal objects is offensive to those seeking a less cluttered ontology as is the doctrine of real spontaneity offensive to adherents of the principle of sufficient reason. Of course there is no reason why the world should necessarily be either simple or wholly rational. Yet it is true that there is ground for controversy over the ontological status of eternal objects in the actual world just as there is some difficulty in relating the macrocosmic experiences of human life to the static epochs of actual occasions. However, this is not the place for a metaphysical critique. For moral purposes, it is our conscious ideas which are far more important than any direct appeal to eternal objects. Further, as pointed out in the discussion of Dewey, even a continuous account of experience still allows for the essential insights of the moral theory.[21]

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[21]Although Whitehead argues for his epochal ontology in terms of physics and biology, as well as observed durations, the application of the notion to conscious events is not adequately explored. Yet the "just noticeable differences" in sensory stimulation identified by psychologists

Perhaps the most serious weakness in the moral philosophy is its failure to offer a more detailed analysis of modes of human valuation, in relation to each other, as a guide to moral evaluation. There is thus a degree of justice in Schilpp's charge that Whitehead identifies the good life with the "patterned" life, without giving us any criterion of pattern. As I have shown, Whitehead does indeed offer criteria of pattern. The deficiency lies rather in the inadequacy of these criteria to specify details of valuation and response for each situation. However, the function of the general principles is to motivate and illuminate the discovery of the particular factors in life--not to serve as a magician's box out of which these factors may be pulled. Like Dewey and Mill, Whitehead takes recourse to the repository of informal understanding of human nature which is embedded in the habits, precepts, etc. of relatively successful persons and societies. This store of practical wisdom and subordinate generalizations is not to be taken as a source of "maxims" for action but of insight into the composition of those elements which combine to magnify the potential for individual enjoyment. Thus common sense must serve where science is lacking.

The continuing goal of increasingly informed and effective morality awaits the growth of moral science.

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and such phenomena as the motion picture suggest the derivative character of observed continuity in change.

XUM

Whitehead's comments upon moral science are scattered throughout his works. At times he substitutes the phrase "sociological sciences," as in Adventures of Ideas. However, it is in discussing the notion of a "Psychological Physiology" in Process and Reality that the most distinct feature of Whitehead's moral science, or science of sentient nature, is brought out.[22] Here he discusses Physical Physiology as the study of systems of inorganic structure which are subservient to the preservation of living organisms. The concern of Psychological Physiology lies in the opposite direction. He poses as the initial question of interest:

> . . . How can there be originality? . . .
> . . . What has to be explained is originality of response to stimulus.[23]

In considering fundamentals of the science, he touches upon some of the elements of creative innovation discussed in Chapter Three of this dissertation. The ultimate function of the science is to investigate the means whereby living occasions in complex organisms realize centrality of control in introducing co-ordinate novelty of functioning into the organic system out of which they originate.

Thus while Dewey's moral science, like Hume's, is a study of human nature as determined by actual interests, Whitehead's presupposes this as one component and goes on to stress the creative capacity of sentient creatures to incorporate possibility into actuality. Moral science must indeed

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[22] PR, p. 158 ff. [23] Ibid., p. 159.

study the influence of inorganic systems on the organic and the comparative relations of organic and living systems determining their relative importance to the final intensities of experience evoked. But beyond this it must concentrate on the study of differing forms of ideal structure and their actual pertinence to such systems. Such a science would have to study not only the enduring biological and psychological habits and needs of human organisms but also the various patterns of conceptual valuation effectively operative in experience in relation with these. These conceptual valuations are systems of relation, symbolically associating individual relata and other systems. They may be conscious moral values with their social coordination of subjects or conscious aesthetic values coordinating the interest of objects, or other conscious non-moral modes of valuation. In any event, each represents a conception of an order unifying such variables as are recognized and held relevant to the living system.

At this point, the final Platonism of Whitehead's thought becomes apparent and one can grasp his notion of the importance of mathematics to the good. It is also here that his dispute with Dewey is most sharp. In "Analysis of Meaning," Whitehead identifies four fundamental assumptions of algebraic method:

> . . . (1) The invariableness of the basic terms of interconnection (the connectives), (2) the invariableness of the unspecified entities indicated by the symbols for "real variables," (3) the

> meaningfulness of the patterns of real variables, thus connected, (4) the irrelevance to the argument of the completion of meaning infused into the basic connectives by the unspecified real variables thus connected. Namely, the meaning as in assumption (1) is not in fact invariable, but the variation is irrelevant.[24]

He then proceeds to explicate his disagreement with Dewey's position:

> These principles of algebraic symbolism express the concurrence of mathematical formal principles with accidental factors. . . .
>
> The basic connectives are the relevant mathematical-formal principles. The real variables are the unspecified accidental factors. But the connection of the accidents is not a mere mathematical-formal principle. It is the concrete accidental fact of those accidents as thus connected. This suffusion of the connective by the things connected is the most general expression of the genetic-functional character of the universe. . . .
>
> . . . . . .
>
> It follows from this explanation of the algebraic method, that our mathematics and our symbolic logic, as hitherto developed, represent only a minute fragment of its possibilities.[25]

Existence itself is a process of composition and morality is an effort to achieve a composition of compositions on behalf of creative composers. What is essential to morality is a science that investigates the compatibility of systems of value, their tolerance of adaptation to individual novelty, the capacity of individual actualities to infuse concretely particular meaning into abstract and general modes of communal relation, and the bounds of relevance beyond which

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[24] "Analysis of Meaning," p. 137.

[25] Ibid., pp. 137-138.

varying modes of difference no longer make a critical difference.

Individual moments of importance are born and pass away but

> Importance depends on endurance. Endurance is the retention through time of an achievement of value. What endures is identity of pattern, self-inherited. . . . The whole of science revolves round this question of enduring organisms.[26]

For Whitehead the hallmark of a mature science is mathematical method. Physical or natural science applies mathematics to understanding the basis of enduring systems. Moral science must apply it to understanding both the endurance of systems and the means whereby that which endures is susceptible to creative modification by elements within the system.

> . . . When in the distant future the subject has expanded, so as to examine patterns depending on connections other than those of space, number, and quantity . . . I suggest that Symbolic Logic, that is to say, the symbolic examination of pattern with the use of real variables, will become the foundation of aesthetics. From that stage it will proceed to conquer ethics and theology.[27]

It is necessary to develop a formal science of aesthetics first, because the comprehension of the conditions of given consummatory enjoyments is a natural pre-requisite of formal comprehension of their means of enhancement. Also Whitehead regards the subject matter as more obvious. Dewey projects the concrete side of a science of aesthetics. Whitehead

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[26] SMW, p. 173. [27] "Analysis of Meaning," p. 140.

projects its formal side.

Morality is the art of fruitful compromise. But compromise is only intolerable to the intolerant. In the compromise there is an inevitable loss for the subordinated factors. There does remain a final component of tragedy in Whitehead's moral philosophy, as Belaief claims. However, it is not the tragedy of a hopeless quest for the absolute. It is the far lesser tragedy that growth requires some loss. It is outweighed by the anticipation and achievement of assemblages within which established interests discover novel satisfactions. In this manner, sacrifice is transformed into self-fulfilling and willing service.

Lacking a developed moral science, we must rely upon the fund of historical experience and example together with immediate intuition. Here intuition refers to the offerings of our own experience. We have available adaptable generalizations and generous sentiments. More importantly, we have ideals of the highest morality, conceivable in terms of actual experience. For this we are indebted to men like Socrates, Christ, and Ghandi for their own approximations of ideal aims to given circumstance and of circumstance to the ideal. They offer guide lines to long range effort but not moral solutions. The appeal to a general principle is only one beginning of moral decision and not its termination. Effective practical morality would be impossible without such applicable generalizations and would not exist without idealized valuations. Yet it is enhanced by every detail

XUM

considered.

APPENDIX

PREHENSIVE RELATION AND ETERNAL OBJECTS

For an excellent attempt to formalize the various aspects of prehensive relation in Process and Reality, see Lucio Chiaraviglio's article "Whitehead's Theory of Prehensions."[1] He makes an admirable effort at eliminating the troublesome eternal objects and conceptual prehensions in terms of an "eternal nexus," itself defined only with reference to actual entities and a transitive and irreflexive relation, "prehends," such that: any two occasions prehend and are prehended by a third and each individual has at least one immediate successor and predecessor.

Such a move is tempting insofar as Whitehead does assert that 'actual' is a relative term. Unfortunately to make his point Chiaraviglio must employ a "set A of all actual entities." If one presupposes the givenness of all actual entities, then the use of conventional extensional logic is appropriate. Since a nexus is a "public matter of fact," Chiaraviglio's analysis would be useful for characterizing only the past actualities. It is not surprising

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[1]Lucio Chiaraviglio, "Whitehead's Theory of Prehensions," Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, ed. George L. Kline (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 81-92.

XUM

that he describes a universe that is static and determinate and in which actual entities seem to include nothing (his prehensive sets having no terminal members). Chiaraviglio commits just the error of ignoring the "relating" in the present analysis. If the present subject in process of concrescence is not taken into account then the process is lost from Whitehead's universe and at best it begins to resemble McTaggart's.

Actuality is relative only among past occasions. Insofar as the past exists only as embodied in the feelings of a present occasion, this is a deficient sort of actuality. I.e., the past is an actual object stripped of its subjective immediacy. The relations of membership and inclusion, which I describe, have meaning that cannot be divorced from the social realization achieved internally to the occasion. "Inclusion" secures transition from one occasion to the next but "membership" functions to terminate one mode of inclusion and determine another. An individual relates socially all those societies in which he is not included, but only mediately, since the immediate society of which he is a member includes the embodying members of antecedent societies. Societies can grow in membership without change in quality but only through the mediation of novel societies including antecedent societies and their members with them. Thus each social realization is unique.

Such a notion as "potential of inclusion in a member" would require expression in a logic having modal

operators governing relations. Without them one can not make sense of aim or anticipatory prehensive enjoyment. Without these, one simply does not have Whitehead's metaphysics. Whitehead insists that this doctrine of "potentiality" is precisely what is needed to avoid a static absolute universe. It is ironic that Chiaraviglio, in attempting to de-emphasize the role of God and eternal objects, should arrive at the same general effect as Belaief who attempts to make an eternal divinity the only ultimate reality. (Belaief identifies "actuality" with "appearance" in its epistemological sense, concluding that transition is an illusion of the Finite. Whitehead fuses the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of form in holding that the eternal is to be found within the actual and not in some remote reality. An actual occasion "illustrates" the eternal object by including it within itself.) Many Whiteheadians would like to dispose of eternal objects on the grounds of inconsistency with the "ontological principle" which holds that actual entities are the only reasons. However, conceptual feeling can not be reduced to the inheritance of antecedent aim--which has only the status of an efficient motive.

A concept of potentiality is requisite to explain "originative" behavior whether in the form of an acceptive re-creation of antecedent aim or the introduction of novel elements. Chiaraviglio points out Whitehead's assertion that:

> . . . The ultimate facts of immediate actual experience are actual entities, prehensions, and nexus. All else is, for our experience, derivative abstraction.[2]

However, Whitehead always bears close reading. These are the "facts" given for present experience. The given is the past. It is precisely within the present subjective immediacy (and the abstractions of conceptual valuation) that the ground of indeterminacy and potentiality are to be found. I think Whitehead would claim that the assertion of the ontological principle would inevitably lead to static determinism if the asserter excludes from it the actuality of the occasion which is realizing the assertion and its unseen contemporaries. The self-referential character of philosophic statement is itself a function of the status of ideality as a constituent within the present occasion.

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[2] PR, p. 30.

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